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I ARTICLESI
Conundrums Of Armed Conflict:
Criminal Defenses To Violations Of
The Humanitarian Law of War
Matthew Lippman*
Following World War II the Allied Powers pledged to
criminally prosecute those responsible for the commission of War
Crimes.' The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were followed by a
series of national and multinational prosecutions of German and
Japanese civilian and military officials! These judgments estab-
lished the foundation for the development of international criminal
law and elaborated on the elements of criminal responsibility and
proof.3 The most confused and contentious area of international
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Court of Justice. This article is dedicated with love and devotion to Lidia Janus
(June 8, 1958-January 24, 1991).
1. Declaration On German Atrocities (Oct. 30, 1943) VI DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, July 1943-June 1944. 231 (1945).
2. See Matthew Lippman, The Other Nuremberg: American Prosecutions Of
Nazi War Criminals In Occupied Germany, 3 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1
(1992). See also Matthew Lippman., Nuremberg: Forty Five Years Later. 7 CONN.
J. INT'L. L.J. 1 (1991).
3. For background on post-World War II trials of alleged German war
criminals, see Matthew Lippman, Fifty Years After Auschwitz: Prosecutions Of
Nazi Death Camp Defendants, -CONN. J. INT'L._ (forthcoming); Matthew
Lippman, War Crimes Prosecutions Of Nazi Health Professionals And The
2 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:1
criminal law concerns the character and scope of criminal defenses.
Curiously, scant scholarly attention has been devoted to this topic
which has been characterized as "a vast terra incognita."4
Government officials invariably claim to have acted out of
altruism and to have lacked criminal intent. They portray them-
selves as having been propelled by patriotic principle rather than
self-promotion or uncontrolled passion. The vanquished also
invariably claim to be the victims of "selective" or "victor's justice."
The exiguous ethical distinction between legitimate acts of war and
murder lends added weight to these claims.5
Former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara published
a volume in 1995 which outlined the flawed and deficient decisions
which led to American involvement in Vietnam.6 McNamara was
an early enthusiast of the effort and supported the insertion of
combat troops and the initiation of bombing sorties. He feared
that the defeat of South Vietnam would diminish American
prestige and perceived power.7 His ardent advocacy8 resulted in
Vietnam being labelled as "'McNamara's War."' 9
McNamara gradually began to shift his sentiments, arguing in
1965 for the initiation of negotiations concerning the construction
of a neutral South Vietnam."0 He concluded two years later that
Protection Of Human Rights, __T. MARSHAL L. REV. -. (forthcoming); Matthew
Lippman, War Crimes: The Trial Of Nazi Military Leaders, 3 ToURO INT'L &
COMp. L.J. 261 (1995); Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Trials Of German
Industrialists: The 'Other Schindlers,' 9 TEMP. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 101 (1995);
Matthew Lippman, The Nazi Doctors Trial And The International Prohibition On
Medical Involvement In Torture, 15 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 395 (1993);
Matthew Lippman, They Shoot Lawyers Don't They?: Law In The Third Reich
And The Global Threat To The Independence Of The Judiciary, 23 CAL. W. INT'L.
L.J. 257 (1993); Matthew Lippman, Nuremberg, 6 LAW IN CONTEXT 28 (1988);
Matthew Lippman, The Denaturalization Of Nazi War Criminals In The United
States: Is Justice Being Served?, 7 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 169 (1985); Matthew
Lippman, The Trial Of Adolf Eichmann And The Protection Of Universal Human
Rights Under International Law, 5 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1982). See generally,
Matthew Lippman, Towards An International Criminal Court, 3 SAN DIEGO J. 1
(1995); Matthew Lippman, War Crimes: The My Lai Massacre And The Vietnam
War, 1 SAN DIEGO J.J. 295 (1993).
4. Albin Eser, Defences in War Crimes Trials, 24 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 201,
202 (1984) (emphasis omitted).
5. See id.
6. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, IN RETROSPECT: THE TRAGEDY AND LESSONS
OF VIETNAM 34 (1995) (McNamara discussed eleven seminal decisions).
7. See id. at 106-07.
8. See id. at 148, 180.
9. Id. at 118. McNamara's measuring success through the accumulation of
"body counts" became a metaphor for America's misguided mission. Id. at 48.
10. McNAMARA, supra note 6, at 181, 204.
CONUNDRUMS OF ARMED CONFLICT
the United States was careening towards a "'major national
disaster'." and called for the cessation of bombing 2 and the
freezing of force levels. 3 McNamara was now convinced that a
settlement would neither threaten United States military credibility
nor undermine America's perceived commitment to its allies. 4
President Lyndon Johnson rejected this analysis and reassigned
McNamara to the World Bank in 1968."5
McNamara's recent recantation was rejected by critics who
considered the former Defense Secretary to be a war criminal. He
was criticized for having muzzled his misgivings so as to maintain
his Pentagon position. Others praised McNamara for placing
patriotism over principle.
What is the appropriate response of a high-ranking official who
is confronted with illicit international conduct? Was McNamara
justified in remaining in office in order to argue against escalation?
Could he reasonably have believed that his muffled dissent would
be effective? Should McNamara have intervened to halt the
bombing of civilian targets? Would McNamara's resignation have
had an impact on American policy? Did McNamara's dissent
mitigate his earlier support for the war? What was the scope of
McNamara's liability for criminal acts committed by American
troops in Vietnam? Should a governmental official be held liable
for acts which he or she believed were required in self-defense or
in furtherance of the national interest? Are decision-makers
immunized from international penal liability stemming from official
acts? Underlying these questions is the conflict between principles
and patriotism. At what point should the dictates of conscience
take precedence over the claims of domestic doctrine? Is it realistic
to require individuals to risk life and limb in order to avoid
criminal culpability?16
These conundrums recur in the consideration of international
criminal defenses. This Article outlines the elements, scope, and
11. Id. at 271.
12. Id. at 153.
13. Id. at 270-71.
14. Id. at 306-09.
15. MCNAMARA, supra note 6, at 311. President Johnson honored McNamara
by awarding him the Medal of Freedom. Id. at 316.
16. See Ronald Steel, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam by
Robert S. McNamara with Brian Van De Mark, THE NEW REPUBLIC 34 (1995)
(book review). See generally James C. Thomson Jr., Getting Out And Speaking
Out, 13 FOREIGN POLICY 49 (1973-1974). The debate over the international
legality of the Vietnam conflict is discussed in Matthew Lippman, Vietnam: A
Twenty Year Retrospective, 11 DICK. J. INT'L L. 325 (1993).
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underlying philosophy of various core criminal defenses, including
superior orders, necessity, vicarious liability, good motive and
reprisals against hostages. Some summary comments on the
contemporary code of conflict are offered in the concluding section.
I. Superior Orders
A. World War I
During World War I, scholars debated whether German
combatants should be permitted to rely on the superior orders
defense. 7 Commander Sir Graham Bower of the Royal Navy
argued in 1915 that submarine officers and crews sinking merchant
vessels should not be held liable: "the blame does not rest with
them, but with their superiors." s According to Bower, the
military could not function under circumstances in which "every
subordinate ... [was] permitted or required to constitute himself
a judge of the legality or morality of the orders received from his
superiors.... To make him responsible ... [would] strike at the
foundations of discipline in every army or navy in the world.'
9
Low-level combatants were ill-equipped to evaluate the context of
a command. An order might appear invalid but in fact be legally
justified as an act of reprisal.2' The extension of criminal culpabil-
17. The trial of Peter von Hagenbach is commonly viewed as the first
international war crimes trial in which the superior orders defense was raised.
Duke Charles of Burgundy appointed Hagenbach as Governor of Breisach in
order to carry out a harsh and severe regime. Hagenbach was tried by a twenty-
eight judge panel representing Alsatian and Upper Rhenanian towns, Berne from
the Swiss Confederation and Austria. The panel rejected Hagenbach's superior
orders defense. See GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, II INTERNATIONAL LAW As
APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 462-66 (1968). For a
historical sketch of superior orders in ancient and medieval law, see Nico Keijzer,
A Plea For The Defence Of Superior Orders, 8 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 78, 80-83
(1978). The trial of Confederate Captain Henry Wirz before a United States
military commission also is pointed to as an important milestone in the develop-
ment of the superior orders defense. See The Trial Of Captain Henry Wirz For
Conspiracy And Murder, Washington, D.C. 1865, 8 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS 657
(1917).
18. Graham Bower, The Laws Of War: Prisoners Of War And Reprisals, I
TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS Soc'Y 15, 24 (1916).
19. Id. at 25.
20. Id. An officer also may possess knowledge which is not available to a
subordinate. A merchant ship, for example, may be transporting military troops
or munitions. Id. Bower noted that Section Four of the Naval Discipline Act of
1866 imposed the death penalty for a failure to carry out superior orders. Id. at
24-25.
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ity would condemn soldiers to the often conflicting commands of
domestic and international law.2
Commander Bower's argument appeared consistent with
Anglo-American military manuals which insulated subordinates
from liability.22 The British Manual of Military Law of 1914
provided that "[m]embers of armed forces who commit ...
violations of the recognized rules of warfare as are ordered by their
Government or their commander are not war criminals, and cannot,
therefore, be punished by the enemy."' American military law
was modelled on the British manual. Article 366 stated:
[i]ndividuals of the armed forces will not be punished ... in
case they are committed under the orders or sanction of their
government or commanders. The commanders ordering the
commission of such acts, or under whose authority they are
When any action or any service is commanded, every person
subject to this Act who shall presume to delay or discourage the
said action or service upon any pretence whatsoever, or in the
presence or vicinity of the enemy shall desert his post or sleep
upon his watch, shall suffer death or such other punishment as
is hereinafter mentioned.
Bower, supra note 18, 24-25, citing The Naval Discipline Act of 1866.
21. See James W. Garner, Punishment Of Offenders Against The Laws And
Customs Of War, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 70, 84-85 (1920). Garner noted that absent
the superior orders defense, a combatant who lacks criminal intent may be subject
to punishment. He conversely recognized that a maliciously motivated soldier
might rely on the defense. Id. at 84-85.
22.- See id. at 84-87.
23. See Guenter Lewy, Superior Orders, Nuclear Warfare, And The Dictates
Of Conscience: The Dilemma Of Military Obedience In The Atomic Age, 55 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 3, 6 (1961). The British military code of 1715 stated that
combatants owed unconditional obedience to a superior officer and that
disobedience was punishable by death. In 1749 the language was modified to
require obedience to lawful orders. See H. Lauterpacht, The Law Of Nations And
The Punishment Of War Crimes, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 58, 69, n.1 (1944). Article
443 of the 1914 edition of the Manual of Military Law 'reverted to the early
English rule of unconditional obedience and non-liability for violations of
international law committed pursuant to superior orders:
Members of armed forces who commit ... violations of the
recognized rules of warfare as are ordered by their government or
by their commander are not war criminals and cannot therefore be
punished by the enemy. He may punish the officials or commanders
responsible for such order if they fall into his hands; but otherwise
he may only resort to the other means of obtaining redress.
Quoted in Hugh H.L. Bellot, War Crimes: Their Prevention And Punishment, II
TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SoC'Y 31, 46 (1917).
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committed by their troops, may be punished by the belligerents
into whose hands they may fall.24
In contrast, Hugh H. L. Bellot of Oxford argued that the
British provision "makes wastepaper" of the humanitarian law of
war.' Responsibility would be shifted upwards in the military
hierarchy until only the Kaiser remained liable. Prosecution of a
head of state remained legally and politically precarious. Paralysis
in prosecution and punishment would be the end result.26 Howev-
er, the imposition of criminal culpability on combatants who
violated the humanitarian law of war in response to superior orders
might nevertheless lead to "some mitigation in the present conduct
of the war. No man likes to fight with a rope round his neck."27
Bellot's views were consistent with the common law which did
not recognize superior orders as a defense to a civilly actionable or
criminal act.28 In Little v. Barreme, Chief Justice John Marshall
observed that "instructions cannot change the nature of the
24. United States Army Rules of Land Warfare (1914), quoted in Gordon
Battle, The Trials Before The Leipsic Supreme Court Of Germans Accused Of War
Crimes, 8 VA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1921). Article 64 of the French criminal code
provided that an act which was carried out through threat of force did not carry
criminal liability. Some commentators contended that this would excuse criminal
acts committed by combatants under the threat of force. Others argued that this
was not applicable to combat. Id. at 24-25. A war crimes reform commission
recommended the extension of the superior orders defense for radio operators
during armed conflict. See Commission of Jurists, Report Upon The Revision Of
The Rules Of Warfare, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 11, art. 12 (Supp. 1938).
25. Bellot, supra note 23, at 46.
26. Id. "It must be noted that this Article enjoys no statutory force or official
authority, and is declared to be only intended for the guidance of officers in the
execution of their duty." Id. The British Manual of Military Law curiously
retained Article 11 which provided that an inferior is justified in questioning, or
even refusing to execute, an obviously illegal order. Id. at 48.
27. Id. at 50.
Upon what ground are the members of the enemy naval
and military forces to be exempted from punishment for the
commission of illegal acts under the orders of superior com-
mand? Can it seriously be contended that a German subaltern
who commands his men to shoot batches of non-combatants
without trial is not a war criminal because he acted under
orders from headquarters? Is the officer ... who sent to their
death over 1,200 non-combatants on board the Lusitania to be
treated when captured as a prisoner of war because he obeyed
the orders of the German Admiralty? In both cases these
officers knew ... they were committing violations of well-
known usages of warfare....
Bellot, supra note 23, at 49.
28. See Garner, supra note 21, at 85. For a brief discussion of British
precedents see Battle, supra note 24, at 20-22.
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transaction, nor legalize an act which, without those instructions,
would have been a plain trespass."29 Chief Justice Roger Taney
reiterated this view in Mitchell v. Harmony and noted that "it can
never be maintained that a military officer can justify himself for
doing an unlawful act, by producing the order of his superior. The
order may palliate, but it cannot justify."3  Qualms about the
consequences of subordinate liability were occasionally expressed.
The Supreme Court observed, in dicta, in Martin v. Mott that
prompt and unhesitating obedience to orders is indispensable.
... [E]very delay, and every obstacle to an efficient and
immediate compliance necessarily tend to jeopard [sic] the
public interests. While subordinate officers or soldiers are
pausing to consider whether they ought to obey... the hostile
enterprise may be accomplished ... without resistance. Such
a course would be subversive of all discipline ......
The judiciary also ameliorated the harshness of the common
law rule in criminal cases by recognizing the superior orders
defense where a defendant carried out a seemingly lawful order
without malicious intent.2
The conflicting views of these scholars and jurists stymied the
fifteen member commission appointed by the Paris Peace Confer-
ence to inquire into the criminal culpability of the Axis Powers. 33
The commission adopted the opaque position that "[i]t will be for
29. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177 (1804) (captain of frigate
capturing Danish ship pursuant to Executive Branch letter broadly construing a
Congressional statute).
30. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 149 (1851) (seizure of
property belonging to an American commercial trader by the United States
military during Mexican War).
.31. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 12, 19 (1827).
32. United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 653, 658 (Case No. 15,495) (1813). The
leading early twentieth century English authority was R. V. Smith, (1900) 17 S.C.
561, 567-69 (Cape of Good Hope) quoted and cited in L.C. Green, The Defence
Of Superior Orders In The Modern Law Of Armed Conflict, 31 ALBERTA L. REV.
320, 324 (1993).
I think it is a safe rule to lay down that if a soldier honestly
believes that he is doing his duty in obeying the commands of
his superior, and if the orders are not so manifestly illegal that
he must or ought to have known that they were unlawful, the
private soldier would be protected by the order of his superior
officer.
Id.
33. See Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on
Enforcement of Penalties, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (1920).
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the court to decide whether a plea of superior orders is sufficient
to acquit the person charged from responsibility."34
Germany resisted turning over those accused of war crimes to
the Allied Powers for prosecution. However, the Reich finally suc-
cumbed to political pressure and brought thirty-three combatants
to trial before the Penal Senate of the Reichsgericht at Leipzig.
35
Three cases raised the issue of superior orders.
In the earliest case, Karl Neumann was a First Lieutenant in
the German Navy and Commander of the submarine U.C. 67.
Neumann's vessel sighted, torpedoed, and sank the hospital ship
Dover Castle on May 26, 1917, killing six members of the crew.
36
Neumann claimed to have been carrying out the orders of the
German Admiralty. The Admiralty issued a memorandum in 1917
that hospital ships traversing the Mediterranean were being utilized
as military transports and were to be regarded as vessels of war.37
The court concluded.that Neumann had relied on the memorandum
in launching what he regarded as a legitimate act of reprisal." In
addition, the court determined that Neumann was entitled to rely
on the superior orders defense.
The Admiralty Staff was the highest service authority
over the accused. He [Neumann] was in duty bound
to obey their orders in service matters. So far as he
did that, he was free from criminal responsibility.
Therefore he cannot be held responsible for sinking
the hospital ship Dover Castle according to orders. 39
34. Id. at 117.
35. Battle, supra note 24, at 4-6.
36. Judgment In Case Of Commander Karl Neumann (1921), 16 AM. J.INT'L
L. 704, 705-06 (1922) [hereinafter Hospital Ship Dover Castle].
37. Id. at 706. Submarine U.C. 67 initially torpedoed the Dover Castle. An
accompanying destroyer rescued the crew as well as the sick and wounded. Ninety
minutes later a second torpedo was fired which sunk the hospital ship. Id at 705-
06. The Military Penal Code adopted by the Reichstag in 1872 established that in
instances in which a penal law was violated through the execution of the order of
a superior,"'the obeying subordinate shall be punished as accomplice (1) if he went
beyond the order given to-him, or (2) if he knew that the order of the superior
concerned an act which aimed at a civil or military crime or offense."' Lewy,
supra note 23, at 7.
38. Hospital Ship Dover Castle, supra note 36, at 707-08. Neumann allegedly
also had received reports of hospital ships carrying military men and munitions
from his comrades. Id. at 707.
39. Id. at 707.
It is a military principle that the subordinate is bound to obey
the orders of his superiors. The duty of obedience is of
considerable importance from the point of view of the criminal
law. Its consequence is that, when the execution of a service
CONUNDRUMS OF ARMED CONFLICT
Unlike the Neumann case, in Llandovery Castle the German
court refused to extend the superior orders defense to clearly illicit
commands. The English hospital ship Llandovery Castle was
torpedoed and sunk off the Irish Coast by German U-Boat 86 on
June 27, 1918. Only twenty-four of 258 survived.'
First Lieutenant Helmut Patzig commanded the German
submarine and was aware that the Llandovery Castle was outside
the attack area announced by the German command. He neverthe-
less erroneously assumed that American airmen were on the
hospital ship and launched a torpedo assault. The boat sank within
roughly ten minutes, permitting only a portion of the crew to crowd
into three lifeboats.41 The submarine surfaced and approached
one of the lifeboats. The occupants protested that the Llandovery
Castle was carrying neither military men nor munitions. Patzig
nevertheless ordered Chief Boatswain's Mate Meissner to fire at
the lifeboats, two of which were sunk. The defendants, First
Lieutenants Ludwig Dithmar and John Boldt, remained on the
deck and relayed the distance and position of the lifeboats.42
The Court ruled that international law prohibited attacks on
unarmed enemies and shipwrecked individuals at sea.43 Dithmar
order involves an offence against the criminal law, the superior
giving the order is alone responsible.
Id.
The German Court noted that a subordinate who has acted in conformity with
orders may be punished in those instances in which the individual has gone beyond
the scope of his orders or possessed knowledge that he had been ordered to
commit a criminal act. The Court noted as to the former factor that the hospital
ship was accompanied by two warships and it was impossible to issue a warning.
Neumann did not act with particular brutality and made every effort to rescue
those on board. Neumann also believed that he was engaged in a legitimate
reprisal. Id.
40. Judgment In Case Of Lieutenants Dithmar And Boldt (July 16, 1921), 16
AM. J. INT'L L. 708, 709-10 (1922) [hereinafter Hospital Ship Llandovery Castle].
41. Id. at 710-12.
42. Id. at 710, 719. Patzig attempted to conceal the incident. He made no
entry in the vessel's log-book, altered the sailing chart and extracted promises of
silence from the crew. Patzig's motive in ordering the attack on the lifeboats
presumably was to eliminate the witnesses. Id. at 716-17.
43. Id. at 721.
The killing of enemies in war is in accordance with the will of
the State that makes war.., only in so far as such killing is in
accordance with the conditions and limitations imposed by the
laws of nations. The fact that his deed is a violation of
international law must be well-known to the doer, apart from
acts of carelessness, in which ignorance is a sufficient excuse.
In examining the question of the existence of this knowledge,
the ambiguity of many of the rules of international law, as well
1996]
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and Boldt were found to have freely followed orders and assisted
in firing at the lifeboats. However, the Reichsgericht found that the
defendants did not harbor a deliberate intent to kill and convicted
the two of being accessories to murder.' Both were sentenced to
four years imprisonment. This relatively light punishment was
premised on the mitigating circumstance that the defendants had
been trained to obey orders.
45
It is certainly to be urged in favor of the military subordinates
that they are under no obligation to question the order of their
superior officer and they can count upon its legality. But no
such confidence can be held to exist if such an order is univer-
sally known to everybody, including ... the accused, to be
without any doubt ... against the law. This happens only in
rare and exceptional cases. But this ... was precisely one of
them, for in the present instance it was perfectly clear to the
accused that killing defenseless people in the life-boats could be
nothing else but a breach of the law. They should, therefore,
have refused to obey. As they did not do so, they must be
punished.'
The superior orders defense was also invoked by Major Benno
Crusius in the Stenger case.47 Crusius alleged that General Karl
as the actual circumstances of the case, must be borne in mind,
because in war time decisions of great importance have
frequently to be made on very insufficient material....
See, supra note 40, at 721.
44. Id. The panel determined that Patzig had ordered the firing on the
lifeboats in a "state of excitement" and that the execution of the deed cannot be
characterized as "deliberate." Id. The Court rejected the contention that had the
defendants refused to obey the order they would have faced retribution. On the
contrary, a refusal to cooperate would have prevented Patzig from carrying out the
order. Id. at 722.
45. Id. at 723. The court did emphasize that the defendants' deed had cast "a
dark shadow on the German fleet, and ... on the submarine weapon which did
so much in the fight for the Fatherland." Id.
46. See, supra note 40, at 722. Vice Admiral (retired) von Trotha and Judge
Toepffer (adviser to the Navy on the law during the war) testified that in the
German fleet the impression prevailed that a naval officer who exceeded the
bounds of the law in the course of a fight was not thereby rendered liable to
punishment. The officer might, however, be responsible to his superior. The court
stated that this related to the view of the high command and there was no
evidence that this was the perception of the accused. These killings were "not
done in the course of a fight, neither in an attack on the enemy nor in defence
against him." Id.
47. See CLAUD MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS: AN AcCOUNT OF THE WAR
CRIMINALS TRIALS AND A STUDY OF GERMAN MENTALITY 151 (1921)
(discussing judgment in the case of Lieutenant General Karl Stenger and Major
Benno Crusius).
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Stenger had ordered the execution of enemy prisoners and
wounded captured on the battlefield. Crusius was charged with
passing on Stenger's order as well as with intentionally killing
several (at least seven) French prisoners and wounded.8 Stenger
and his subordinate officers testified that Crusius had misconstrued
the General's remarks. They uniformly claimed that Stenger had
casually mentioned that those wounded who concealed their
weapons and then attacked German troops should be shot.49
Crusius's misunderstanding of the facts and failure to grasp the
illicit nature of Stengel's alleged order
seems only comprehensible in view of the mental condition of
the accused .... [H]e was intensely excited and suffered from
nervous complaints. . . [T]hese complaints did not preclude the
free exercise of his will, but were nevertheless likely to affect
his powers of comprehension and judgment... . Had he applied
the attention which was to be expected ... [then] what was
immediately clear to many of his men would not have escaped
him, namely, that the indiscriminate killing of all wounded was
a monstrous war measure, in no way to be justified.'
The court convicted Crusius of "'killing through negligence.' 51 He
was sentenced to two years in prison. 2
In summary, the German Supreme Court's judgments
recognized that a defendant might rely on the superior orders
defense in those instances in which he harbored a good faith belief
in the legality of an otherwise illicit command. Such a claim was
barred in those instances in which the order contravened a
"simple" and "universally-known" rule of international law. A
combatant carrying out such a command was presumed to possess
48. Id. at 152.
49. Id. at 154. The court ruled that the protection afforded to the wounded
does not extend to those who take up arms again and renew the fight. Id. at 155.
50. Id. at 160.
51. Mullins, supra note 47, at 161. The German Penal Code provides that
"'there is no criminal act if the doer at the time of his act was in a state of
unconsciousness, or if his mind was deranged so that there could be no free
volition on his part."' Id. at 165. The court determined that Crusius suffered from
a degenerative mental disease and by the afternoon had suffered "a complete
mental derangement excluding beyond any doubt all criminal responsibility.. 
Id. at 166.
52. Id. at 167. The court considered in mitigation that Crusius possessed a
stellar moral and service record and suffered from a mental defect. The judges
also speculated that General Stengel may have encouraged his subordinates to kill
prisoners and wounded enemy combatants. Id. at 167-68.
1996]
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criminal intent.53 A soldier's subjective and false belief in the
existence of an illegal order also was not adjudged exculpatory.'
The superior orders defense was likewise inapplicable in those
instances in which a subordinate independently and intentionally.
exceeded the scope of a criminal command.55 The fact that a
combatant had acted in response to an illegal order, or believed in
good faith that such an order had been issued, was considered in
mitigation of punishment.56 Combatants were not charged with a
duty to investigate or question an order and were able to rely on
the facial validity of a command. 7
These principles balanced the existing tensions within Anglo-
American law. 8 Yet, the defense remained perniciously political.
As a case in point, in July 1916 the German courts rejected the
superior orders plea of British subject Captain Charles Fryatt who
had attempted to ram a German submarine in accordance with the
British admiralty's instructions. Fryatt was subsequently execut-
ed.59
B. Nuremberg
The promise of Allied prosecution of German war criminals
stimulated scholars to propose various practices and procedures for
the prospective Nuremberg tribunal.' The respondeat superior
defense was the subject of comment and criticism. At a meeting of
the American Society of International Law in 1943 Professor Edwin
Dickinson observed that "if we permit the plea to get out of hand,
53. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
58. See Bellot, supra note 23, at 46-50.
59. See James Brown Scott, The Execution Of Captain Fryatt, 10 AM. J. INT'L
L. 865 (1916). These decisions of the German courts in reference to submarine
warfare varied from a treaty on submarine warfare which had been drafted in 1922
by the Washington Conference On The Limitation Of Armament. The unratified
treaty abrogated the superior orders defense. See A Treaty on Submarines and
Noxious Gases in Warfare, 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, art. 3 (Supp. 1922) (never
ratified). But the superior orders defense was not incorporated into subsequent
treaties regulating submarine warfare. See Proce's Verbal Relating to the Rules
of Submarine Warfare Set Forth In Party IV Of the Treaty of London on Apr. 22,
1930 reprinted in 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 137 (Supp. 1937). See also International
Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament (Apr. 22, 1930), T.S.
No. 1 (1931).
60. See Sheldon Glueck, By What Tribunal Shall War Offenders Be Tried? 56
HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1943).
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as we did after the last war, we shall be confronted with the
reductio ad absurdum that the only war criminals available for
punishment are Hitler and Tojo, neither of whom is likely to be
available ... when the victory is finally won.",6' Another com-
mentator noted that the superior orders plea resulted in more
severe punishments for combatants who had impulsively or
independently violated the law of war than for those whose acts
were part of a deliberate design to disregard the law of war. 2
Most argued for a nuanced approach which limited the defense to
orders which were reasonably believed to be consistent with
international law or which were carried out as a result of duress or
coercion.6' This compromise centered culpability on criminal
intent in order to prevent the principle of respondeat superior from
limiting "the effectiveness of the law in a manner which may be
rightly regarded as a perversion of justice."'
Still, others objected to condemning combatants to prison for
the "sins of their superiois."65 Perhaps the most prominent
proponent of the superior orders defense was Professor Hans
Kelsen who invoked the interests in military discipline and
efficiency. He asserted that the abrogation of respondeat superior
would impose an inordinate burden on combatants; orders
emanating from high-echelon officials were colored by command
and were rarely in clear contravention of the code of war. The
intricacies of international law made it inconceivable for a conscript
61. Charles Cheney Hyde, Punishment Of War Criminals, 37 PROC. AM. Soc'y
INT'L L. 39, 49 (1943) (comment by Edwin Dickinson) (emphasis omitted). But
see George Manner, The Legal Nature And Punishment Of Criminal Acts Of
Violence Contrary To The Laws Of War, 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 407 (1943).
62. See Jacob Berger, The Legal Nature Of War Crimes And The Problem Of
Superior Command, 38 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1203, 1207 (1944).
63. See Lauterpacht, supra note 23, at 73.
[A] person obeying an obviously unlawful order the refusal to
obey which would not put him in immediate jeopardy, will not
be able to shield himself behind the excuse of superior orders.
At the other end, a person obeying, in an isolated case, an
illegal order which is not on the face of it unlawful and
disobedience to which would expose him to the full rigours of
summary military discipline, may rely on the plea of superior
orders. There will be a variety of intermediate situations
between these two extremes.
Id. at 73.
64. Id.
65. Ernst J. Cohn, The Problem Of War Crimes To-day, 26 TRANSACTIONS
GROTIUS SOC'Y 125, 144 (1941).
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to determine whether an act constituted a delict or a reprisal.66
Kelsen concluded that "It]he idea of justice ... is certainly not
favorable to the prosecution of individuals who committed war
crimes in response to a superior command."67
Paving the way for the weakening of the superior orders
defense was Professor L. Oppenheim of Cambridge who co-
authored the British military manual's provision on superior orders.
This section reflected his 1912 text which opined that "[i]f members
of the armed forces commit violations by order of their Govern-
ment, they are not war criminals and may not be punished by the
enemy."68  Oppenheim's position was qualified in the manual's
sixth edition. The "major principle" he propounded was that
"members of the armed forces are bound to obey lawful orders...
and... cannot ... escape liability if, in obedience to a command,
they commit acts which both violate unchallenged rules of warfare
and outrage the general sentiment of humanity."69
66. Hans Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law
with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 CAL. L. REV. 531,
556-58 (1943).
67. Id. at 558. The London International Assembly in 1943 adopted a
resolution calling for the abrogation of the superior orders defense. Such
commands might be considered as a defense or in mitigation in those instances in
which the accused acted under duress. Such exculpating or extenuating
circumstances were not to apply in the case of heinous acts or in those instances
in which the accused was a member of an organization engaged in criminal
conduct. The International Commission for Penal Reconstruction And Develop-
ment endorsed a memorandum drafted by Professor Lauterpacht and adopted the
view that superior orders should be available to an individual obeying an order in
good faith which was not unlawful on its face. See UNITED NATIONS WAR
CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 275-76 (1948).
[hereinafter UN WAR CRIMES COMMISSION]. The United Nations War Crimes
Commission, following extended debate and deliberation, declined to propound
a principle or rule on superior orders. The Commission explained that the
diversity of domestic rules and the complexity of factual scenarios mitigated
against any single standard. But, the Commission did maintain that the "'mere
fact of having acted in obedience to the orders of a superior does not of itself
relieve a person who has committed a war crime from responsibility."' Id. at 280.
68. L. OPPENHEIM, II INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE: DISPUTES WAR
AND NEUTRALITY 310 (2d ed. 1912) (emphasis omitted). See also L. OPPENHEIM,
II INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE: DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY 410
(Arnold D. McNair ed., 4th ed. 1926).
69. L. OPPENHEIM, II INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE: DISPUTES, WAR
AND NEUTRALITY 453 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 6th ed. 1944). The text qualified the
rule by noting that a court would likely consider in exculpation the duty of
obedience, the requirement of swift action, the ambiguity of rules and the fact that
a war crime may be undertaken as an act of reprisal. Id. at 452-53. "To limit
liability to the person responsible for the order may frequently amount ... to
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The British War Office finally abrogated the superior orders
defense in April 1944.70 The United States military followed suit
in November 1944, one year prior to the Nuremberg trial, but did
recognize that superior orders could be considered "in determining
culpability either by way of defense or in mitigation of punish-
ment."71 However, Germany persisted in prohibiting the superior
orders defense. Josef Goebbels declared that the Reich considered
Allied pilots to be war criminals and that "'[iut is not provided in
any military law that a soldier in the case of a despicable crime is
exempt from punishment because he blames his superior, especially
if the orders of the latter are in evident contradiction to all human
morality and every international usage of warfare.' 72
concentrating responsibility on the head of the State whose accountability... is
controversial." Id. at 453. Professor Oppenheim had been responsible for the
superior orders provision which appeared as Chapter XIV of the sixth edition in
the British Manual of Military Law published in 1914. The doctrine of subordinate
immunity survived for roughly thirty years. The Birkenhead Committee of
Enquiry on War Crimes, established by the British Government in 1918 concluded
that the statement in the Military Manual lacked authority and that it was the duty
of a soldier to unquestioningly obey an order which he received. See N.C.H.
Dunbar, Some Aspects Of The Problem Of Superior Orders In The Law Of War,
63 JURID. REV. 234, 242-43 (1951).
70. See Lewy, supra note 23, at 6. The revised Article 443 provided that:
The fact that a rule of warfare has been violated in pursuance
of an order of the belligerent Government or of an individual
belligerent commander does not deprive the act in question of
its character as a war crime; ... members of the armed forces
are bound to obey lawful orders only and.., cannot therefore
escape liability if, in obedience to a command, they commit acts
which both violate unchallenged rules of warfare and outrage
the general sentiments of humanity.
Quoted in Lewy, supra note 23, at 6.
71. Id. Article 345.1 provided that:
Individuals and organizations who violate the accepted laws and
customs of war may be punished therefor. However, the fact
that the acts complained of were done pursuant to order of a
superior or government sanction may be taken into consider-
ation in determining culpability, either by way of defense or in
mitigation of punishment. The person giving such orders may
also be punished.
Quoted in Lewy, supra note 23, at 6.
72. Quoted in Lewy, supra note 23, at 7. Article 47 of the German Military
Code (Oct. 10, 1947) only modestly differed from the provision applicable during
World War I. See supra note 37.
(1) If a criminal law is violated through the execution of an order in
a matter pertaining to the service, the superior giving the order is
alone responsible. The subordinate who obeys such an order
however is punishable as a participant
1. if he has exceeded the order given him, or
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The Allied Powers convened in London to formulate the
guiding principles for the prosecution of Nazi War Criminals.73
Justice Robert H. Jackson, in a memorandum to President
Roosevelt, noted that the immunity accorded to heads of state, as
well as the superior orders defense, impeded the imposition of
criminal liability: "It will be noticed that the combination of these
two doctrines means that nobody is responsible. Society as
modernly organized cannot tolerate so broad an area of official
irresponsibility."74 Jackson conceded that superior orders should
be available to a conscript serving on a firing squad. But, he
argued that the defense should not apply to individuals who possess
discretion as to whether to obey an order or who voluntarily enlist
in a criminal organization. Jackson advocated authorizing the
Nuremberg Tribunal to determine on a case-by-case basis whether
superior orders should "constitute a defense or merely extenuating
circumstances, or perhaps carry no weight at all."75
The American draft gave the Tribunal discretion to determine
in each instance whether superior orders should be considered as
a defense or a mitigating factor.76 General I.T. Nikitchenko
queried, as a matter of principle, whether major Nazi leaders
should be permitted to raise the superior orders defense.77 Sir
David Maxwell Fyfe of the United Kingdom argued that the
2. if he knew that the order of the superior concerned an
act, which had in view a general or military major or minor
crime.
(2) If the guilt of the subordinate is trivial, he may be exempted
from punishment.
Mitchell Franklin, Sources of International Law Relating to Sanctions Against War
Criminals, 36 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 153, 162-63 (1945).
73. See REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
To THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS (1945) [hereinafter
JACKSON REPORT].
74. Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson, June 6, 1945, in JACKSON
REPORT, supra note 73, at 42, 47.
75. Id.
76. See American Draft of Definitive Proposal, Presented to Foreign Ministers
at San Francisco, April 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 73 at art. 11, at 22,
24.
The fact that a defendant acted pursuant to an order of a
superior or government sanction shall not constitute an absolute
defense but may be considered either in defense or in mitiga-
tion of punishment if the tribunal before which the charges are
being tried determines that justice so requires.
Id. at 22.
77. See Minutes of Conference Session of July 24, 1945 in JACKSON REPORT,
supra note 73, at 360, 367.
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application of the defense should remain within the discretion of
the Tribunal: "Suppose someone said he was threatened to be shot
if he did not carry out Hitler's orders. If he wasn't too important,
the Tribunal might let him off with his life."78 Justice Jackson
noted that the superior orders defense would be helpful in
clarifying the culpability of members of criminal organizations. 79
Sir David then received unanimous support for a modified proposal
which he described as representing international doctrine. This
provision provided that superior orders should "not be an absolute
defense."" ° Article Eight of the Nuremberg Charter accordingly
provided that "[t]he fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to [an]
order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from
responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment
if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires."81  Judge
Robert Falco of France presciently pointed out that the provision
neglected to enumerate the grounds for mitigation of punish-
ment.
82
The Nuremberg defendants contended that the superior orders
defense was universally recognized in those instances in which a
defendant lacked knowledge of an order's illegality. They argued
that this should be broadened since "[o]rders can ... place the
perpetrator under a state of compulsion, and for that reason
exclude guilt. ' 83 In rebuttal, the chief French prosecutor, M.
Francois de Menthon, argued that the superior orders defense does
not encompass the execution of orders whose "illegality is manifest
.... [A]ny other solution would.., be unacceptable, for it would
testify to the impotence of all repressive policy."' The American
prosecutor, Justice Robert H. Jackson, noted that the defendants
had "destroyed free government in Germany and now plead to be
excused from responsibility because they became slaves. They are
in the position of the fictional boy who murdered his father and
78. Id. at 368.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Agreement For The Prosecution And Punishment Of The Major War
Criminals Of The European Axis Powers And Charter Of The International
Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 8, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter
Nuremberg Charter].
82. JACKSON REPORT, supra note 73, at 368.
83. XXI TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNA-
TIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 626 (1948) (argument of Horst Pelckmann).
84. V TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 418 (1948).
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mother and then pleaded for leniency because he was an or-
phan. 85
The judgment stressed that the core concept behind the
Nuremberg Charter was that individuals possess international duties
which transcend their domestic obligations. An individual who
adheres to the authority of the State "cannot obtain immunity...
if the state in authorizing [the] action moves outside its competence
under international law."86 The Tribunal noted that this criminal
culpability was qualified by the superior orders provision of the
Nuremberg Charter which, according to the judicial panel, was in
conformity with "the law of all nations."' The Tribunal interpret-
ed Article Eight to mean
[t]hat a soldier [who] was ordered to kill or torture in violation
of the international law of war has never been recognized as a
defense to such acts of brutality, though, as the Charter here
provides, the order may be urged in mitigation of the punish-
ment. The true test, which is found in varying degrees in the
criminal law of most nations, is not the existence of the order,
but whether moral choice was in fact possible.' 8
This test applies to grave crimes (war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and crimes against peace) and, in accordance with
Article Eight of the Charter, stipulates that superior orders may
only be considered in mitigation. The issue of moral choice
presumably depends upon whether an individual was compelled to
carry out an illicit order under threat of serious bodily harm or
death.
Some questions remain. What factors will mitigate punish-
ment? What is the test for determining actual or constructive
knowledge of an order's illegality? Is subjective good faith a
defense? What of commands which are not clearly criminal, such
as those camouflaged as reprisals? Is there a requirement of
proportionality between the harm inflicted and the harm threat-
ened? Must the threat be reasonable, immediate and imminent?
What amount of harm may individuals inflict on others in order to
safeguard themselves or their families? How is the balance to be
85. XIX TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNA-
TIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 424 (1948).
86. XXII TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 466 (1948) [hereinafter NUREMBERG JUDGMENT].
87. Id.
88. NUREMBERG JUDGMENT, supra note 86, at 466.
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struck in cases of commands which call for damage to property or
provisions?
Ultimately, the superior orders defense had limited relevance
in the disposition of the twenty-two high-level defendants prosecut-
ed at Nuremberg. Most had invented and issued the Nazis'
criminal policies and practices.89  The Tribunal did however
explicitly address the superior orders defense in the disposition of
General Alfred Jodl.
Jodl was Chief of the Operations Staff of the High Command.
He was subordinate to Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, but reported
directly to Hitler. Jodl helped to formulate orders and signed
orders issued by Hitler which required the killing of Russian
combatants without trial, the evacuation and destruction of
northern Norway and the decimation of Leningrad and Moscow.
He claimed that as a military man he was obligated to carry out
these commands. His superior orders plea was rejected': "There
is nothing in mitigation. Participation in such crimes as these has
never been required of any soldier and he cannot now shield
himself behind a mythical requirement of soldierly obedience at all
costs as his excuse for commission of these crimes." 9
The Nuremberg Tribunal thus introduced a "voluntariness"
test. An individual carrying out a clearly criminal command under
international law is culpable absent evidence that he lacked moral
choice - that his action was the product of duress or coercion.
This equivocal standard was subsequently endorsed by the United
89. See id. at 540-41 (Alfred Rosenberg) (formulation of policies in occupied
territories of Germanization, exploitation of forced labor, extermination of Jews);
see id. at 558 (Admiral Karl Donitz) (sinking neutral ships without warning when
found within designated zones); see id. at 537 (Ernst Kaltenbrunner) (mistreatment
of prisoners of war); see id. at 567 (Fritz Saukel) (enforced labor); see also id at
578 (Albert Speer) (slave labor policies).
90. NUREMBURG JUDGEMENT, supra note 86, at 568-71 (Alfred Jodl).
91. Id. at 571. See also id. at 559-60 (Admiral Karl Donitz) (Commando
Order); see id. at 563 (Admiral Erich Raeder) (Commando Order); and see also
id. at 576 (Arthur Seyss-Inquart) (crimes in occupation of the Netherlands).
Mitigating circumstances were recognized in the case of Konstantin von Neurath,
Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. Von Neurath intervened with the
Security Police for the release of arrested Czech citizens and students. After being
reprimanded by Hitler, he unsuccessfully offered to resign and then went on leave
and refused to continue in office. NUREMBERG JUDGMENT, supra note 86, at 582.
The Tribunal intimated the type of factors which might be pled in mitigation in the
case of Albert Speer. Speer established a labor program in the occupied territories
which permitted a number of foreign workers to avoid deportation to Germany,
possessed the courage to tell Hitler that the war had been lost, and deliberately
sabotaged the scorched earth policy "at considerable personal risk." Id. at 579.
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Nations and cited in subsequent prosecutions of Nazi war crimi-
nals.92
C American Post-Nuremberg Prosecutions
The Allied occupation authorities subjected alleged German
war criminals to prosecution. Control Council Law No. 10
established "a uniform legal basis" for the prosecutions.93 The
provision on superior orders was modelled on the Nuremberg
Charter and provided that "[t]he fact that any person acted
pursuant to the order of his Government or of a superior does not
free him from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in
mitigation. 94
This standard was interpreted by the three-judge American
panel in the Einsatzgruppen judgment.9' The Einsatzgruppen, or
killing squads, shadowed the Nazi troops as they swept across
Russia. The units ruthlessly carried out the FUhrer Order,
summarily executing over a million Jews, Gypsies, disabled and
homeless individuals, mentally disturbed persons, and Communist
functionaries.96  The Einsatzgruppen typically required their
victims to kneel adjacent to a deep trench. They then shot them
in the back of the neck. They then repeated the process with the
next group. The victims, in other instances, were crowded into the
ditch and massacred. The trench was then covered with dirt.97
The psychological strain on the shooters eventually led the
Germans to introduce mobile gas vans.98
At trial, the Einsatzgruppen defendants argued that the
Nuremberg Charter and Control Council Law No. 10 could not
change the pre-existing legal rule acknowledged by the community
of nations which recognized a strict superior orders defense.99 The
92. See U.N.G.A. Res. 95(I), 188 U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (1946). This General
Assembly resolution affirmed "the principles of international law recognized by
the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal." Id.
93. Control Council Law No. 10, reprinted in VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAW No. 10 XVIII (1952).
94. Id. at art. 4(b).
95. See United States v. Otto Ohlendorf, IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAW No. 10, 411 (1950) [hereinafter Einsatzgruppen Judgment].
96. Id. at 412-16.
97. Id. at 443-44.
98. Id. at 448-49.
99. IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 329 (1950) (Extract From
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modifications in the British and American military manuals,
according to the defense, were manufactured in anticipation of
prosecution. But neither should be retroactively applied to
encompass acts committed prior to 1944."° The defendants
stated that the superior orders defense was premised on the
availability of an appeal to higher authorities. This avenue was
unavailable in Germany since draconian demands such as the
FUhrer Order emanated from Adolf Hitler - Germany's effective
command center. Protest would have led to repression rather than
to the retraction of an order. 101
The Einsatzgruppen Tribunal recognized that two principles
were in conflict. On the one hand, "[iut is axiomatic that a military
man's first duty is to obey."" On the other hand, "[t]he obedi-
ence of a soldier is not the obedience of an automaton. A soldier
is a reasoning agent. He does not respond, and is not expected to
respond, like a piece of machinery.'"103 The Tribunal somewhat
facetiously noted the consequences of unreflective obedience: "a
sergeant could order the corporal to shoot the lieutenant, the
lieutenant could order the sergeant to shoot the captain,.the captain
could order the lieutenant to shoot the colonel, and in each
instance the executioner would be absolved of blame.
' 1°4
Essentially, a subordinate is bound to obey only orders which
are within a superior's scope of command. 0 5 An individual who
voluntarily carries out an illicit order possesses the burden of
establishing excusable ignorance.1 6 This may not be pled in the
The Closing Statement For Defendant Erich Naumann) [hereinafter
Einsatzgruppen MATERIALS].
100. Id. at 332-34.
101. Id. at 336-37.
102. Einsatzgruppen Judgment,.supra note 95, at 470.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. The order must relate to military duty. An authority may not require
a subordinate to commit a civilian crime, such as robbing a bank. Id.
106. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 95, at 473. The Tribunal noted that
these requirements did not go beyond the requirements of Article 47 of the
German Military Penal Code. This rule was incorporated into the Prussian
Military Code as early as 1845 and subsequently was included in the Military Penal
Codes of the Kingdom of Saxony in 1867 and of Baden in 1870. The superior
orders defense was included in the Bavarian Military Penal Code of 1869 and in
the Military Penal Code of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1855. Id. at 471.
The Tribunal adopted a liberal interpretation of the phrase: "individuals... will
not be punished for.., offenses in case they are committed under the orders or
sanction of their government or commanders" in Article 347 of the American
Rules of Land Warfare. This clause did not limit liability to the chief executive.
Instead, all who ordered troops under their command to commit war crimes were
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case of a command which is "manifestly beyond the scope of the
superior's authority."' 1" An individual who enlists in an illicit
campaign also may not claim that he or she was unaware that he
or she would be called upon to commit a crime: "He who willingly
joins an illegal enterprise is charged with the natural development
of that unlawful undertaking. What S.S. man could say that he was
unaware of the attitude of Hitler toward Jewry?"'" Plainly, the
FUhrer Order was illegal. The idea that Jews were the bearers and
progenitors of Bolshevism and that they posed a threat to the
Reich was disingenuous."'° "What saved Benjamin Disraeli,
Leader of the Conservative Party and several times Prime Minister
of Great Britain, from being a Bolshevist? And had he lived in
1941, would Hitler have declared him a carrier of
[B]olshevism?""'
Individuals carrying out such manifestly illicit orders with
malicious intent could not claim the defense of duress either, in
instances where the harm caused by obeying an order was disprop-
ortionately greater than the harm resulting from disobedience.
Thus, a subordinate could not kill an innocent in order to avoid a
few days of confinement.111 However, an individual was not
required to forfeit his life or suffer serious harm in order to avoid
committing a crime. This threat had to reasonably be believed to
be imminent and inevitable:
The test to be applied is whether the subordinate acted under
coercion or whether he himself approved of the principle
involved in the order .... When the will of the doer merges
with the will of the superior in the execution of the illegal act,
the doer may not plead duress under superior orders."2
liable. A strict interpretation would have permitted all officers below the
individual who initially issued the order to plead respondeat superior. Id. at 487.
107. Id. at 471.
108. Id. at 473. "The sailor who voluntarily ships on a pirate craft may not be
heard to answer that he was ignorant of the probability he would be called upon
to help in the robbing and sinking of other vessels." Id. "One who embarks on
a criminal enterprise of obvious magnitude is expected to anticipate what the
enterprise will logically lead to." Id. at 481.
109. Id. at 474-76.
110. Id. at 476.
111. Id. at 471. The plea of duress is inapplicable once the initial threat lapses.
Id.
112. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 95, at 480. Superior means dominant
in capacity as well as in the power to compel an act. This does not mean superior
in rank since a lower-ranking officer may direct a superior. Id. An individual who
acquiesces in the illegal character of an order at any time may not plead duress.
Id. at 481.
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Ultimately the duress defense was dismissed in Einsatzgruppen
because there was no evidence that the defendants had sought to
avoid complicity in the exterminations. Combatants claiming a
constitutional incapacity to kill, according to the Tribunal, were
routinely relieved.113 "No one can shrug off so appalling a moral
responsibility with the statement that there was no point in
trying."" 4 The defendants further contended that it was futile to
resist because another would have aggressively assumed authority
and ferociously carried out the Fishrer Order. But the Tribunal
observed that guilt is a personal matter and that the reaction of
others was speculative. A decision to dissent may have deterred
the implementation of the FUhrer Order or inspired others to
resist. 5
The Tribunal finally articulated a test for analyzing pleas of
superior orders:
Did he agree with the order or not? If he did not and thus was
compelled by [the] chain of command and [a] fear of drastic
consequences to kill innocent human beings, the avenue of
mitigation is open for consideration. If, however, he agreed with
the order, he may not ... plead superior orders) 16
Thus in the case of defendant Erich Naumann, the Command-
er of Einsatzgruppen B who received the liquidation order from
Reinhard Heydrich, Chief of the Security Police and Security
Service," 7 the Tribunal held that his statement, that he "'consid-
ered the decree to be right because it was part of our aim of the
war and, therefore, it was necessary,"' precluded his reliance on the
superior orders defense.' Other defendants attempted to avoid
moral responsibility by deferring to the Fishrer. Otto Ohlendorf,
the commander of Einsatzgruppen D, testified that "there is no
113. Id. at 481-82. Defendants did dissent against orders without suffering
recrimination. Defendant Werner Braune opposed and sabotaged German policy
in Norway. Id.
114. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 95, at 482. The Tribunal ruled that
in considering the issue of intent, the defendants' motives were irrelevant to the
determination of guilt. It was irrelevant whether a defendant killed out of animus
or personal ambition. Id. The defendants expressed greater concern for the
soldiers who were ordered to kill than for the victims. Id. at 491.
115. Id. at 485. The Tribunal concluded that "Hitler struck the match, but the
fire would have died a quick death had it not been for his fellow arsonists ... who
continued to supply the fuel . . . ." Id at 507-08.
116. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 95, at 517-18.
117. Id. at 517-18.
118. Id. at 518.
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question for me whether it was moral or immoral, because a leader
... decides from his own responsibility and this is his responsibility
and I cannot examine and ... judge. I am not entitled to do
SO."'1 9  Erwin Schulz, commander of Eisatzkommando 5, a
subordinate unit of Einsatzgruppen C, sought exoneration on the
grounds that he was in Berlin when his squad executed 157
detainees. The Tribunal summarily dismissed Schulz's claim. "'The
man who places a bomb, lights the fuse, and rapidly takes himself
to other regions is certainly absent when the explosion occurs, but
his responsibility is 'no less because of that prudent
nonpresence."120
In the Hostage case the Tribunal continued to define the limits
of the superior orders defense. The Hostage defendants were
charged with the murder of hundreds of thousands of civilians in
Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania, and with the destruction of
property in Norway.121  German forces invaded Yugoslavia on
April 6, 1941 and seized control nine days later. The Reich's
regiments swept south and occupied Greece within six days.
German occupation forces were subjected to persistent and
prolonged attacks by Yugoslavian and Greek partisans. The
guerrillas faded into the forests, mountains and rural villages
following these- armed forays.1 22 The German occupants, in an
effort to deter and defeat guerilla activity, seized and executed
hostages.123  Suspected partisans were also summarily shot.1 24
The Tribunal found a "record of killing and destruction seldom
exceeded in modern history. Thousands of innocent inhabitants
lost their lives by means of a firing squad or hangman's noose,
people who had the same inherent desire to live as do these
defendants."1"
Hitler personally assigned defendant Wilhelm List to suppress
this insurgent movement in the Southeast. Field Marshal Wilhelm
119. See EINSATZGRUPPEN MATERIALS, supra note 99, at 303.
120.. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 95, at 519.
121. See United States v. Wilhelm List, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAW No. 10, 1230, 1233 (1950) [hereinafter Hostage Judgment].
122. Id. at 1243.
123. See id. at 1264. For the requirements for the detention and execution of
hostages, see id. at 1250-51.
124. Id. at 1244, 1269. The Tribunal determined that the partisans did not
abide by the requirements of the humanitarian law of war and were not entitled
to the status of lawful belligerents. These executions were determined to be
legally justified. Hostage Judgment, supra note 121, at 1244, 1269.
125. Id. at 1254.
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Keitel, Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces,
simultaneously issued a directive, dated September 16, 1941, which
ordered that "'severest means are to be employed in order to break
down this movement in the shortest time possible.. . . [T]he death
penalty for 50 to 100 Communists must in general be deemed
appropriate as retaliation for the life of a German soldier.""
126
List distributed the Keitel command to his subordinate units
and the order was reinforced by Franz Boehme, commanding
general in Serbia. Boehme admonished his troops on September
25, 1941 that "'[a]n intimidating example must be created for the
whole of Serbia, which must hit the whole population most severely
.... Everyone who wishes to rule charitably sins against the lives
of his comrades ....,,,1'7 Keitel distributed a directive-three days
later calling for the collection of hostages from among "leading
personalities or members of their families."" 2  List issued a
subsequent order dated October 4, 1941 requiring retaliation
against suspected partisans or partisan supporters.129  General
Boehme issued a reprisal ratio six days later: "'[f]or each killed or
murdered German soldier or ethnic German ... 100 prisoners or
hostages; [flor each wounded German soldier or ethnic German, 50
prisoners or hostages.""
' 30
List was succeeded by Lieutenant General Walter Kuntze in
October 1941 who continued this method of "ratio" retaliation.
Kuntze issued an order in March 1942 proclaiming, "'[n]o false
sentimentalities! It is preferable that 50 suspects are liquidated than
one German soldier lose his life."' Kuntze called for reprisals
against the residents of villages surrounding the sites of partisan
attacks "'according to a definite ratio (for instance, 1 German dead
- 100 Serbs; 1 German wounded - 50 Serbs).' '' 31
When finally brought to justice, the defendants in the Hostage
case argued that the superior orders defense was a maxim of
international law. The Allied Powers were thus powerless to
modify this rule by either domestic legislation or quad-partite
126. Id. at 1264. The two orders were issued.on Sept. 16, 1941. Id.
127. Id. at 1265.
128. HOSTAGE JUDGMENT, supra note 121, at 1265.
129. Id. at 1265-66.
130. Id. at 1266. "[I]n Serbia all Communists, male residents suspicious as such,
all Jews, a certain number of Nationalistic and democratically inclined residents
are to be arrested as hostages by means of sudden actions..I.." Id. at 1266.
"Communists captured.., in combat... are to be hanged or shot as a matter of
principle at the place of crime .. " Id. at 1267.
131. HOSTAGE JUDGMENT, supra note. 121, at 1278.
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agreement. 13 2 The attorney for defendant List noted that "[t]he
events in Germany . . . showed very clearly where the casting
overboard of fundamental principles of law has got us to. No legal
system can survive such treatment; neither can international
law." ' The abandonment of superior orders would compel
combatants to consult with barristers during battle and bowdlerize
military discipline. 34
The Tribunal dismissed Professor Oppenheim's advocacy of
the defense as a "decidedly minority view.''135 The pre-prosecu-
tion American and British military manuals were also accorded
slight significance: "[t]hey are neither legislative nor judicial
pronouncements ... [and] are not competent for any purpose in
determining whether a fundamental principle of justice has been
accepted by civilized nations." 
1 36
The Tribunal concluded without citation that
the rule that superior orders is not a defense to a criminal act
is a rule of fundamental criminal justice that has been adopted
by civilized nations extensively. It is not disputed that the
municipal law of civilized nations generally sustained the
principle at the time the alleged criminal acts were commit-
ted.137
132. XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 759,862-64 (1950) (Dr. Hans
Laternser, Opening Statement for Defendant List) [hereinafter HOSTAGE
MATERIALS]. The abrogation of respondeat superior under domestic law pertains
to commands which contravene domestic rather than international law. The
defense noted that this presents different considerations than are involved in the
conflict between national and international law. Id. at 862-63.
133. Id. at 1225 (Extracts from Closing Statement for Defendant List).
134. Id. at 1227.
135. Hostage Judgment, supra note 121, at 1237. Oppenheim overlooks that
"an illegal order is in no sense of the word a valid law which one is obliged to
obey." Id.
136. Id. Military manuals may "play an important role but ... do not
constitute an authoritative precedent." Id. The determination of whether a
custom or practice exists is a question of fact which is determined by an
examination of judicial and legislative sources. Id. The Tribunal analyzed the
latter materials in order to determine whether superior orders "is a fundamental
rule of justice and for that reason has found general acceptance." HOSTAGE
JUDGMENT, supra note 121, at 1238. If the rights of nations and the rights of
individuals who become involved in international relations are to be respected and
preserved, fundamental rules of justice and rights which have become commonly
accepted by nations must be applied. But the yardstick to be used must in all cases
be a finding that the principle involved is a fundamental rule of justice which has
been adopted or accepted by nations generally as such. Id. at 1235-36.
137. Id. at 1236. "This being true, it properly may be declared an applicable
rule of international law." Id.
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The judges acknowledged the indispensability of obedience to
orders but said that such obedience was limited to lawful orders.
As such, the requisite criminal intent was established in instances
where a subordinate was aware or reasonably should have been
aware of an order's illegality.3 '
While the Court conceded that an officer must choose between
possible punishment for disobeying an illicit order and prosecution
under the law of nations, it concluded that "[t]o choose the former
in the hope that victory will cleanse the act of its criminal charac-
teristics manifests only weakness of character and adds nothing to
the defense." '139 The Tribunal justified this choice on the basis of
necessity: "otherwise the opposing army would in many cases have
no protection at all against criminal excesses ordered by superi-
ors." 
140
Defendant List distributed the September 16, 1941 Keitel
command containing the reprisal ratios. The Tribunal ruled that it
was immaterial whether the order was "mandatory or directory.
... An order to take reprisals at an arbitrarily fixed ratio under
any and all circumstances constitutes a violation of international
law. Such an order appears to have been made more for purposes
of revenge than as a deterrent." '41  The Tribunal further noted
that the killing of thousands under the guise of reprisals was the
type of conduct which a defendant "knew or ought to have known"
was criminal. 14' List was therefore convicted of having knowingly
conveyed the command to his subordinates:
An officer is duty bound to carry out only the lawful orders
that he receives. One who distributes, issues, or carries out a
criminal order becomes a criminal if he knew or should have
known of its criminal character. Certainly, a field marshal of the
German Army with more than 40 years of experience as a
professional soldier knew or ought to have known of its
criminal nature.43
138. Id. "But the general rule is that members of the armed forces are bound
to obey only the lawful orders of their commanding officers and they cannot
escape criminal liability by obeying a command which violates international law
and outrages fundamental concepts of justice." Hostage Judgment, supra note 121,
at 1236.
139. Id. at 1237.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1269-70.
142. Id. at 1281.
143. Id. at 1271. "That he did know of it is evidenced by the fact that he
opposed its issuance and, according to his own statement, did what he could to
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As for those who attempted to ameliorate criminal commands,
their sentences were mitigated. The FUhrer ordered the execution
of thousands of Italian troops who resisted surrender following the
Allied armistice. Hubert Lanz, Commander of the XXII Mountain
Corps in Greece, resisted the FUhrer's order and successfully
restricted executions to the officer corps.1" The Court also
mitigated the punishment of defendant Ernst Dehner, Commander
of the LXIX Reserve Corps, who was subordinate to Lothar
Rendulic, head of the 2d Panzer Army. Dehner issued an order in
which he attempted to align the practice of German troops toward
hostages with the requirements of international law.145
In a.third case before the Tribunal, the High Command case,
several leading members of the Nazi officer corps were charged
with the execution of various criminal commands. The judgment
focused chiefly on the Commando, Commissar and Barbarossa
Jurisdiction Orders. The Commando Order 'of October 1942
required the summary execution of Allied commando units
operating behind German lines in Czechoslovakia, France, Italy and
Norway." The Commissar Order was issued in June 1941 and
ameliorate its effect." Hostage Judgment, supra note 121, at 1271. List regularly
appealed for more troops to subjugate the resistance movement and his orders and
directives were more moderate than those of his superiors. Id. at 1273. He was
sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 1318.
144. Hostage Judgment, supra note 121, at 1313. "While his protests... were
successful in reducing the number of Italians to be subjected to the unlawful order,
the fact remains that the killing of the reduced number was just as much a criminal
act." Id.
145. Id. at 1299-1300. Rendulic issued a reprisal order on Sept. 15, 1943 which
required the execution of fifty hostages for each German killed and the execution
of twenty-five hostages for each German wounded. Id. at 1289. Dehner ordered
that innocent hostages were not to be held responsible for the misdeeds of
partisans in the area adjacent to their own villages. Id. at 1300. He was sentenced
to seven years in prison. Hostage Judgment, supra note 121, at 1319. A number
of factors were considered in mitigation:
The degree of mitigation depends upon many factors including the nature
of the crime, the age and experience of the person to whom it applies,
the motives for the criminal act, the circumstances under which the crime
was committed, and the provocation, if any, that contributed to its
commission. It must be observed, however, that mitigation of punish-
ment does not in any sense of the word reduce the degree of the crime.
It is more a matter of grace than of defense. In other words, the
punishment assessed is not a proper criterion to be considered in
evaluating the findings of the Court with reference to the degree of
magnitude of the crime.
Id. at 1317. '
146. United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
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called for the killing of captured Soviet political operatives attached
to Russian military units. The directive admonished that "'[i]n this
fight, leniency and considerations of international law are out of
place... [tihe originators of barbarous Asiatic methods of warfare
are the political commissars. They must ... be dealt with ...
severely ... and summarily."'147  The Barbarossa Jurisdiction
Order was issued in May 1941 in anticipation of the Reich's
invasion of the Soviet Union. The directive abolished the jurisdic-
tion of military courts over crimes committed by enemy civilians.
Partisans and enemy civilians suspected of having attacked
Germans were subject to summary execution. Collective punish-
ment was to be carried out against towns and villages that opened
fire on German troops." These mass murders and barbarities
were designed to eliminate partisans and to expel and exterminate
the Polish and Russian populations.149
The Tribunal once again announced that acceptance of the
respondeat superior doctrine would limit liability to Adolf Hitler
and thus diminish the capacity of international law to channel and
control the conduct of combatants. The Allied prosecutions were
premised on the primacy of the law of nations."5 It necessarily
followed that a "directive to violate international common law is
... void and can afford no protection to one who violates such law
in reliance on such a directive." '151 Compliance with a "clearly
criminal" command out of fear of discipline or disadvantage was
held not to constitute a defense.152  The plea of coercion or
necessity requires a demonstration that a "reasonable man would
apprehend that he was in such imminent physical peril as to
deprive him of freedom to choose the right and refrain from the
LAW No. 10, 462, 492 (1950) [hereinafter High Command Judgment].
147. Id. at 517.
148. Id. at 521. The criminal prosecution of members of the Wehrmacht who
had contravened the military code was not "'obligatory."' Id. at 522 (emphasis
omitted). In order to moderate the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order, Field Marshal
Walter von Brauchitsch, Commander in Chief of the Army, issued the so-called
Disciplinary Order which obligated superiors to prevent "'arbitrary excesses of
individual members of the army and to prevent .... the troops becoming
unmanageable."' Id. at 519 (emphasis omitted). These orders violated the Reich's
obligation, as an occupying power, to insure the fair treatment of civilian
inhabitants. Inordinate and indefinite discretionary power was lodged in
subordinate officers. Id. at 525.
149. High Command Judgment, supra note 146, at 499.
150. Id. at 507-08.
151. Id. at 508.
152. Id. at 509.
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wrong., 113  In addition, a superior issuing an order could not
invoke the defense that subordinates should have been aware that
he or she did not expect compliance with the command. It is
"contemptible" to argue that "subordinates should have had the
courage to disobey the order which he himself in passing it down
showed that he lacked. 15
4
Citing the Hostage judgment, the Court stated that its central
contribution was to set standards for adjudging the liability of field
commanders who endorsed and transmitted illicit orders and
subordinates who drafted, conveyed and implemented the com-
mands. Field commanders were entitled to assume that their
superiors' orders conformed to international law. Officers were
understandably preoccupied with the pressures of combat and could
not examine every directive transmitted through their headquarters.
However, the Tribunal limited the liability of field commanders to
the transmittal of an order which was "criminal upon its face, or
... which [the commanders knew] was criminal.""15 Field com-
manders were also adjudged liable for criminal commands which
they independently issued to subordinate units."6 Clearly, the
orders involved in the Hostage case:
were contrary to the customs of war and accepted standards of
humanity. Any commanding officer of normal intelligence must
see and understand their criminal nature. Any participation in
implementing such orders, tacit or otherwise, any silent acquies-
cence in their enforcement by his subordinates, constitutes a
criminal act on his part."7
The Tribunal also clarified the liability of staff officers for
drafting and transmitting criminal commands:
If the basic idea is criminal under international law, the staff
officer who puts that idea into the form of a military order,
either himself or through subordinates under him, or takes
personal action to see that it is properly distributed to those
153. Id.
154. High Command Judgment, supra note 146, at 520-21.
155. Id. at 511.
156. Id. The Tribunal conceded that a field commander was in an untenable
situation; a subordinate officer lacked authority to issue a countermanding order.
Such a directive would have resulted in Hitler energetically enforcing his
command. Resignation may have entailed severe sanctions and sabotage would
not be of sufficient scope to impede the order. Id. at 511-12.
157. Id. at 512.
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units where it becomes effective, commits a criminal act under
international law.158
As to the disposition of each defendant's case in High
Command, Field Marshal von Leeb was Commander in Chief of
the Army Group North in the Russian campaign. He had been
present during the meeting at which Hitler discussed exterminating
the commissars. Von Leeb later complained to the High Command
that this might embolden Russian resistance. The Fiihrer refused
to modify the order and circumvented command resistance by
routing the directive to subordinate army groups. Von Leeb
countered by expressing opposition to his officers. The order was
nevertheless implemented.15 9
The Tribunal acquitted von Leeb on the grounds that he "did
not disseminate the order. He protested against it and opposed it
in every way short of open and defiant refusal to obey it. If his
subordinate commanders disseminated it and permitted its
enforcement, that is their responsibility and not his."1" Despite
his acquittal, von Leeb was considered criminally culpable for
transmitting the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order. He took no steps
to prevent the order's implementation and "[h]aving set this
instrument in motion, he must assume a measure of responsibility
for its illegal application." '161
Field Marshal von Kuechler was Commander of the 18th Army
and later succeeded von Leeb. He received and transmitted the
Commissar Order to his troops. Von Kuechler claimed that he had
158. High Command Judgment, supra note 146, at 513. Commanding officers
signed communications to higher commanders as well as orders to subordinates
which established policy. Most orders were issued by the chief of staff on behalf
of the commanding officer. Id. at 514.
159. Id. at 555-57.
160. Id. at 557-58.
161. Id. at 560-61. Von Leeb's sentence was mitigated by the facts that he was
not a member of the Nazi Party and was charged with authority for hundreds of
thousands of soldiers. Id. at 563, 677. The Tribunal enumerated factors which
might be included in mitigation:
We realize the feelings of professional pride, of ambition to
succeed in their profession of arms, of fear for their personal
safety or of reprisals against their families, their love of country,
their soldiers' concept of obedience, and indeed, the ingrained
respect of the German for those in authority over him, were
factors in their decisions. We are aware of the tendency
towards degeneration of "civilized" warfare in the modem
concept of "total" war, and of the war madness that engulfs all
people of belligerent powers.
High Command Judgment, supra note 146, at 553.
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privately opposed the command, but feared the consequences of
contumaciousness. The Tribunal ruled that despite von Kuechler's
misgivings, "the cold, hard, inescapable fact remains that he
distributed it, and that it was enforced by units subordinate to him
in the 18th Army .... [I]t was a criminal order."162
General Hermann Hoth was Commander of Panzer Group 3
and also conveyed the Commissar Order to his troops. He claimed
that his subordinates
were sufficiently radar-minded to pick up the rejection impulses
that radiated from his well known high character and that he
believed that they would have the courage that he lacked to
disobey the order . . . That the character impulses were too
weak or the minds of the subordinates were too insensitive to
pick them up is shown by the documents.163
General Hans Reinhardt, Commanding General of the XLI
Panzer Corps under Panzer Group 4, transmitted the Commissar
Order to his troops, despite his alleged misgivings. The Tribunal
ruled that "[i]f international law is to have ... effectiveness, high
commanding officers ... must have the courage to act, in definite
and unmistakable terms... [Tihe proper report to have been made
... would have been that this unit does not murder enemy
prisoners of war.""
Certain defendants were also held liable for drafting and
disseminating criminal orders. Lieutenant General Hermann
Reinecke was Chief of the General Wehrmacht Office (AWA) with
authority over Prisoner of War Affairs."6 He drafted and pre-
pared orders on behalf of Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the High
162. Id. at 567. The Tribunal expressed doubt whether von Kuechler protested
the order. Von Kuechler claimed to have been unaware of the execution of
commissars. "[W]e cannot believe that the members of his staff would not have
called these reports to his attention had he announced his opposition to the
order." Id.
163. Id. at 582. General Hoth testified that he did not believe that Hitler would
ask his commanders to do anything wrong. He further testified that Hitler was the
head of the state and that a directives from him superseded section 47 of the
German Military Penal Code. That section provides that an officer need not carry
out an order that is clearly criminal on its face and commits a criminal act if he
does so. Id.
164. High Command Judgment, supra note 146, at 598. The defendant
contended that he had not transmitted the order and that it had been spread
informally among the troops. The court rejected this contention, questioning "how
it would sweep the entire Russian front. The obvious explanation ... is that it
became known because of its implementation." Id.
165. Id. at 648, 650.
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Command of the Armed Forces. Reinecke then signed and
distributed these draconian directives."6  He was convicted:
"[Tihe defendant ... cannot escape responsibility for decrees
issued under his signature merely by the fact that they were issued
'by order' [of Keitel]. The defendant ... concedes that many of
the ideas ... were his own .... 167
. Brigadier General Walter Warlimont was Chief of National
Defense in the High Command. He crafted and refined the
Commissar Order. "The idea for the murder of prisoners of war
in the name of ideological warfare did not originate with
Warlimont. However, the evidence establishes that he contributed
his part to moulding it into its final form .... There is nothing to
indicate that those contributions . . . in any way softened its
harshness . .. ."" Rudolf Lehmann was Chief of the Legal
Department of the High Command and was convicted of having
assisted in the drafting of the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order.
Lehmann explained that he had removed jurisdiction over civilian
offenses from military courts because he had anticipated that
acquittals would lead Hitler to attack and abolish the tribunals. "In
other words, it is apparent that, in order to avoid criticism of
military courts by the Fiuhrer, he was ready to sacrifice the lives of
Iinnocent people. 169
The military cases solidified the contours of superior orders
-and established that the defense does not relieve an individual of
international legal liability.7 A combatant is obligated to obey
166. Id. at 652.
167. Id. at 653.
168. High Command Judgment, supra note 146, at 665.
169. Id. at 693. Lehmann "became the main factor in determining the final
form into which the criminal ideas of Hitler were put ... and placed the whole
into an effective military order which was transmitted to the troops and carried
-out." Id.
170. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
Hitler was not above international law. Let us suppose that in
1935 Hitler ordered one of his men to go to Siam and there
assassinate its King. Would it be argued that the assassin in
that situation would be immune because acting under superior
orders? Any judicial inquiry would establish that the Siam
assassin had committed a crime and the fact that he had acted
in pursuance to the order of his government or a superior did
not possibly free him from responsibility for the crime. This is
exactly what Control Council Law No. 10 says, and this is what
the law has always said, or ever since there was international
law.
Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 95, at 486.
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only lawful orders. An individual voluntarily carrying out an illegal
order must establish excusable ignorance. 7' The Tribunals
adopted several objective standards for adjudging knowledge of an
order's illegality."' Application of these standards was to be
adjusted in accordance with a defendant's military position and past
experience. 7 3 Individuals enlisting in an illicit enterprise may not
later claim that they were unaware that they would later be called
upon to commit a crime.74 In addition, defendants may not
contend that resistance was futile since another may have carried
out the order.1
75
The Tribunals refined the Nuremberg standard 76 and ruled
that defendants may rely upon the defense of duress in those
instances in which they reasonably believe that they confront
immediate and imminent physical peril. The harm resulting from
the commission of the criminal command may not be dispropor-
tionate to the threat, and the defense is unavailable to a defendant
who voluntarily carries out a superior's orders. 77  The
Einsatzgruppen Tribunal determined that [i]f any of these
Kommando leaders had stated that they were constitutionally
unable to perform this cold-blooded slaughter ... it is not
unreasonable to assume that they would have been assigned to
other duties, not out of sympathy ... but for efficiency's sake
alone. 1
78
Field commanders and staff in the military cases were held
liable for drafting and transmitting clearly criminal commands.'79
They also possessed a duty to protest such orders or to issue
countervailing commands." A commander could not claim in
171. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 107 (manifestly beyond the scope of a superior's
authority), 138 (aware or reasonably should have been aware), 143 (knew or ought
to have known), 155 (criminal upon its face or known to be criminal), 157
(contrary to customs of war and accepted standards of humanity), 158 (basic idea
is criminal under international law) and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 142.
174. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. The Judgments balanced three
values: the protection of civilians and combatants, see supra notes 140-41; the rule
of international law, see supra note 151 and accompanying text; and military
efficiency and individual morality, see supra notes 102-04.
176. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
178. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 95, at 481. See also id. at 473.
179. See supra notes 155-158 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 160, 164 and accompanying text. Resignation following the
implementation of an order did not relieve a defendant of liability. See United
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defense that his subordinates should have known that they were
not expected to fulfill the order.181 An officer's absence during
the implementation of an order also did not constitute a de-
fense.1" Swearing an oath of obedience to Hitler did not relieve
military men of their obligation to obey lawful orders.l" Assur-
ances that orders to abuse prisoners of war were lawful under
international law also did not exculpate a defendant.M The
Tribunals did enumerate various factors which might be considered
in mitigation of punishment.185
This same analysis was applied to Japanese defendants. Rear
Admiral Nisuke Masuda was accused in the Jaluit Atoll case of
ordering four co-defendants to kill three Allied prisoners of war.
Masuda's subordinates pled that an Imperial Rescript had estab-
lished that the orders of superiors are "'nothing but the orders
personally from His Majesty the Emperor."' 1  They pointed out
that the individualistic values which animated Allied nations were
inapplicable to authoritarian societies which were based upon
subordination to the State. An even greater degree of devotion
was demanded as Japan's strategic position worsened. It was
unthinkable under such circumstances that a Warrant or Petty
Officer would resist an order of Rear Admiral Masuda.1" The
Tribunal nevertheless ruled that an individual of ordinary sense and
States v. Josef Altstoetter, III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 954,
1086 (1951) (defendant Franz Schlegelberger) [hereinafter Justice Judgment].
181. See supra text accpmpanying note 154.
182. See supra text accompanying note 120.
183. See United States v. Milch, II TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at
355, 689 (1950) (excerpts from the testimony of Defendant Milch) [hereinafter
Milch Materials]; see also id. at 773, 792-95 (prosecution for medical experimenta-
tion and slave labor) [hereinafter Milch Judgment]. See also id. at 797, 858
(Concurring Opinion by Judge Michael A. Musmanno). Lawyers and jurists
unsuccessfully contended that they were legally obligated to respect and enforce
the law in the Third Reich. "The very essence of the prosecution case is that the
laws, the Hitlerian decrees and the Draconic, corrupt, and perverted Nazi judicial
system themselves constituted the substance of war crimes and crimes against
humanity and that participation in the enactment and enforcement of them
amounts to complicity in crime." See Justice Judgment, supra note 180, at 984.
184. See Milch Materials, supra note 183, at 192-95, 730, 747-50 (closing
statement of the defendant).
185. See supra notes 144-45, 161 and accompanying text.
186. The Jaluit Atoll Case (U.S. Milit. Comm'n, Kwajalein Island, Kwajalein
Atoll, Marshall Islands, Dec. 7-13, 1945), I LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 71, 74
(U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1947). This trial was conducted under the authority
of the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP Rules). Id. at 75.
187. Id. at 74.
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understanding would have grasped the illegal nature of the
execution order, and sentenced all those integrally involved in the
killings to death. 8
D. British Post-Nuremberg War Crimes Prosecutions
British war: crimes tribunals clarified the mental element of the
superior orders defense. Defendants who either knew or reason-
ably ought to have known of an order's illegality were denied the
defense. Such individuals were presumed to possess the requisite
criminal intent and were required to establish duress."'
Defendant Otto Sandrock was convicted in The Almelo Trial
for complying with a command to execute a captured British pilot
and a young Dutch draft dodger in whose home the Allied airman
had been apprehended.1" The Judge Advocate instructed the
188. Id. at 75-76. Tasaki was custodian of the prisoners and was sentenced to
ten years imprisonment. His participation was 'brief, .passive and mechanical."'
Id.
The Tribunal in the trial of Lieutenant General Shigeru Sawada and three
others was one of the few courts which openly applied superior orders in
mitigation of punishment. Eight downed American airmen were charged with,
violations of the Enemy Airmen's.Act and subjected to a swift, slanted, summary
trial lacking in elemental due process. The evidentiary presentation and
proceedings were orchestrated from Tokyo and the Court dutifully returned a
sentence of death. Instructions later were issued to commute five of the sentences,
to life imprisonment. Trial of Lieutenant General Shigeru Sawada and Three.
Others (U.S. Milit. Comm'n, Shanghai, China, Feb. 27-Apr. 15, 1946), V LAW'
REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1, 2-4 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948) [hereinafter
SAWADA]..
The Tribunal determined that the defendants had obeyed the laws and
commands of the Japanese regime. They had merely followed the instructions
issued by their superiors and had exercised little initiative in the trial and
treatment of the American airmen. The court was persuaded that there were
strong mitigating considerations. Sawada had unsuccessfully protested the death
sentences to his superior, but had not pursued the matter in Tokyo. He was
sentenced to five years at hard labor. Id. at 7-8. Defendants Wako and Okada
had served on the Tribunal and were sentenced to hard labor for nine and five
years respectively. Defendant Tatsuta had executed the three airmen and headed
the prison where the other Allied pilots had been incarcerated. He was sentenced
to five years at hard labor. Id. at 7-8. The pressure exerted by authorities in
Tokyo resulted in the mitigation of the sentences. Defendants who participated
in similar trials in which there was an absence of external pressure received
harsher sentences. See Trial of Lieutenant General Harukei Isayma And Seven
Others (U.S.- Milit. Comm'n, Shanghai, China, July 1-25, 1946), V LAW REP.
TRIALS WAR CRIM. 60 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948).
189. See infra text accompanying notes 190-198.
190. Trial Of Otto Sandrock And Three Others (The Almelo Trial) (Brit. Milit.
Ct., Almelo, Holland, Nov. 24, 1945), I LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 35, 36-37,
41 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1947) [hereinafter Almelo Judgment]. Sandrock
was informed the prisoners had been condemned to death and proceeded to shoot
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panel that Sandrock was required to demonstrate that he "honestly
believed that this British officer had been tried according to the
law, and that they were carrying out a lawful execution."' 91 The
court might conclude in the absence of such evidence that the
"circumstances were such that a reasonable man might have
believed that this officer had been tried according to law, and that
they were carrying out a proper judicial legal execution, then it
would be open to the court to acquit the accused."'"
The defendants in Buck were charged with the execution of
captured American, British and French prisoners in Alsace. The
Judge Advocate noted that in the circumstances of conscription,
combat and controversies over the code of conflict, ignorance of
the law may excuse criminal conduct. The accused were neither
lawyers nor legal scholars and could not be expected to completely
comprehend the documents and doctrines of the humanitarian law
of war. The need to strike swiftly also might militate against a
strict and scrupulous weighing of a superior's commands. The
remainder of the Judge Advocate's charge was similar to that
issued in Almelo. He instructed the court to ascertain whether the
defendants believed that the execution orders were lawful. If so,
the court was to determine "'whether men who are serving either
as soldiers or in proximity. to soldiers know as a matter of the
general facts of military life whether a prisoner of war has certain
rights and whether one of those rights is not, when captured,
security for his person.""'
The British military courts also augmented the jurisprudence
of command liability. A commanding officer who amends an
otherwise ambiguous order in a criminal fashion was determined to
be liable for transmitting an illicit command. The intentional
issuance of such an order is criminal regardless of whether the
directive is implemented. The harm resulting from an order's
implementation is relevant in assessing the appropriate punish-
and bury the victims. Sandrock had been a printer in civilian life. Id. at 36-37.
191. Id. at 40.
192. Id. at 41.
193. Trial Of Karl Buck And Ten Others (Brit.Milit. Ct., Wuppertal, Germany,
May 6, 1946), V LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 39, 44 (U.N. War Crimes,
Comm'n, 1948) (notes on the case). An accused would be guilty if he committed
a war crime in pursuance of an order, "if the order was obviously unlawful,
secondly if the accused knew that the order was unlawful, or thirdly if he ought
to have known it to be unlawful had he considered the circumstances in which it
was given." Id. at 43 (emphasis omitted) (Notes on the Case).
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ment.19 A defendant officer who issues or transmits an illegal
order remains criminally responsible in those instances in which a
subordinate exacerbates the illicit character of the command.19
The issue of reprisals continued to trouble tribunals. For
example, General Oberst Nickolaus von Falkenhorst, Commander-
in-Chief of the German Armed Forces in Norway, was charged
with transmitting the Commando Order to forces under his
command. The result was the execution of a number of British
prisoners and Falkenhorst was later convicted and sentenced to
death.1'9
Falkenhorst contended that the Fiihrer's Commando Order
was a lawful act of reprisal. The Judge Advocate issued no
instructions on this defense and presumably the Tribunal was not
satisfied that Falkenhorst had believed that commandos were being
killed in reprisal. The reasonableness of a defendant's belief that
an order is a lawful reprisal, in most instances, may be difficult to
evaluate. A senior soldier may comprehend the rules of warfare
while remaining confused about reprisals. Under these circum-
stances an officer may understandably choose to rely on the
informed judgment of his superiors." There is no more
difficult subject in the.., law relating to war crimes than a...
case where reprisal and superior orders are raised by the
defense in respect of one and the same order which the
defendant is alleged to have carried out. The whole basis of the
wrongfulness of disobeying an unlawful order may fall to the
ground ... 19
194. See Trial Of Karl-Heinz Moehle (Brit. Milit. Ct., Hamburg, Germany, Oct.
15, 1946), IX LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIMINALS 75, 76 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n, 1949).
195. See Trial Of General Von Mackensen And General Maelzer (Brit. Milit.
Ct., Rome, Italy, Nov. 18, 1945), VIII LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1-2, 6-7
(U.N. War Crimes Comm'n 1949) [hereinafter ARDEATINE CAVE JUDGMENT]
(pursuant to higher command defendant ordered the reprisal killing of those
serving long-term imprisonment or sentenced to death).
196. Trial Of Generaloberst Nickolaus Von Falkenhorst (Brit. Milit. Ct.,
Brunswick, Germany, July 29, 1946), XI LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 19-23
(1949) [hereinafter FALKENHORST JUDGMENT].
197. Id. at 26 (notes on the case). The Commando Order alleged that the
enemy was utilizing methods which contravened the Geneva Conventions such as
the execution of prisoners of war. The execution of commandos was portrayed as
the "same procedure" which was being employed by the Allied troops. Id. at 20.
198. Id. at 27 (notes on the case). Reprisals may not be taken against prisoners
of war. Id. (Notes on the Case).
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E. Other Post-Nuremberg War Crimes Prosecutions
European post-war superior orders statutes varied. Most
recognized the plea as a mitigating rather than a justifying factor
while others were used to exonerate a defendant. This flexible
approach thus permitted the individualization of Punishment.
Another set of states abrogated the defense while failing to
enumerate the evidentiary significance of superior orders. In
particular, The Netherlands War Crimes Law of July 1947 was
singularly silent regarding the plea.1"
The Israeli Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law
provided that the superior orders defense in the Israeli criminal
code is inapplicable to individuals prosecuted under the war crimes
statute. The latter states that superior orders may be considered in
mitigation of punishment other than in those instances in which the
order was "'manifestly unlawful.""'
In the trial of Adolf Eichmann, the Israeli District Court
observed that the abrogation of the superior orders defense in the
prosecution of war criminals had been acknowledged by the United
Nations in 1946 and had "'now become general in all civilized
countries."201
199. SAWADA, supra note 188, at 20, 21 (notes on the case). See Trial Of Willy
Zuehlke (Netherlands Special Court, Amsterdam, Aug. 3, 1948 and Netherlands
Special Court Of Cassation, Dec. 6, 1948), XIV LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM.
139, 146-49 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) (rejecting applicability of the
Nuremberg standard as a general rule of international law).
200. Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 5710/1950 cited in
Attorney General Of The Gov't Of Isr. v. Adolf Eichmann, (Dec. 12, 1961) 36
INT'L. REV. 18, 20 (1968) [hereinafter Judgment Of The District Court], aff'd Text
Of Judgment Of The Supreme Court (May 29, 1962), id. at 277 [hereinafter
Judgment Of The Supreme Court]. Article 8 of the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators
Law provides that Section 19 of the Criminal Code Ordinance of 1936 is inappli-
cable. The latter provision absolves an individual of criminal culpability for an act
committed in obedience to an order "'unless the order is manifestly unlawful."'
Reprinted in Judgment Of The District Court, supra note 200, at 255. Section
11(a) of the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators Law provides that an individual who
commits an offense "under conditions which, but for Section 8, would have
exempted him from criminal responsibility or constituted a reason for excusing the
offense, and that he did his best to reduce the gravity of the offense ...." Id. at
256.
201. Judgment of The District Court, supra note 200, at 257. The United
Nations affirmed the principles recognized in the Nuremberg Judgment. See
U.N.G.A. Res. 95(I), supra note 92. This view was endorsed by the Supreme
Court. See Judgment of the Supreme Court, supra note 200, at 317-18. The
Supreme Court noted that this principle had crystallized in international law
following the Nuremberg Judgment. The abrogation of the superior orders
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The District Court determined that "the accused [Eichmann]
well knew that the order for the physical extermination of the Jews
was manifestly unlawful and ... in carrying out this order he
engaged in criminal acts on a colossal scale."' 2  He made no
effort to reduce the scope or severity of this crime and "performed
his duties at every stage ... whole-heartedly and willingly."'
Eichmann was no cipher, he displayed innovation and initiative in
implementing the Nazi's pernicious policies and plans. He was a
man on a mission to ensure that even a single Jew would not
survive.204
This "manifestly unlawful" standard was clarified by the Israeli
Military Court of Appeal in upholding the convictions of six
members of the Israeli Defense Forces for executing forty-three
Arab citizens.2 5 The court asserted that a "reasonable soldier
can distinguish a manifestly illegal order on the face of it, without
requiring legal counsel and without perusing the law books ....
[T]he expected danger from illegal orders issued maliciously or
negligently or even with good intentions will be averted."'  This
required a case-by-case analysis of the context surrounding the
defense reflected an interest in extending criminal liability to those throughout the
State who knowingly committed criminal acts against the law of nations. Id. at
315-317.
202. Judgment Of The District Court, supra note at 200, at 257. Eichmann
headed Section IVB and was responsible for Jewish Affairs, including emigrations
and evacuations. Id. at 224-25.
203. Id. at 263.
204. Id. at 226. The court expressed confidence that Eichmann could have
avoided involvement in this murderous task. He would have been transferred to
another task had he expressed reservations concerning the Final Solution. The
Supreme Court noted that Eichmann had exceeded the requirements of his office
in implementing the Final Solution. See id. at 261-62. See also Judgment of the
Supreme Court, supra note 200, at 313.
205. Chief Military Prosecutor v. Malinki (Military Court of Appeal, 1957), II
PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 70, 77, 108 (1985) [hereinafter Kafir Qassem Judgment].
This case was not litigated under the standards of international law. Id. at 105-06.
The court applied the Military Justice Law which provided that a soldier is not
obligated to obey a manifestly illegal order. This mirrored the Israeli domestic
criminal code. See id. at 116 (reprinting relevant sections of the criminal code).
206. Id. at 109. The prosecution "need not prove that it was obvious to the
defendant... but even if the defendant believed that the order was not manifestly
unlawful, his belief will be of no avail if it was not reasonable, that is, objectively,
justified." Id. at 110. Such an extreme order "bursts out of the confines . ..
calling for help on the sense of lawfulness that ies deep within the conscience of
every human being ... even if he is an not expert in the law." Kafir Qassem
Judgment, supra note 205, at 108. This involves a relaxation of the rule that
ignorance of the law does not constitute a legal excuse as pertains to those orders
which are not manifestly illegal. Id.
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command: "After all these factors have been placed in the scale,
we must ask the main decisive question ... was the order bound
to appear manifestly unlawful in the eyes of those who received
it?"'2' TWo privates were acquitted on one of the murder counts
"since they had not yet had sufficient time to consider the illegality
of the order to open fire... taking into account the suddenness of
the order and the habits of immediate obedience to orders.., with
which they were inculcated."2'
A Dutch court in B and Van E relied on a similar rationale in
acquitting two defendants. B was a former officer in the Dutch
resistance who had ordered Van E to execute four Dutch Nazis for
murder and treason. B feared that the prisoners would interfere
with the unit's capacity to combat an anticipated German assault.
The Tribunal concluded that B and Van E had contravened the
humanitarian law of war.' Nevertheless, both were adjudged to
have acted in good faith under the pressure of exigent circumstanc-
es. B possessed no possibility of "consulting a superior [because]
... he was placed in a position for which he had not been prepared
... in circumstances -in which a calm weighing of interests was
impracticable.... [I]t cannot even be said that he ought to have
been conscious of the illegality of his act., 211 Van E was presum-
ably adjudged to have been prey to similar pressures and poorly
positioned to adjudge the legality of the order.21'
The jurisprudence of superior orders was further refined by the
Austrian Supreme Court in Leopold L. The defendant was an S.S.
deputy troop leader and a Labor Camp T guard. The court stated
207. Id. at 110. The Tribunal noted that in determining whether an order is
manifestly illegal, a court will consider the totality of the circumstances: a
recipient's rank; the respective ranks of the superior and subordinate; the
reasonableness of the belief that the commanding officer possessed special insight
and information; the pressures placed on the subordinate as well as the time
available for reflection; and the reasonableness of any mistake of fact. Id. at 109-
10. The question of a manifestly unlawful order "is not just a technical 'legal
question,' that is, a matter of the court setting a standard but is, at least in part,
also a legal question in a narrower sense ... what is the relevant law and how far
did the defendant deviate from the law." Id. at 111.
208. Kafir Qassem Judgment, supra' note 205, at 112. "Such an order should
have aroused the conscience of all the appellants, including the privates, even in
the special circumstances that prevailed on that day. . . . [But] a consideration
which cannot tip the balance in favor of acquittal can nevertheless exert an
influence toward reducing the sentence." Id. at 114.
209. Military Prosecutor v. B. and Van E., 18 INT'L L. REP. 536 (1957)
(Holland, Court Martial Jan. 2, 1951).
210. Id. at 537.
211. Id. at 536-37.
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that the general orders issued by occupation authorities to
exterminate Jews and Poles were not directly addressed to the
defendant. Unauthorized killings which were in line with these
directives may have been tolerated or even approved and support-
ed by the defendant's immediate superiors, but defendant Leopold
was not required to undertake any of the killings with which he was
charged. The labor camp regulations stated that internees were to
be subjected to hard labor; no instructions were issued requiring
their ill-treatment or death. Even the most draconian German laws
provided for a preliminary proceeding.212 Thus, any putative
orders to exterminate internees "were straightaway recognizable as
illegal .... [R]ecognizable by anybody as illegal....
Continental courts also convicted several defendants who
displayed confusion about the requirements of the humanitarian
law of war. The German Federal Supreme Court, in the Preventive
Murder Judgement, confronted the question of reciprocity.214 The
Nuremberg Tribunal had acquitted Admirals Donitz and Raeder of
unrestricted submarine warfare based upon the rule of reciprocity.
The same policy had been practiced by the British in the Skagerrak
and the Americans in the Pacific. 21 '5 But the Federal Court failed
to find an equivalency between Allied air attacks on civilians and
the killing of foreign workers. 216
In addition, a French military court confronted the challenge
of reprisals in 1945 at the trial of Colonel Carl Bauer in which
Bauer ordered defendant Ernst Schrameck to execute three
captured French resistance fighters. These orders were passed on
to Lieutenant Herbert Falten whose squad executed the prisoners.
Bauer contended that he had acted pursuant to Hitler's order to
make reprisals against irregular combatants and Schrameck testified
that Bauer's order was not subject to discussion or dissent. Falten
had postponed the executions and had unsuccessfully asked
Schrameck to cancel the command. The defendants were convicted
of having unlawfully executed the three prisoners. Bauer was
sentenced to death but because Schrameck and Falten had acted on
212. Public Prosecutor v. Leopold L, 47 INT'L L. REP. 464 (1974) (Austrian
Supreme Court, May 10, 1967).
213. Id. at 466.
214. WAR CRIMES (PREVENTIVE MURDER) (GERMANY) CASE, 32 INT'L L.
REP. 563, 565 (1966)(Federal Supreme Court, Sept. 30, 1960) [hereinafter
PREVENTIVE MURDER JUDGMENT].
215. See NUREMBERG JUDGMENT, supra note 86, at 559.
216. PREVENTIVE MURDER JUDGMENT, supra note 214, at 564-65.
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Bauer's orders this fact was admitted as a mitigating circumstance
and the two were instead sentenced to five years imprisonment.217
Were the three victims lawful belligerents entitled to the
protections accorded to prisoners of war? The one question
remaining from this case is whether the detainees displayed the
identifying insignia required of lawful belligerents. The three men
were dressed as civilians when captured and the arm of one was
adorned with a tricolor strap while another wore an American
helmet. The partisans fought alongside uniformed free French
forces, but it was uncertain as to whether they were organized
under the required military command. The Tribunal conceded that
the defendants' status was ambiguous and suggested that the
defendants may have lawfully and spontaneously taken up arms to
defend the unoccupied territory of Autun. Such considerations
may have explained their failure to organize themselves into
military units. German control over French territory was being
challenged by invading Allied troops, but it was unclear as to
whether Autun constituted unoccupied territory. A hearing, of
course, is a prerequisite to execution. But, the victims' admission
that they had fought against the Germans may have reasonably
been viewed as satisfying this procedural requirement.218
Following these cases, an American military commission
convicted Lieutenant General Kurt Maelzer for obeying the order
of Field Marshal Kesselring to parade hundreds of American and
British prisoners of war through Rome. The crowds allegedly
showered the captives with sticks and stones. Prisoners who
responded with derisive gestures were purportedly threatened with
217. Trial Of Carl Bauer, Ernst Schrameck And Herbert Falten (Perm. Milit.
Trib., Dijon, Oct. 18, 1945), VIII LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 15-16, 17-18, 20-
21 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) [hereinafter Bauer Judgment]. Colonel
Schrameck and Lieutenant Falten had been involved in the capture of the three
partisans. They were aware that executions had been scheduled within a day of
the apprehension and that a hearing could not possibly have been conducted.
Schrameck nevertheless passed on the order to kill which was carried out by
Falten. Id. at 16-20.
218. See id. at 16-20 (notes on the case). A lawful belligerent at that time was
legally required to wear a fixed, distinctive and visible insignia, carry arms openly,
fight under organized military command and respect the laws and customs of war.
The law of war also provided belligerent status to the inhabitants of a territory
who spontaneously took up arms without having had time to organize themselves
on the approach of the enemy. Id. at 16-17. See Convention (No. IV) Respecting
The Laws And Customs Of War On Land, With Annex Of Regulations, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 arts. 1 (qualifications of a belligerent), 2 (right of
inhabitants to resist invading troops in unoccupied territory) (1907) [hereinafter
Hague Convention].
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armed retaliation. Films and photos of the event were disseminat-
ed in order to quell rumors of German defeat. Maelzer's superior
orders plea was rejected and he was sentenced to ten years
imprisonment, later reduced to three years, for contravening the
requirement that prisoners should be humanely treated and
protected from public insult. Still, was Maelzer's offense was
manifestly illegal? Did parading the prisoners clearly constitute
inhumane treatment?
21 9
F Superior Orders And Vietnam: The Calley Case
The contemporary American standard for superior orders was
established in the 1953 case United States v. Kinder. Airman First
Class Thomas L. Kinder was convicted for obeying an order to kill
a Korean civilian who had been apprehended in an Air Force
bomb dump. The Air Force Board of Review held that the orders
of a superior officer "will not justify a homicide resulting from such
acts if the acts ordered are manifestly beyond the scope of the
superior officer's authority and the order is so obviously and
palpably unlawful as to admit of no reasonable doubt on the part
of a man of ordinary sense and understanding.
220
The Calley case followed the rule of the Kinder decision. In
1973 Lieutenant William Calley was convicted by a general court
martial of premeditated murder and assault with intent to commit
murder. Calley's platoon participated in a March 1968 assault
against the elite 48th Viet Cong Battalion. His troops swept
through sub-hamlet My Lai (4) and then joined other units in
encircling the Viet Cong. An investigation later revealed that
Calley had supervised and had participated in the shooting of two
groups of Vietnamese civilians, including infants and children.2
The Court of Military Review concluded that:
219. Trial Of Lieutenant General Kurt Maelzer (U.S. Milit. Comm., Florence
Italy, Sept. 9-14, 1946), XI LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 53 (U.N. War Crim.
Comm'n, '1949). A defendant may not raise a mistake of law defense to a
manifestly illegal order: such a command would be instantly recognizable as illicit
by a person of ordinary sense and understanding. See supra notes 206-08 and
accompanying text.
220. United States v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R 742, 773 (1953). The court dismissed
the defense that the defendant believed he was obligated to obey superior orders.
The Board of Review queried whether a subordinate would be obliged to cut off
his or her head in response to a command. Id at 775.
221. United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1164, 1169-70 (A.C.M.R. 1973)
affd 22 C.M.A. 534, 48 C.M.R. 19 (A.C.M.R. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Calley v.
Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650 (M.D. Ga. 1974), verdict reinstated, 519 F.2d 194 (5th
Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
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[t]here is no doubt that a group of submissive defenseless
Vietnamese, women, children, and old men ... were shot down
in summary execution .... 222 Reprisal by summary execution
of the helpless is forbidden in the laws of land warfare ....
Whether an armed conflict be a local uprising or a global war,
summary executions as in My Lai (4) are not justifiable.2 3
Calley claimed that he had been ordered to eliminate the
villagers. He testified that Captain Ernest Medina ordered the
troops to destroy everything and everyone encountered in their
rapid advance through My Lai (4). The civilians would be at the
market and Medina allegedly stressed that the Americans would
finally confront the Viet Cong. Medina conceded that he advised
Calley to use prisoners to lead the troops through the mine fields.
Calley responded that he had been in radio contact with Medina
during the My Lai mission and had been instructed to execute the
prisoners. 4 The Court of Military Review concluded:
[i]f the members found that appellant fabricated his claim of
obedience to orders, their finding has abundant support in the
record. If they found his claim of acting in obedience to orders
to be credible, he would nevertheless not automatically be
entitled to acquittal. Not every order is exonerating.22
The Court of Military Review approved the trial judge's
instruction that Calley could not rely on the superior orders
defense if the jury determined that Calley knew, or a man of
,ordinary sense and understanding would have known, that the
order was illegal.2" A purely "subjective innocence-through-
ignorance" standard would diminish the protections afforded to
innocents and risk fueling a cycle of retaliation.227
222. Ca~ley, 46 C.M.R. at 1170.
223. Id. at 1174.
224. Id. at 1180-81. Medina conceded that he had ordered troops to burn the
homes, kill livestock, close wells, destroy food crops, and deploy prisoners to lead
troops through the mine fields. He also noted that the incursion would be
preceded by artillery fire. Id. at 1181-82. The witnesses all anticipated that they
:would encounter the Forty-eighth Viet Cong Battalion. Only three of twenty-three
prosecution witnesses remembered a direction to kill. Id. at 1182.
225. Calley, 46 C.M.R. at 1182-83.
226. Id. at 1183. The illegality of the alleged order is "apparent upon even
cursory evaluation by a man of ordinary sense and understanding." Id.
227. Id. at 1184. "Casting the defense of obedience to orders solely in
subjective terms of mens rea would operate practically to abrogate those objective
restraints which are essential to functioning rules of war." Id.
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The Court of Military Appeals also endorsed the trial judge's
actual knowledge or objective person of ordinary sense and
understanding standard.2" The defense conceded before the
appellate tribunal that an objective standard was required but
contended that the controlling test should be whether the order was
so "palpably or manifestly illegal that a person of 'the commonest
understanding' would be aware of its illegality." '229 The ordinary
sense and understanding test was described as unfair to those with
a slow or substandard mentality who were continuously challenged
by the conflicting commands and conundrums of domestic and
international law. ° The intellectually indolent thus confronted
the prospect of being sanctioned for negligent rather than inten-
tional violations of the humanitarian law of war. 1 Judge Robert
E. Quinn rejected these arguments and stated that Calley would
not be absolved by adopting a lower standard: "[W]hether
Lieutenant Calley was the most ignorant person in the ... Army
... or the most intelligent, he must be presumed to know that he
could not kill ... infants and unarmed civilians who were ...
demonstrably incapable of resistance ....
Judge William H. Darden in his dissent argued that the
majority standard was too strict. It would lead to sanctioning those
who, as a result of attitude, aptitude or training, were inclined to
comply with commands. The commonest understanding standard
recognized that discipline is the central component of the military
mission and should not be compromised by the fictional reasonable
person test under which "an accused ... after the fact may find
himself punished for either obedience or disobedience, depending
on whether the evidence will support.., simple negligence on his
228. Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 19-26. The jury was to apply the superior orders
instructions unless it determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Calley had not
received such commands. In considering whether Calley possessed knowledge of
the illegality of the order, the jury was instructed to review all relevant facts. This
included Lieutenant Calley's age, background, education, rank, and training. Id.
at 27.
229. Id. at 27.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 27-28. Defense psychiatrists testified that Calley had acted
automatically and lacked the capacity to premeditate the killings because he lacked
the capacity to reflect upon alternative courses of action. See 46 C.M.R. at 1177.
The Court of Military Review conceded that Calley's judgment, perception, and
stability were "lesser in quality" than the average officer and that these
deficiencies to some extent mitigated his guilt. Id. at 1196.
232. Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 29.
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part." 3  Judge Darden believed that Medina's bombastic brief-
ing, combined with faulty intelligence and Calley's experiences in
Vietnam, may have made "the illegality of ... orders to kill
civilians ... less clear than they are in a hindsight review. '
Calley was singled out for trial while his superiors escaped
prosecution. This inequity was exacerbated by the fact that his
conduct was a logical extension of the strategy and tactics em-
ployed by the United States. Calley and his men had been
precipitously propelled to Vietnam and were unprepared and
poorly trained for combat. Could not Calley reasonably conclude
that his conduct would have been rewarded rather than reviled?
Analysts also argued that Calley's crimes were a predictable
psychological response to the pressures on his platoon. The
question of whether it was unreasonable to expect Calley to
counter Medina's subtle suggestion to murder the Vietnamese still
remains.23'
American court-martials continued to struggle with superior
orders claims. For example, in United States v. Griffen, an
American platoon apprehended a Viet Cong. As the platoon
moved forward, the men feared that they were being shadowed.
The wounded were evacuated by helicopter, but the company
headquarters refused to authorize the prisoners removal.2 6
The accused, Staff Sergeant Walter Griffen, overheard a radio
order to execute the detainee. Griffen then received and complied
with a direct command to remove and shoot the prisoner. He later
233. Id. at 31. Judge Darden noted that, while the reasonable person test was
commonly employed in legal jurisprudence, in this instance, the standard should
be compromised by the concern with discipline. Id. Judge Robert M. Duncan
concurred in the judgment. He noted that he favored a standard which required
that "every member of the armed forces would have immediately recognized that
the order was unlawful, as well as a consequence of his age, grade, intelligence,
experience, and training." Id. at 30. The man of ordinary sense and understand-
ing standard is contained in the court-martial manual:
An order requiring the performance of a military duty may be
inferred to be legal. An act performed manifestly beyond the
scope of authority, or pursuant to an order that a man of
ordinary sense and understanding would know to be illegal, or
in a wanton manner in the discharge of a lawful duty, is not
excusable.
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES l 216 (rev. 1969) quoted in id.
at 29-30.
234. Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 33.
235. See Matthew Lippman, War Crimes: The My Lai Massacre And The
Vietnam War, supra note 3, at _.
236. United States v. Griffen; 39 C.M.R. 586, 587 (A.B.R. 1968).
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testified that he believed that the detainee's execution was justified
since the prisoner impeded the platoon's progress and increased the
likelihood of an enemy attack. This fear was heightened by the
fact that the platoon had suffered heavy casualties several months
earlier in the same vicinity. Griffen also believed that the execu-
tion order was required to prevent the prisoner from escaping and
breaching security since one detainee had previously attempted to
flee.237
The Army Board of Review rejected Griffen's superior orders
defense and ruled that the order was "so obviously beyond the
scope of authority of the superior officer and so palpably illegal on
its face as to admit of no doubt of its unlawfulness to a man of
ordinary sense and understanding.""2  Griffen's guilt was none-
theless mitigated because he had been caught in a confusing
kaleidoscope of events and had no criminal record. He was
sentenced to two years hard labor.3 9
Realistically, could Griffen be expected to defy a directive of
his company commander and platoon leader while isolated in the
jungles of Vietnam? Was the order clearly contrary to the
humanitarian law of war? This was a case of the selective
imposition of criminal culpability: both officers were acquitted
while Griffen and two other low-level combatants were convicted
for obeying superior orders.21
When it came to actually being sent to Vietnam, combatants
were unsuccessful in using the superior orders defense as a shield
to prevent being sent. Captain Howard Levy, for instance, was
prosecuted for refusing to establish and operate a dermatological
training program for Special Forces personnel. He contended that
these types of troops were committing war crimes and that
obedience to the orders violated medical ethics. The court rejected
Levy's claim and ruled that he had "failed to show that Special
Forces aidmen as a group engaged systematically in the commission
of war crimes by prostituting their medical training.
' 241
237. Id. at 588.
238. Id. at 590.
239. Id. at 591. The Army Field Manual prohibited putting prisoners to death
because their presence retarded movements or diminished the power of resistance.
Id. at 589.
240. Griffen, 39 C.M.R. at 591.
241. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772, 797 (3d Cir. 1973), affd sub nom. Parker v.
Levy, 471 U.S. 733 (1973). See generally Switkes v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 358
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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G. A Contemporary Canadian Case
In 1994, the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v. Finta ruled
that the superior orders defense was available to defendants
charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity.42 The
court noted that war crimes and crimes against humanity are core
legal concepts controlling the conduct of States. These principles
would be frustrated "if individuals could be absolved of culpability
for such crimes simply because it was not illegal under the law of
the state on behalf of which they acted. . . . [T]he mere existence
of such law cannot be a defence to an individual charged with a
war crime."
243
The Canadian criminal code authorizes those accused of war
crimes and crimes against humanity to rely on any justification
available "under the laws of Canada or under international law at
that time or the time of the proceedings." 2" The Canadian
Supreme Court stated that this presumably included military
necessity and reprisal.245 Section Fifteen of the Penal Code
provides that a defendant may not rely on the defense that he or
she acted in obedience to, or in conformity with, legal codes and
statutes.246  Thus, the Supreme Court accordingly ruled that
Section Fifteen precluded the "simple argument that because a
domestic law existed . . . authoriz[ing] the conduct . . . the law in
itself acts as an excuse. 2 47 The court observed that recognizing
a defense that an individual acted in accordance with a domestic
decree which contravened international law would be illogical and
senseless.2' There are "higher responsibilities than simple
242. Regina v. Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701. The accused, Irme Finta, was charged
with illegal confinement, robbery, kidnapping and manslaughter as well as with
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Finta, an officer in the Gendarmerie,
allegedly committed these crimes pursuant to the "Baky Order," a decree issued
by the Hungarian Ministry of Interior. He purportedly supervised the shipment
of 8617 Jews to the gas chambers. See id. at 788-92 (Cory, J.).
243. Id. at 729 (La Forest J.).
244. Id. at 776 (La Forest, J.) quoting Criminal Code, § 7(3.74). The war crimes
statute provides that a war crime or crime against humanity perpetrated abroad
is considered to have occurred in Canada so long as the act, if committed in
Canada, would constitute a breach of Canadian domestic law. Ida at 801-02
quoting § 7(3.71)(3.76) (Cory, J.).
245. 1 S.C.R. at 777 (La Forest, J.).
246. Id. at 776 (La Forest, J.).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 865-66 (Cory, J.). It is not a violation of fundamental justice to
preclude a defense which is "inconsistent with the offense proscribed in that it
would excuse the very evil which the offense seeks to prohibit or punish." Id. at
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observance of national law .... [T]he standards of international
law are part of our [Canadian] domestic law [and we] cannot allow
for other states simply to deny or violate observation of the
standards of international law by the enactment of contrary
domestic laws."'24 9 After all, "even Hitler could have defended
charges... by claiming that he was merely obeying the law of the
country."2-0
Section Fifteen could not be used by a defendant to plead the
defense of superior orders or, in the case of a sworn officer, the
police officer defense.251 According to Judge Gerard La Forest,
"the rationale for these defences is that a realistic assessment of
police or military organizations requires an element of simple
obedience; there must be some degree of accommodation to those
who are members of such bodies. 25 2 He added that respect for
the equality, dignity and autonomy of the individual cannot be fully
extended to members of the military. The armed forces are vital
for national defense and depend upon "instant, unquestioning
obedience to.. . those in authority.... This is. . . the only way in
which a military unit can effectively operate . . . . [T~he lives of
every member of a unit may depend upon ... instantaneous
compliance with orders even though those orders may later ...
appear to have been unnecessarily harsh."253 (emphasis in origi-
nal).
865 (Cory, J.). Section 7(3.74) appears to have been enacted to limit the scope of
section 15 which provided a defense against conviction in those cases in which the
accused acted "'in obedience to the laws for the time being made and enforced by
persons in de facto possession of the sovereign power in and over the place the act
or omission occurs."' 1 S.C.R. at 839 quoting § 15 (Cory, J.).
The Supreme Court noted that section 7(3.74) is permissive. Where a law
falling within section 15 is not manifestly unlawful, the accused may be able to
argue a mistaken belief in the validity of the law. This belief may be taken into
account in determining whether the defendant possessed the requisite guilty mind.
Id. at 864 (Cory, J.).
249. Id. at 780-781 (La Forest, J.).
250. Id. at 840 (Cory, J.).
251. Id. at 840-41 (Cory, J.). The police officer defense provides "legal
protection to a police officer, who, acting in good faith and on a reasonable belief
that his or her actions are justified by law, later finds out that those actions were
not authorized because the law was found to be defective." 1 S.C.R. at 842 (Cory,
J.). The defense is not available in those instances in which the order is manifestly
unlawful. See id Section 25 sets forth the peace officer defense. See id. at 803
(Cory, J.) quoting § 25. This provides a defense to law enforcement officers or
others involved in the administration or enforcement of the law who in good faith
carry out or reasonably rely on force to carry out various legal procedures. Id
252. 1 S.C.R. at 777 (La Forest, J.).
253. Id at 828-29 (Cory, J.).
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The Finta court further explained that criminal codes tradition-
ally had limited liability for illegal orders to those who issued and
transmitted the commands. These individuals possessed the
opportunity and knowledge to ensure that military orders con-
formed to the humanitarian law of war. But in those instances in
which such commands were manifestly illegal, respect for interna-
tional morality and law dictated the extension of liability to low-
level combatants." This test has received "a wide measure of
international acceptance" and balanced the imperative of obedience
with the requisites of the humanitarian law of war. A manifestly
illegal order is one that "offends the conscience of every reason-
able, right-thinking person" and must be "obviously and flagrantly
wrong.' '255  It is "not a requirement that the accused knew or
believed, according to his or her own moral code or knowledge of
the law, that the orders and his or her actions were unlawful." 6
The court did, however, recognize that the Canadian code
permitted the use of superior orders as a defense or mitigating
defenses. 257 A defendant confronting a manifestly illegal order
might still plead superior orders in those instances in which he or
she was subjected to duress and possessed "no moral choice but to
obey." 8  A threat which is "imminent, real, and inevitable" is
considered to constitute a "level of compulsion that disables a
subordinate from forming a culpable state of mind." 9 In deter-
mining the reasonableness of such a threat, a court may consider
the subordinate's circumstances and state of mind.2" The lower
the subordinate's rank, "the greater will be the sense of compulsion
that will exist and the less will be the likelihood that the individual
will experience any real moral choice."261
254. Id. at 829 (Cory, J.).
255. Id. at 834 (Cory, J.). Judge Cory proved the example of the order of King
Herod to kill babies under two years of age which was considered to "offend and
shock the conscience of the most hardened soldier." Id.
256. 1 S.C.R. at 844 (Cory, J.).
257. Id. at 777-78 (La Forest, J.).
258. Id. at 778 (La Forest, J.).
259. Id. at 837 (Cory, J.).
260. Id. (Cory, J). The circumstances include a subordinate's age, education,
intelligence, length of time in action, the nature of the hostilities, the type of
enemy confronted and the opposing methods of warfare. Circumstances going to
state of mind include the announced and probable sanction for disobedience, the
reasonable beliefs of other combatants and the subordinate's beliefs concerning the
possible penalty, and the alternatives available to avoid imposition of the sentence.
1 S.C.R. at 837-38 (Cory, J.).
261. Id. at 838 (Cory, J.). The "whole concept of the military is... coercive.
... The question of moral choice will arise far less in the case of a private accused
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Finta is a testimony- to the coherence and consensus surround-
ing the superior orders defense. The Canadian Supreme Court
recognized superior orders as a fundamental principle of the
humanitarian law of war incorporated into the Canadian Criminal
Code. This decision was a concession to the exigencies of military
and police organizations. The court incorporated the reasonable-
ness, manifest illegality and duress standards into Canadian
jurisprudence of superior orders, but at the same time would not
extend the defense to individuals simply complying with their
country's legal code. Canada of course deviated from the interna-
tional standard by recognizing superior orders as a defense, as well
as a factor in mitigating punishment.26
H. Summary
In 1946 the United Nations affirmed the principles of interna-
tional law recognized by the Nuremberg Tribunal." The Tribu-
nal's interpretation of the superior order provision of the London
Charter continues to set the standard for international instruments.
The Draft Code of Crimes Against The Peace and Security of
Mankind in Article Nine lists as one of the "exceptions to criminal
responsibility" for crimes against the peace and security of mankind
"[tihe order of a Government or of a superior, provided a moral
choice was in fact not possible to the perpetrator."'' z" The superi-
or orders defense is incorporated into a separate article in the
amended 1991 draft code while other defenses are encompassed
within a generic provision.265 The admissibility of these defenses
of a war crime or a crime against humanity than in the case of a general or other
high ranking officer." Id. Judge Peter Cory noted that a defendant might rely on
mistake of fact in those instances in which an order is not manifestly unlawful. A
peace officer or soldier in such circumstances may plead that he or she reasonably
believed that the order was lawful. Id at 845 (Cory, J.).
262. See supra notes 242-61 and accompanying text. The state of war, the
presence of German occupation forces, the declared state of emergency,
government and public approval of the persecution of Jews and the imminent
invasion of the German forces give "an air of reality to the defenses" of obedience
to superior orders. 1 S.C.R. at 848 (Cory, J.). For the jury instructions see id. at
779-80 (Cory, J.).
263. U.N.G.A. Res. 95(I), supra note 92.
264. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art.
9(d), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/25 (1950), reprinted in INT'L L. COMM. 150 (1954). See
Benjamin B. Ferencz, The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security
of Mandin, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 674 (1981).
265. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess.
Supp. (No. 10) at 242, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991). The order of a superior does not
relieve an individual of responsibility "if, in the circumstances at the time, it was
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is to be considered by a competent court "under the general princi-
ples of law . . . [in] the light of the character of each crime. 266
Superior orders may also be considered as an extenuating circum-
stance at sentencing.2
67
Superior orders were also included in the Convention Against
Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman Or Degrading Treatment Or
Punishment, which provides that "[a]n order from a superior officer
or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification... [for]
torture. ''21 In fact, the statute granting jurisdiction to the tribu-
nal judging war crimes in former Yugoslavia incorporated the
Nuremberg standard.269
Scholars continue to disagree about whether there is an
international consensus on the contours of the superior orders
defense.270 Neither the Genocide 71 nor Apartheid Conven-
tions272 contain superior orders provisions. Furthermore, a
proposal by the International Committee of the Red Cross to
incorporate a superior orders provision in the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 was rejected.273 The Red Cross submitted a similar draft
possible for him not to comply with that order." Id. at art. 11, 242. The
"competent court shall determine the admissibility of defences under the general
principles of law, in the light of the character of each crime." Id. at art. 14(1), 243.
266. Id. at art. 14(1)m 243.
267. Id. at 14(2), 243.
268. Convention Against Torture And Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 31 U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/198472, Annex (1984), art. 2(3). A similar provision is contained in
the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, O.A.S. Treaty Ser.
No. 67, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/ Ser. P, AG/Doc.2023/85 rev. 1, at 46 (1986), art. 4.
269. See United Nations Secretary General, Report on Aspects of Establishing
an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia, 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1175, art. 7(4) (1993).
270. See Theo Vogler, The Defense of "Superior Orders" in International
Criminal Law, in I A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES
AND PUNISHMENT 619 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973). But see
L.C. Green, The Defence of Superior Orders In the Modern Law of Armed
Conflict, 31 ALBERTA L. REV. 320, 331 (1993).
271. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 297.
272. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of "Apartheid", U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30 at 75, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1974).
273. See Howard S. Levie, Some Comments On Professor D'Amato's
"Paradox", 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 608, 609 (1986). See generally Convention For The
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva I];
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
Wrecked Members of Armed.Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
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to the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the 1977 Protocols to
the Geneva Conventions. Unfortunately, the proposal failed to
receive the required two-thirds support.
274
The judgments of national and international tribunals have
nevertheless mainly "displayed a commendable uniformity in the
matter of superior orders. 2 5 The reasonable person and mani-
fest illegality standards have received wide-spread acceptance. The
reasonableness standard is calibrated to the defendant's back-
ground, rank and circumstance, thus taking into account the typical
conscript's level of understanding and the conflicting pressures
placed upon him. A more comprehensive command of the law has
been demanded of officers in comparison to subordinates.
276
The manifest illegality standard also reflects an appreciation
for the view that a "soldier cannot be expected to carry in his
knapsack not only a Field Marshal's baton but also a treatise on
international law., 277 In the words of the District Court in Finta,
the order "must wave like a black flag ... a warning saying:
'forbidden."' [A]n unlawfulness that pierces the eye and agitates
the heart" must be apparent.27 Defendants charged with serious
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
Geneva III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
274. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977 U.N.
JURID. Y.B. 95, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter "Protocol I"];
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1977 U.N. JURID.
Y. B. 135, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter "Protocol II"]. The Red
Cross proposal denied the superior orders defense if "'in the circumstances at the
time he should have reasonably known that he was committing a grave breach...
and that he had the possibility of refusing to obey the order."' Green, supra note
270, at 330. But such orders might be considered in mitigation of punishment.
Industrialized countries favored extending the defense to all war crimes while
developing countries opposed recognizing the privilege to disobey orders. Other
countries advocated a generic provision that an individual only may be convicted
of a war crime if demonstrated to have wilfully committed the crime. Id.
275. N.C.H. Dunbar, Some Aspects of the Problem of Superior Orders in the
Law of War, LXIII JURID. REV. 234, 250 (1951). The duty of absolute obedience
to superior orders has been "discredited.... But it is also true that the contrary
view according to which superior orders can in no circumstances constitute a
defense is equally untenable." Id. at 251.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 261.
278. Kafir Qassem Judgment, supra note 205, at 108. The Nuremberg standard
did not distinguish between the gravity of criminal offenses for purposes of the
superior orders defense. Nevertheless, the Nuremberg Charter and judgment
addressed the grave offenses of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes
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offenses are thus precluded from relying on the superior orders
defense. Combatants are "expected to realize that acts such as the
killing and ill-treatment of prisoners of war, the mass extermination
of civilian inhabitants ... and the wanton devastation and pillage
of property ... are manifestly unlawful.
279
The superior orders standard, as such, creates an irrebuttable
presumption that a defendant carrying out a manifestly illegal order
possesses the requisite knowledge of the command's criminal
character. An international law defense is thus precluded'
because these orders are plainly contrary to international law.
"Although military discipline is a necessity for the smooth opera-
tion of a hierarchical chain of command, allowing obedience as a
defense to carrying out an obviously illegal order makes military
obedience superior to the rule of law.""1  The legal application
of the manifest illegality test nevertheless remains an irresistibly
political one.'
The Nuremberg Judgment's "moral choice" standard provides
a defense of duress to subordinates who reasonably believe that
they are coerced or compelled to comply with a command to
commit an illegal act.' The Einsatzgruppen panel decided that
an individual is not required to "forfeit his life or suffer serious
harm in order to avoid committing a crime which he con-
demns."'  The threat must be "imminent, real and inevita-
ble" and must be disproportionate to the harm caused by a
defendant's criminal conduct. Thus "[i]t would not be an adequate
excuse ... if a subordinate ... killed a person ... because by not
obeying it he himself would risk a few days of confinement. Nor
may he ... commit the illegal act once the duress ceases. '' 8
To date, there is no reported case in which a defendant
successfully combined the superior orders and duress defenses. The
Tribunals uniformly rejected the claim that Nazi defendants would
have suffered severe retribution had they refused to comply with
superior orders. In contrast, the Einsatzgruppen panel observed
against peace. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 81, at art. II.
279. Dunbar, supra note 275, at 255.
280. See Jeanne L. Bakker, The Defense of Obedience to Superior Orders: The
Mens Rea Requirement, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 60, 67 (1989).
281. Id. at 60.
282. See Scott, supra note 59 and accompanying text.
283. 1 S.C.R. at 836, 838.
284. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 95, at 480.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 471.
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that the reluctant and recalcitrant interfered with the efficiency of
extermination and were swiftly dispatched from the battlefield.'
Thus, the issue of whether combatants ever feel free to disregard
an order during combat remains. When are threats so clear and
compelling that the duress defense is applicable? What war crimes
may be justified under the defense of duress?28
Clearly, an officer is charged with a singular duty to refuse to
carry out or to convey an illegal command. "If international law
is to have any effectiveness, high commanding officers ... must
have the courage to act, in definite and unmistakable terms, so as
to indicate their repudiation of such an order., 289  This duty
appears to be satisfied by a good faith effort to interfere with the
enforcement of an illicit order. Specifically, there is no require-
ment that an officer openly defy a dictate2", but a superior who
passes on an illegal order may not later contend that his or her
character was so well known that subordinates should have realized
that they were not to obey the order.291
Indeed, the rule of resistance may place a commander or
combatant in a precarious position. He may be forced to choose
"between possible punishment by his lawless government for ...
[disobeying] the illegal order.., or... lawful punishment for the
crime under the law of nations. To choose the former in the hope
that victory will cleanse the act of its criminal characteristics
manifests only weakness of character."292  The fact that others
would have carried out the command had the defendant desisted
does not constitute a defense. An individual is responsible for his
or her own conduct and the reaction of others is speculative. 93
In addition, individuals who knowingly enlist in an illegal enterprise
287. Id. at 401-03.
288. Bakker, supra note 280, at 71.
289. High Command Judgment, supra note 146, at 598.
290. Id. at 557.
291. Id. at 520-21.
292. Hostage Judgment, supra note 121, at 1237. An individual who is not
under a legal duty to prevent an illegal act is not privileged to intervene. See
United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968) affd sub nom. United
States v. Eberhardt, 417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969) cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970);
State v. Marley, 54 Haw. 450, 509 P.2d 1095 (1973) (rejecting Nuremberg defense).
See generally Matthew Lippman, Liberating the Law: The Jurisprudence of Civil
Disobedience and Resistance, 2 SAN DIEGO L.J. 299 (1994); Matthew Lippman,
Civil Resistance: Revitalizing International Law In The Nuclear Age, 13 WHITIER
L. REV. 17 (1992).
293. Einsatzgruppen Judgment. supra note 95. at 485.
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may not later contend that they were compelled to commit a
criminal act. 94
In terms of mitigating punishment, the Nuremberg standard
provides for reducing the grade of the offense or the severity of
punishment.2 95 Various domestic codes permit superior orders to
be considered as either an extenuating or exculpatory consider-
ation.2 96 The sentences of low-ranking combatants were reduced
in cases where they complied with commands due to a lack of
comprehension or circumstance.297 The sentences of officers who
acted to ameliorate the impact of superior orders were also
mitigated29 and defendants deemed to have lacked the opportu-
nity for deliberation and decision were exculpated.2' 9
The slight difference in drafting between international and
domestic codes reflects a profound philosophical division. The
Nuremberg tribunals emphasized individual accountability and the
amelioration of criminal conduct. Domestic courts, particularly
when adjudicating the fate of domestic defendants, typically
stressed the imperative of organizational obedience and efficiency
and consequently imposed lighter sanctions. 3°°
The superior orders defense remains a topic of continuing
debate. The imposition of culpability on combatants is counter to
trained obedience and instinctual group solidarity and support. The
law of war's complexities also thrust soldiers into a maze of rules
which are complicated by reciprocity, reprisal, selective prosecution
and problems of proof?0 1 One country's celebrated combatants
are often another's war criminals. For instance, were the North
Vietnamese justified in characterizing captured American pilots as
criminals? 32 Was the Hiroshima bombing authorized under
international law3"3 or the attack on the Al'-Amariyah command
294. Id. at 480-81.
295. See NUREMBURG JUDGMENT, supra note 88 and accompanying text.
296. See supra text accompanying note 199.
297. See Bauer Judgment, supra note 217 and accompanying text.
298. See Hostage Judgment, supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
299. See Military Prosecutor v. B. and van E. supra notes 209-11 and
accompanying text.
300. See generally Kafir Qassem Judgment, supra note 205, at 76.
301. See Bakker, supra note 280, at 55-67.
302. See Hamilton Desaussure, The Laws of Air Warfare: Are There Any? 5
INT'L LAW 527 (1971).
303. See Matthew Lippman, Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Towards
a Declaration on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Nuclear
Humancide, 8 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 183 (1986).
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and control bunker in Baghdad which housed civilians?3°4 What
of the United States' 1986 air raid on Libya in retaliation for the
bombing of a Berlin discotheque? °" These American attacks
inflicted extensive damage and human destruction and were
characterized as catastrophic crimes by the victims. Were the
acclaimed and admired pilots who fulfilled these missions coura-
geous combatants or war criminals?3"
Some continue to argue that liability should not extend beyond
the policy level. This purportedly provides an adequate deterrent
and vindicates the rule of law. But the prosecution of policy
makers is politically precarious and presents perplexing problems
of proof. The treatment of subordinates as mindless machines who
are immune from punishment also contravenes the principle of
criminal culpability. A strict liability standard is unfair and
unrealistic because combatants who lacked criminal intent would be
subject to sanctions. But, this would encourage the examination of
orders and impede the military machine.3" The so-called "gold
mean" limits liability to combatants who carry out commands which
contravene "the sense of lawfulness that lies deep within the
conscience of every human being ... even if he is not [an] expert
in the law."3" The Israeli Military Court of Appeal, in Kafir
Qassem, concluded that "this solution ... is the best that can be
attained, and is fully consistent with.., a country.., based on the
rule of law."3"
304. See United States: Department of Defense Report to Congress on the
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War-Appendix on the Role of the Law of War, 31
I.L.M. 612, 624-26 (1992).
305. See Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the United States Air
Operation Against Libya, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 933 (1987).
306. See Lewy, supra note 23. A Tokyo District Court concluded that the
United States bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki violated international law. See
Richard Falk, The Shimoda Case: A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks upon
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 759 (1965).
307. See Eser, supra note 4, at 204-11.
308. II PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. at 108 (Kafir Qassem Judgment). But,
combatants are not held strictly liable for implementing orders which do not rise
to the level of manifest illegality. "To this end the legislator compares a mistake
of law to the general rule that an honest and reasonable mistake of fact exempts
the mistaken person from criminal responsibility." Id.
309. Id. at 109 (Kafir Qassem Judgment).
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II. Necessity
A. Military Necessity
In World War I the German military followed the credo that
military necessity supersedes the humanitarian law of war.31° The
German General Staff of Prussia expressed contempt for the fact
that "'the tendency of thought of the last century was dominated
... by humanitarian considerations which not infrequently
degenerated into sentimentality and flabby emotion.""'3 " This
thinking was criticized as being "'in fundamental contradiction with
the nature of war and its object."'312 Oxford Professor Hugh H.L.
Bellot commented in a 1917 essay that "[m]ilitary necessity knows
no law. Each belligerent is a law unto himself. It means the
abrogation of all law. Its application can only result in anarchy,
and in reprisals culminating in a competition of barbarism.
3 3
German defendants invoked military necessity as a defense to
the reprisal execution of hostages, seizure of property and use of
slave labor during World War II. In the Hostage case, the Tribunal
ruled that military necessity permits the incidental maiming and
killing of civilians during attacks on military targets which are
demanded by the exigencies of war. But military necessity does not
justify a violation of the positive provisions of the humanitarian law
of war. Necessity only qualifies a legal rule in those instances in
which it is explicitly incorporated into a positive principle.31 a The
Tribunal rejected the view that the rules of warfare "are anything
less than they purport to be. Military necessity ... [does] not
justify a violation of positive rules. International law is prohibitive.
... The rights of the innocent ... must be respected even if
military necessity or expediency decree otherwise." '315 An occu-
pant who is unable to control the local population must either
curtail operations or withdraw from the territory; it is not justified
in violating the law of war.316
The High Command Tribunal rejected the view of German
publicists that "military necessity includes the right to do anything
310. See Theodore S. Woolsey, Retaliation and Punishment, 9 PROC. AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. 62, 63 (1916).
311. Hugh H. L. Bellot, supra note 23, at 41.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 32.
314. Hostage Judgment, supra note 121, at 1253-54.
315. Id. at 1256.
316. Id. at 1272.
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that contributes to the winning of a war .... [S]uch a view would
eliminate all humanity[,] ... decency law from the conduct of war
and ... [is] contrary to the accepted usages of civilized na-
tions." '3 17 Recognition of such an expansive version of military
necessity would mean that a belligerent in danger of defeat would
be authorized to suspend the humanitarian law of war. The result
would be that "the rules of war would quickly disappear. Every
belligerent could find a reason to assume that it had higher
interests to protect." '318 The pernicious result of this philosophy
is illustrated by the Nazi's killing of Russian Jews, the "bearers of
Bolshevism."319
German defendants also contended that the saturation
bombing of cities during World War-II exemplified the increasingly
"totalitarian aspect""32  of contemporary "total war." '321
Einsatzgruppen recognized that the Allies attacked cities for tactical
purposes, to shut down communications, railroads, ammunition
plants, and factories in order to obtain military advantage.
Civilians were inevitably injured and killed in these operations but
the bombing was terminated following surrender. This behavior
differed from the German justification of exterminating enemy
civilians on the basis of necessity. The exterminations bore little
relation to the pursuit of military success and continued long after
the enemy's capitulation.322
Necessity is implicitly incorporated into the law of the
governance of occupied territory. An occupant is authorized to
"take all ... measures ... to restore and ensure ... public order
and safety, while respecting ... the laws in force in the coun-
try.'7323  Article 53 permits an occupying power to requisition
property and services in order to satisfy the "needs of the army of
occupation.. . . They shall be in proportion to the resources of the
country . Requisitions include billets, stables, food and
317. High Command Judgment, supra note 146, at 541. The Tribunal opined
that "[tihe devastation prohibited by the Hague Rules and the usages of war is
that not warranted by military necessity." Id.
318. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 95, at 463.
319. Id. at 464. "If merely being an inhabitant of Russia made that inhabitant
a threat to Germany then the Einsatzgruppen would have had to kill every
Russian, regardless of race." Id.
320. HOSTAGE JUDGMENT, supra note 121, at 1317.
321. Id.
322. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 95, at 467. See Protocol I, supra note
274, at arts. 51-52 (protection of civilian population from indiscriminate attack).
323. Hague Convention, supra note 218, at art. 43.
324. Id. at art. 52.
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urgently needed equipment and supplies. There is no provision for
the large-scale despoliation or transfer of industrial property to the
occupant's home territory.3"
B. War Crimes Prosecutions And The Defense Of Military
Necessity
The Krupp Tribunal rejected the contention that the "great
emergency" in the German economy justified the plunder and
spoliation of industrial property in the occupied territories.326
The rules and customs of warfare were designed for "all phases of
war. . .. To claim that they can be wantonly - and at the sole
discretion of any one belligerent - disregarded when he considers
his own situation to be critical, means nothing more or less than to
abrogate the laws and customs of war entirely." 27 The panel in
Farben rejected the idea that the necessities of economic warfare
had qualified the Hague Convention and that the instrument should
be interpreted in accordance with the exigencies of total war.312
In Krupp the Farben firm argued that its acquisition of a
controlling share in plants, factories and other interests in the
occupied territories were in accordance with an occupant's
obligation to provide for an orderly economy. The Tribunal
rejected this explanation and determined that these acquisitions
"were not primarily for the purpose of restoring or maintaining the
local economy, but were rather to enrich Farben as part of a
general plan to dominate the industries involved, all as part of
Farben's asserted "'claim to leadership."'329 The Flick Tribunal
conceded that the Flick firm's seizure of the Rombach plant in
Lorraine could be defended on the grounds of military necessity.
There was an absence of responsible management and an idle
population needing work. But Flick's conversion of the plant
325. United States v. Alfried Krupp, IX TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No.
10 1327, 1344-45 (1950) [hereinafter Krupp Judgment].
326. Id. at 1347.
327. Id.
328. United States v. Carl Krauch, VIII TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No.
10 1081, 1137-38 (1950) [hereinafter Farben Judgment]. The Tribunal determined
that the provisions governing the conduct of an occupant were neither vague nor
had been altered through custom and usage. Id at 1138.
329. Id. at 1141.
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indicated that the firm's intent was to plunder rather than to
preserve order.33°
The issue of military necessity was also addressed in the
context of the outright destruction of occupied territory. Defen-
dant Lothar Redulic was commander of the 20th Mountain Army
which retreated from Finland in the face of a Russian advance.
The Germans depopulated the Norwegian province of Finmark and
destroyed houses, highways and infrastructure in order to deny
resources to enemy forces. The Hostage Tribunal noted that
Article 23(g) of the Hague Convention prohibits the destruction or
seizure of enemy property, "unless. .. imperatively demanded by
the necessities of war., 331 The destruction of public and private
property which would provide aid and comfort to the enemy by
retreating military forces may, under the appropriate circumstances,
fall within the necessity provision of Article 23(g). But the
Tribunal failed to find a military necessity for the destruction and
devastation of Finland.332 Rendulic was nevertheless acquitted on
the ground that "[tihe conditions, as they appeared to the defen-
dant at the time, were sufficient upon which he could honestly
conclude that urgent military necessity warranted the decision
made. ,
333
The British Judge Advocate elaborated on military necessity
in the prosecution and conviction of Field-Marshal Erich von
Manstein. Von Manstein had ordered the destruction of property
and the evacuation of the Ukrainian population in order to deny
assistance to the advancing Russian forces. The Judge Advocate
opined that necessity permits that degree of destruction which is
required to preserve the safety and security of troops. It does not
authorize depredations undertaken to obtain a mere military
330. VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 1187, 1206 (1952) [hereinaf-
ter Flick Judgment]. "Military necessity is a broad term. Its interpretation
involves the exercise of some discretion. ... [Ihf after seizure the German
authorities had treated their possession as a conservatory for the rightful owners'
interests, little fault could be found with the subsequent conduct of those in
possession." Id
331. Hague Convention, supra note 218, at 23(g).
332. Hostage Judgment, supra note 121, at 1296.
333. Id. at 1297.
The course of a military operation by the enemy is loaded with
uncertainties, such as the numerical strength of the enemy, the quality of
his equipment, his fighting spirit, the efficiency and daring of his
commands, and the uncertainty of his intentions. ... [T]he defendant
may have erred in... his judgment but he was guilty of no criminal act.
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advantage. Armies in retreat would otherwise routinely ravage
property. The destruction of property must be limited to that
which would militarily assist the enemy and which does not include
desolation of vegetation or closing of wells. However, the accused
is to be accorded the benefit of the doubt in adjudging whether he
harbored a good faith belief under the circumstances that the
nature and scope of the devastation was justified."
The Judge Advocate also stated that necessity does justify
deporting the population in order to deny recruits and labor to
enemy forces. In limited circumstances, such evacuations may be
undertaken on humanitarian grounds in order to alleviate poverty
and starvation. The Judge Advocate raised an issue which remains
unresolved. What constitutes military necessity as opposed to a
mere military advantage? Von Manstein contended that the
destruction of property was required in order to deny the Russians
billets, observation posts and machinery and to delay their advance
as well. Necessity presumably requires that the destruction was
demanded to preserve and protect the lives of troops.3 35
In the case of maiming or killing protected persons, courts
were unwilling to accept such acts on the basis of military necessity.
A British military court ruled that Kapitanleutenant Heinz Eck was
not justified in directing machine gun fire and grenades at the
remnants of the sunken ship The Peleus, killing a number of
survivors. Eck contended that air surveillance would have spotted
the detritus and detected and destroyed his submarine. The court
rejected Eck's defense of operational necessity and sentenced him
to death. The Judge Advocate noted that the facts contradicted
Eck's claim. Eck had surveilled and sprayed the site for five hours
rather than attempting to escape. He undoubtedly realized that
this strafing could not eliminate the oil slicks which were easily
observable from the air.336
In another case, Gunther Thiele and Georg Steinert were
convicted of executing a wounded American officer. The accused
were part of a German unit which was hiding from nearby United
States troops. The verdict suggests that the American military
334. In Re von Lewinski (Brit. Milit. Ct., Hamburg, Germany, Dec. 1949), 16
INT'L L. REP. 509, 521-23 (1955) [hereinafter von Manstein Judgment].
335. Id.
336. Trial Of Kapitanleutenant Heinz Eck And Four Others For The Killing Of
Members Of The Crew Of The Greek Steamship Peleus, Sunk On The High Seas
(Brit. Milit. Ct., Hamburg, Germany, Oct. 17-20, 1945), I LAW REP. TRIALS WAR
CRIM. 1, 12 (1947) (The Peleus).
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commission rejected the claim of necessity. It determined that the
defendants breached their obligation to humanely treat a prisoner
of war.337  Similarly, an Australian military court rejected
Lieutenant General Baba Masao's claim that the lethal 165 mile
forced-march of American and British prisoners of war from
Sandakan to Ranau in Borneo was justified by the operational
necessity of an anticipated Allied invasion.33
The Tribunal in the Hostage case convicted Helmuth Felmy,
Commander of the LXVII Corps in Greece, for failing to vigorous-
ly pursue those responsible for two massacres involving civilians.
The court noted that "under no circumstances can cold-blooded
mass murder ... be considered as related remotely ... to the
exigencies of war." '339 Defendant Ernst Lautz, Chief Prosecutor
of the People's Court, relied on necessity to retroactively extend
the German law of treason to Poles for unspecified acts against
racial Germans. The Justice Tribunal stated that this violated
"every concept of justice and fair play ... [and] [became] a
monument to Nazi arrogance and criminality."'
In sum, military necessity does not justify a violation of the
code of conflict because it would permit a belligerent to disregard
legal doctrine when confronted with disaster or defeat. Necessity
may only be relied upon in instances where this justification is
incorporated into the humanitarian law of war.34' There are
difficulties in distinguishing between the destruction of property for
military advantage or profit as opposed to military necessity.342
The Rendulic judgment indicates that, in such instances, courts will
exonerate decision-makers who mistakenly, but in good faith, rely
on necessity.
34 3
A belligerent is privileged to destroy property or harm
protected persons incidental to an otherwise lawful military action
so long as the damage is not disproportionate to the anticipated
military advantage. This invites combatants to camouflage their
targeting of civilians as either collateral damage or as an accidental
337. Trial Of Gunther Thiele And Georg Steinert (United States Milit.
Comm'n, Augsberg, Germany, June 13, 1945), II LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM.
56-57 (1948). See id. at 58 (Notes on the Case).
338. Trial Of Lieutenant-General Baba Masao (Aust. Milit. Ct., Rabaul, May
28, 1947), XI LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 56 (1949) [hereinafter Baba Masao].
339. Hostage Judgment, supra note 121, at 1309.
340. Justice Judgment, supra note 180, at 1127.
341. See supra notes 326-28 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 331-34 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
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attack. Even those acting in good faith will be tempted to
subordinate their concern with safeguarding protected persons to
the military advantage to be gained from attacking civilian
areas.
344
The United States Department of Defense's report on the Gulf
War conceded that air attacks resulted in collateral civilian death
and destruction. For example, communications and utility grids
which were attacked were situated in civilian areas. The report
concluded that the "attack of legitimate ... military targets,
notwithstanding the fact it resulted in collateral injury to civilians
and damage to civilian objects, was consistent with the customary
practices of nations and the law of war."345  In addition, the
report concluded that accidents are inevitable. Those who had
selected the Al-Firdos Bunker for attack had been unaware that the
command center sheltered civilians during the evening hours.
According to the report, this miscalculation illustrated "the
difficulty of decision making amid the confusion of war."3"
Nevertheless, "[u]nder the rule of... military necessity... this was
a legitimate military target. Coalition forces had no obligation not
to attack it. If Coalition forces had known that Iraqi civilians were
occupying it ... they may have withheld attack... (although the
law of war does not require such restraint)." 7
The related defense of reciprocity was also rejected as a
defense under certain circumstances. Admiral Karl Donitz was
acquitted of waging unrestricted submarine warfare on the ground
that the American and British navies had officially pursued a
similar policy. The defense of tu quoque was rejected by the
Supreme Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in convicting
an accused of executing involuntary workers fleeing Germany in
1945. The German Court stated that "[a]ny close connection
between air attacks by the enemy or acts of violence by foreign
troops after the invasion of German territory ... and the killing of
defenseless foreign workers . . . must be vigorously denied.
348
344. See Protocol I, supra note 274, at art. 51(5)(b).
345. United States Department Of Defense, Report To Congress On The
Conduct Of The Persian Gulf War-Appendix On The Role Of The Law Of War,
31 I.L.M. 612, 624 (1992).
346. Id. at 626. Iraqi "disinformation" created the "misimpression" that the
United Nations had failed to exercise a "high degree of care" in aerial attacks. Id.
at 624.
347. Id. at 627.
348. PREVENTIVE MURDER JUDGMENT, supra note 214. "The rule... means
that no State may accuse another State of violations of international law and
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Reciprocity is a potentially pernicious device which repeals all
legal restraints. Nation-states which have been victimized by an
illegal weapon or tactic are authorized to adopt the same strategy.
This rarely invoked doctrine permits State practice to modify legal
principle.349
C Individual Necessity
The tribunals presiding over the prosecutions of Nazi industri-
alists recognized the common law necessity defense. The defense
involves: a reasonable belief that an individual confronts an
imminent and irreparable harm, a lack of legal avenues to avoid
the evil, the commission of a criminal act which is reasonably
calculated to eliminate the harm; and a proportionality between the
crime and the threat. Those acting under compulsion are consid-
ered to have lacked criminal intent. The defense is inapplicable in
those instances in which a defendant voluntarily engaged in
criminal conduct.350
In Flick, the American tribunal asserted that the necessity
defense was not incorporated into Control Council Law No. 10.
The Tribunal nevertheless observed that it might be "reproached
for wreaking vengeance rather than administering justice if it were
to declare as unavailable to defendants the defense of necessity....
This principle has had wide acceptance in American and English
courts and is recognized elsewhere., 35 1 The court recognized the
challenge of applying a defense whose broad and flexible nature
impeded precise analysis. 352
The Tribunal stated that the Nazi regime assigned production
quotas to industrial plants. The management submitted requests
exercise criminal jurisdiction over the latter's citizens in respect of such violations
if it is itself guilty of similar violations against the other State or its allies." Id. at
564. The rule does not affect the right and duty of a State to hold its own citizens
responsible, in accordance with its municipal criminal law, for violations of
international law. Id. The "most stringent requirements must be observed where
crimes against life are concerned because there is a rule of law accepted by all
civilized nations ... that the right of a human being to his life must be protected
in the highest degree." Id.
349. Id.
350. Krupp Judgment, supra note 325, at 1438-39. International law was
determined to extend to civilians as well as to governmental officials. "Acts
adjudged criminal when done by an officer of the government are criminal also
when done by a private individual. The guilt differs only in magnitude, not in
quality." Flick Judgment, supra note 330, at 1192.
351. Id. at 1200.
352. Id. at 1201.
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for labor and involuntary foreign workers, prisoners-of-war and
concentration camp inmates. These were then assigned to plants
through the governmental labor office. A plant's production quota
could not be met without these laborers and failure to accept the
workers would have likely resulted in capital punishment or the
loss of title to the property.3 3 The defendants understandably
hid their dissent and complied with Reich regulations, seeking when
possible to ameliorate the atrocious treatment of workers by the
Security Police.354
The Tribunal found that the defendants had acted under the
threat of a "'clear and present danger.' 355  The Reich secret
police were "always 'present,' ready to go into instant action and
to mete out savage and immediate punishment against anyone
doing anything that could be construed as obstructing or hindering
the carrying out of governmental regulations or decrees. '356
However, the defense of necessity was denied to defendants
Bernhard Weiss and Friedrich Flick. Weiss, with Flick's support,
obtained an increased production for the Linke-Hofmann Works.
Weiss then secured a complement of Russian prisoners of war in
order to satisfy this. The "steps taken ... were initiated not in
governmental circles but in the plant management. They were not
taken as a result of compulsion or fear, but admittedly for the
purpose of keeping the plant as near capacity as possible. 357
The General Tribunal of the Military Government of the
French Zone of Occupation in Germany followed the Flick
standard in convicting industrialist Hermann Roechling and two
other executives.3 8  The French Tribunal applied the initiation
standard in rejecting the necessity defense. It determined that
Roechling, President of the Reich Association, had repeatedly
353. Id. at 1197.
354. Id. at 1198-99. The slave labor program was administered by the Reich
and the labor camps were under the jurisdiction of the military or security police.
Workers in the plants generally were under the control of private industrial police.
Industrial managers controlled workers' clothing, feeding, and work schedules.
The Tribunal determined that the Flick firm had treated the workforce in a
humane fashion. Id. at 1198-1200.
355. Flick Judgment, supra note 330, at 1201.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 1202.
358. France v. Hermann Roechling (General Tribunal Of The Military
Government Of The French Zone Of Occupation In Germany, June 30, 1948),
XIV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 1075 (1952) [hereinafter
Roechling Trial Judgment]. See id. at 1061 (Indictment).
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intervened to secure involuntary labor from the occupied territo-
ries.3" 9  Roechling "sacrificed all human considerations and
demonstrated a complete lack of respect for the rights of the
civilian population in the occupied countries" in an effort to raise
steel production.3" He was indifferent to the fate of those he
had deported and ignored their continuing abuse and mistreat-
ment.36' Roechling and his co-defendants "were not moved by a
lack of moral choice, but ... embraced the opportunity to take full
advantage of the slave-labor program. Indeed ... they were, to a
very substantial degree, responsible for broadening the scope of
that reprehensible system. 3
62
The Farben Tribunal also adhered to the initiation test. It
ruled that the necessity defense was applicable in those instances
where an individual was deprived of a "moral choice as to his
course of action .... [T]he defense. .. is not available where the
party seeking to invoke it was ... responsible for the existence or
execution of such order or decree, or where his participation went
beyond the requirements thereof, or was the result of his own
initiative.'
The American judges in Farben determined that a refusal to
satisfy a plant's production schedule or to utilize slave labor would
have been treated as treasonous sabotage, resulting in swift and
severe retaliation.)" Yet, several Farben executives took the
initiative in locating a buna rubber plant at Auschwitz because of
the availability of concentration camp workers. These defendants
also deployed prisoners of war and concentration camp labor in
mining operations. The use of involuntary workers "with the
initiative displayed by ... Farben [officials] in the procurement and
utilization of such labor, is a crime against humanity and, to the
extent that non-German nationals were involved, also a war crime,
to which the slave-labor program of the Reich will not warrant the
359. France v. Hermann Roechling, (Superior Military Government Court Of
The French Occupation Zone In Germany, Jan. 25, 1949) (appeal judgment) XIV
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 1097, 1104-05 (1952) [hereinafter
Roechling Appeal Judgment].
360. Id. at 1131.
361. Id. at 1136. Hans Lothar von Gemmingent-Hornberg and Wilhelm
Rodenhauser were determined to have exercised initiative in the mistreatment of
workers. Id. at 1136-38.
362. Farben Judgment, supra note 328, at 1179.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 1175.
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defense of necessity."365 The members of various Farben admin-
istrative boards and plant leaders were ultimately acquitted on the
ground that they had not gone "beyond what the regulations
required in the treatment or discipline of workers."3"
The Krupp Tribunal rejected the defense of necessity and
determined that the defendants had eagerly employed involuntary
workers as part of the firm's plans for industrial expansion.367
The criminal acts committed by the defendants were disproportion-
ate to the harm with which they were threatened. Alfried Krupp,
for instance, confronted a forfeiture of industrial property and the
others risked a loss of employment. Notwithstanding this dilemma,
"it is difficult to conclude that the law of necessity justified a choice
favorable to themselves and against the unfortunate victims who
had no choice at all in the matter."3" Furthermore the defen-
dants were not likely to be punished with sanctions, let alone
confinement in a concentration camp. In fact, Gustav Krupp was
a confidant of the Fahrer who had consolidated corporate, financial
and political support for the Nazi regime. Hitler reciprocated by
issuing a decree which permitted Krupp to continue as a family
enterprise. The firm's select standing was suggested by Krupp's
successful defiance of decrees prohibiting births among eastern
workers, peacetime production and the sale of Reich bonds.369
In a similar case, a Norwegian panel refused to recognize the
defense of necessity to justify acts of abuse and torture. The court
rejected the defendants' plea that they would have confronted
serious retribution had they refused to abuse members of the
resistance. The court also suggested that the defendants had
willingly engaged in brutality, refusing to "believe that a state, even
Nazi Germany, could force its subjects, if they were unwilling, to
365. Id. at 1187. Defendants Otto Ambros, Heinrich Buetefisch and Walter
Duerrfeld, and Fritz ter Meer, were convicted of employment of slave labor at
Auschwitz. Id. at 1187, 1192. Defendant Carl Krauch also was determined to
have exercised initiative in employing such workers in the chemical industry.
Farben Judgment, supra note 328, at 1188.
366. Id. at 1194. The members of the Vorstand (board of directors) were aware
that slave labor was being employed on an extensive scale. But, according to the
Tribunal, the defendants were not shown to have exercised initiative in securing
involuntary workers or to have been aware that the availability of concentration
camp labor was a factor in locating the plant at Auschwitz. Id. at 1195.
367. Id. at 1442.
368. Id. at 1145. Various authorities dispute whether the anticipated loss of
property will justify reliance on the necessity defense. Farben Judgment, supra
note 328, at 1145.
369. Id. at 1444-48.
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perform such brutal and atrocious acts as those of which the
defendants were guilty. 3 7° In addition, a British military court
rejected the plea of necessity where there had been no explicit
threat of retribution and where the defendant was free to refuse to
apprehend and execute escaped prisoners of war.371
In summary, American judges accepted the industrial defen-
dants' plea of necessity. Defendants who cooperated in the slave
labor program and condoned and committed criminal acts against
involuntary workers were absolved from criminal liability. These
defendants were deemed to have reluctantly employed involuntary
workers. Only those who went beyond the parameters of the
program were considered criminally culpable.372
The defendants may have preferred German workers, but
embraced the employment of slave labor.373 Judge Paul M.
Herbert of Louisiana State University Law School dissented in
Farben, arguing that the defendants could have creatively circum-
vented complicity in the slave labor program. The American
Court's uncritical acceptance of the necessity defense, according to
Herbert, constituted "unbridled license for the commission of...
crimes ... on the broadest.., scale through the simple expediency
of the issuance of compulsory governmental regulations combined
370. Trial Of Kriminalsekretar Richard Wilhelm Hermann Bruns And Two
Others (Eidsivating Lagmannsrett and Supreme Court Of Norway, March 20, 1946
and July 3, 1946), III LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 15, 18 (1948).
371. Trial Of Max Wielen And 17 Others (Brit. Milit. Ct., Hamburg, Germany,
July 1, 1947), XI LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 31, 49 (1949) (The Stalag Luft III
Case).
372. See supra notes 350-69 and accompanying text.
373. Farben Judgment, supra note 328, at 1307, 1309 (Herbert, J., on slave labor
charges).
Under the majority view a defendant who is a plant manager
may willingly cooperate in the execution of cruel and inhumane
regulations, such, for example, as putting into effect the
required discriminations as to food and clothing in the case of
the eastern workers, or putting the miserable workers beyond
barbed wire fences; this was no more than complying with the
requirements of the governmental regulations and, according to
the majority opinion, does not result in criminal responsibility.
Similarly, where the evidence establishes that a defendant was
responsible for the erection of a disciplinary camp at a Farben
plant, or participated in the initiation of disciplinary measures
against unruly compulsory workers-there is no criminal
responsibility, the action is protected by the defense of "necessi-
ty" as the defendant did no more than that which the cruel and
inhumane regulations required ....
Id. at 1311.
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with the terrorism of the totalitarian or police system. 37 4 This
effectively elevated the dictates of domestic doctrine over the
international protection of human rights.3
75
American courts thus determined that the enslavement and
sacrifice of prisoners was a justified effort to protect the defen-
dants' person, power and privilege. But, even if the defendants had
been incarcerated, they would not have found themselves "in a
worse plight than the thousands of helpless victims whom they daily
exposed to . . . death[,] ... starvation[,] . . . air raids upon ...
armament plants[,I . . . involuntary servitude and ... other
indignities. The disparity in the number of actual and potential
victims is ... thought provoking. 3 76  Yet, should judges in
cloistered chambers impose a duty of defiance on relatively
impotent private citizens?
III. Command Responsibility
A. The Yamashita And Tokyo Judgments
General Tomoyuki Yamashita assumed the position of
Japanese Supreme Commander in the Philippines on October 9,
1944, nine days prior to the United States' invasion. His jurisdic-
tion also included the military police and prisoner of war and
civilian internment camps.377 Yamashita was charged, convicted
and sentenced to death by a United States military war crimes
commission which determined that he had disregarded and failed
to discharge his duty to control his command.378
374. Id. at 1310. "The coercion exercised by a totalitarian police state in the
form of commands to its citizens should not be permitted to operate as a complete
negation of the opposing command of international penal law which has erected
standards for the protection of human rights." Id. at 1311.
375. Id. at 1310-11. Judge Herbert argued that the Farben executive
committees were well-aware of the Auschwitz initiative. Farben Judgment, supra
note 328, at 1322.
376. Krupp Judgment, supra note 325, at 1446.
377. General Headquarters United States Army Forces, Pacific Office Of The
Theater Judge Advocate, Review of the Record of Trial by a Military Commission
of Tomoyki Yamashita, General, Imperial Japanese Army, reprinted in COURTNEY
WHITNEY, THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA: A MEMORANDUM 60,69 (1950)
[hereinafter Military Commission]. Additional military and naval forces were
eventually assimilated into Yamashita's command between December and January
1944. His command reached 240,000 in Luzon and included 160 coastal ships,
various prisoner of war and civilian internment camps and the military police. Id.
at 69-70.
378. Id. at 60.
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Japanese depredations against civilians, prisoners of war,
internees and the hospitalized during the invasion included:
(1) Starvation, execution or massacre without trial and mal-
administration.., of civilian internees and prisoners of war; (2)
Torture, rape, murder and mass execution of... large numbers
of residents of the Philippines ... by starvation, beheading,
bayoneting, clubbing, hanging, burning alive, and destruction by
explosives; (3) Burning and demolition without adequate
military necessity of large numbers of homes, places of business,
places of religious worship, hospitals, public buildings, and
educational institutions . .. ."'
Japanese forces also intentionally deprived the indigenous popula-
tion and prisoners of adequate food, shelter, medical care, hygiene,
food and water. These acts resulted in malnutrition and death.
Non-combatants were also compelled to construct entrenchments
and fortifications and to assist the occupation forces. Public,
private and religious property was destroyed, looted and pil-
laged.3 °
Sixteen thousand unarmed non-combatant civilians were killed
in Batangas Province, Luzon Island, alone between November 1944
and April 1945. Individuals were shot, bayoneted and buried alive.
Three hundred Filipinos were forced to leap into a deep well into
which heavy weights were dropped. Those who survived were shot.
Three to four hundred civilians were bayoneted, shot, and immolat-
ed in another incident."' Prisoners of war were mistreated and
were compelled to catch and consume cats, pigeons, and rats. Over
fifteen hundred Americans were crowded into the cramped cargo
hold of a Japanese steamship. They were starved and driven to
dementia, wildly attacking one another, and sucking their victims'
blood.38 2
The Japanese also destroyed large portions of Manila as
American troops approached the city. Eight thousand residents
were killed and over seven thousand were mistreated, maimed and
wounded without cause or trial. Hundreds of females were beaten
and ,raped, their breasts and genitals abused and mutilated. The
Military Commission concluded that the Filipino people,
379. Trial Of General Tomoyuki Yamashita (U.S. Milit. Comm'n, Manila, Oct.
8-Dec. 7, 1945), IV LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1, 4 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n, 1948) [hereinafter Yamashita Trial].
380. Id. at 5-6.
381. Military Commission, supra note 377, at 63.
382. Id. at 68-69.
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including thousands of women and children, were tortured,
starved, beaten, bayoneted, clubbed, hanged, burned alive and
subjected to mass executions rarely rivaled in history, more than
30,000 deaths being revealed by the record. Prisoners of war
and civilian internees suffered systematic starvation, torture,
withholding of medical and hospital facilities and execution in
disregard of the rules of international law .... [There were]
systematic. .. [executions] with indescribable bestiality of little
girls and boys only months or even days old. ... .3
Yamashita claimed that he had been unaware of these
atrocities. His troops had been scattered and communications
disrupted. He admitted having approved the execution of forty
convicted partisans but denied having approved the summary
execution of suspected guerrillas.3"
The American military commission concluded that the crimes
had been so widespread, similar and systematic, that the accused
must have known and ordered, or tacitly condoned, the actions of
the Japanese troops. Yamashita also failed to punish the perpetra-
tors.385 The Commission concluded that "[t]aken all together ...
the accused failed to discharge his responsibility to control troops[,]
thereby permitting the atrocities[,] ... and was thus guilty as
charged., 386
General Douglas MacArthur affirmed the verdict: "This
officer, of proven field merit, entrusted with high command
involving authority adequate to responsibility, has failed ... his
383. Id. at 79.
384. Id. at 73.
He was completely absorbed by the operational command of
preparing to confront superior United States forces; communica-
tions were poor; he was unfamiliar with the character and
ability of his subordinates; because of the day and night
pressure consuming all of his time he was completely out of
touch with the situation.
Id. at 74.
385. Military Commission, supra note 377, at 80-81. The accused issued an
order to "'mop up"' the guerrillas. "One cannot be unmindful of the fact that the
accused, an experienced officer, in giving such an order must have been aware of
the dangers involved when such instructions were communicated to troops the type
of the Japanese." Id. at 80.
386. Id. at 81-82. The Commission propounded an unprecedented and
perplexing doctrine: "[tihe accused was not accused of having done something or
having failed to do something, but solely of having been something, namely
commander of the Japanese forces. It was ... claimed that.., he was guilty of
every crime committed by every soldier assigned to his command." Yamashita
Trial, supra note 379, at 12.
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duty to his troops, to his country, to his enemy, to mankind[,] [he]
has failed utterly his soldier faith."3"
In affirming Yamashita's conviction, the United States
Supreme Court observed that unrestrained and unsupervised
military operations inevitably result in violations of the humanitari-
an law of war, undermining the protections afforded civilian
populations and prisoners of war.388 According to the majority,
the central role of a commanding officer in protecting civilians and
wounded or captured enemy belligerents, was recognized in the
Hague Convention of 1907. Article 1 established as a condition of
lawful belligerency that troops are "commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates."3" The Court cited additional
provisions which purportedly provided support for the conclusion
that the humanitarian law of war "presupposes that its violation is
to be avoided through the control of the operations of war by
commanders who are ... responsible for their subordinates.
390
The majority ruled that Yamashita had failed to fulfill his
"affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his power
and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war
and the civilian population., 391 The Court also observed that the
military commission had not required Yamashita to take measures
which "were beyond his control or inappropriate for a commanding
officer to take in the circumstances.,
392
In his dissent, Justice Frank Murphy argued that international
law does not provide the "slightest precedent for the charge"
387. General Headquarters Supreme Commander For The Allied Powers
Government Section, Memorandum For The Record ("'The Case of General
Yamashita,"' by A. Frank Real) (Nov. 22, 1949), Military Commission, supra note
377, at 1, 4. General MacArthur issued a warning as the Americans invaded the
Philippines:
As Commander in Chief of the Allied forces in the field,
I shall in addition, during the course of the present campaign,
hold the Japanese military authorities in the Philippines
immediately liable for any harm which may result from failure
to accord prisoners of war, civilian internees or civilian non-
combatants the proper treatment and due protection to which
they, of right, are entitled.
Id. at 5.
388. In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1945).
389. Hague Convention, supra note 218, at art. 1. See also id. at art. 43, which
requires an occupying power to "take all the measures in its power to restore, and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." Id.
390. 327 U.S. at 15.
391. Id. at 16.
392. Id. at 16-17.
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against Yamashita.39  According to Murphy, in holding
Yamashita culpable for the criminal conduct of his subordinates,
the Court had abrogated the principle of individual responsibility.
All executive officials, including the President of the United States,
were now potentially liable for the actions of the armed forces. 94
Charging and convicting Yamashita, in the view of the dissenting
justices, was particularly unfair. The American military had
decimated and scattered the Japanese forces. These disorganized
troops had then engaged in repeated depredations. Justice Murphy
criticized the Court for presuming, without proof, that Yamashita
had ordered, condoned or been complicitous in these crimes: "To
use the very inefficiency and disorganization created by the
victorious forces as the primary basis for condemning officers of the
defeated armies bears no resemblance to justice or to military
reality."395  Intentional or negligent inaction may give rise to
liability, but the prosecution had failed to establish that Yamashita
had been cognizant of, or directly connected with, the atrocities.
The imposition of responsibility on Yamashita for the widespread
criminal conduct of his anarchic army during a devastating enemy
attack established a dangerous precedent.3" Justice Murphy
noted that "[b]y this flexible method a victorious nation may
convict and execute any or all leaders of a vanquished foe,
depending upon the prevailing degree of vengeance and the
absence of any objective judicial review. ' 397
Altogether, the Yamashita decision imposed an affirmative
duty upon commanding officers to prevent and punish violations of
the humanitarian law of war. The judgment appeared to impose
strict liability on military officers. Clearly, Yamashita was not
cognizant of and could not have been aware of each and every
crime committed under his command. The type of affirmative
393. Id. at 28.
394. Id. See 327 U.S. at 38, (discussing the provisions of the United States
Army Field Manual).
395. Id. at 35.
396. Id. at 39-40.
397. Id. at 40.
Mass guilt we do not impute to individuals, perhaps in any case
but certainly in none where the person is not charged or shown
actively to have participated in knowingly to have failed in
taking action to prevent the wrongs done by others, having both
the duty and the power to do so.
Id. at 43-44 (Rutledge J., dissenting).
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actions required of Yamashita were never suggested by the
Court.398
The vicarious liability standard was elaborated upon by the
International Military Tribunal at Tokyo.399 The Allied Powers
charged the Japanese Cabinet, high-level military officers and
correctional officials with varying degrees of duty in safeguarding
prisoners of war. " The members of the Japanese Cabinet were
considered collectively responsible for the care of convicts. Those
with authority over prisoners who possessed actual or constructive
knowledge of mistreatment were under an obligation to prevent the
recurrence of such abuse or resign. A cabinet member with
knowledge of the ill-treatment of prisoners who lacked authority to
curb such crimes was required to leave office. Those who volun-
tarily remained were held responsible for any additional mistreat-
ment.401
Military and civilian officials who were responsible for
protecting prisoners were held criminally culpable in those
instances in which they were aware or should have been aware of
abuse and mistreatment and failed to take curative action. In
contrast, bureaucrats with knowledge of ill-treatment and who were
not charged with the care of convicts were neither under a duty to
402act nor required to resign.
The requisite criminal intent was established in those instances
in which an individual occupying an authoritative position pos-
sessed actual or constructive knowledge of war crimes and failed to
prevent their recurrence. Actual knowledge was established in
those instances in which an individual planned or ordered a course
of criminal conduct. Constructive knowledge was imputed in those
cases in which an individual possessed access to information; for
398. See supra notes 377-397 and accompanying text.
399. See International Military Tribunal for the Far East, The Tokyo War
Crimes Trial (Nov. 1948), reprinted in II THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 1029 (Leon Friedman ed. 1972) [hereinafter Tokyo Trial]. This doctrine
was implicitly applied in the Nuremberg trial. See NUREMBERG JUDGMENT, supra
note 86, at 539 (Ernst Kaltenbrunner), 546 (Wilhelm Frick).
400. Tokyo Trial, supra note 399, at 1038. A duty was imposed upon members
of the government; military or naval officers in command of formations having
prisoners in their possession; officials in those departments which were concerned
with the well-being of prisoners; officials, whether civilian, military or naval, having
direct and immediate control of prisoners. Id.
401. Id. at 1039.
402. Id. at 1039-40.
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example, the memorialization of war crimes in reports or wide-
spread and sustained delicts. °3
The Tokyo Tribunal thus relaxed and replaced the Yamashita
standard with an actual or constructive knowledge requirement.'
An individual occupying an authoritative position was not obligated
to take affirmative acts absent evidence that he was cognizant of
criminal conduct. As a case in point, Shimada Shigetaro, Navy
Minister in the Tojo Cabinet between 1941 and 1944 was acquitted.
The Tribunal ruled that he had not ordered, authorized, permitted
or been aware of the "disgraceful massacres and murders ofprisoners.",405
However, in the case of an official with plenary power such as
Kuniaki Koiso, appointed Prime Minister in 1944, atrocities and
crimes were so "notorious" that it was "improbable" that Koiso
"would not have been well-informed either by reason of their
notoriety or from inter-departmental communications."' These
brutalities were also discussed at a meeting of the Supreme Council
for the Direction of War at which the Foreign Minister requested
the issuance of a directive discouraging indiscipline. Koiso
remained in office for an additional six months during which
prisoners and internees continued to be mistreated - "[t]his
amounted to a deliberate disregard of duty.''
In addition, a government official with knowledge of war
crimes must act in an affirmative and aggressive fashion. Hideki
Tojo, Minister of War and then Prime Minister in October 1941,
was aware of the casualties which occurred during the Bataan
Death March. Tojo had failed to request a report about the event,
made only perfunctory inquiries, and refrained from initiating
criminal proceedings. He was also aware of the plight of prisoners
involved in constructing the Burma-Siam Railway. Yet, Tojo made
no effort to improve their billeting, food and hygiene and only
brought a single combat commander to trial. Deaths due to
starvation and disease continued until the completion of the
project. The condition of prisoners in Japanese custody at the
end of the war, as well as the enormous number who died from
U
403. Id. at 1038-40.
404. See Tokyo Trial, supra note 399. See also, supra notes 400-03, and
accompanying text.
405. Id. at 1149 (Shimada Shigetaro).
406. Id. at 1141.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 1154-55.
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starvation, constituted "conclusive proof that Tojo ... [did not
take] proper steps to care for them."'
As for a high-ranking official who receives assurances that
criminal conduct will be curtailed, he may not ignore continued
reports of criminal conduct. For instance, when Japanese troops
entered Nanking in December 1937, an estimated twelve thousand
non-combatants were killed during the first few days alone.
Twenty thousand were raped during the initial month of occupa-
tion. The death toll of civilians and prisoners of war in the first six
weeks reached two hundred thousand.41 Foreign Minister Koki
Hirota learned of the atrocities through diplomatic reports and
newspaper accounts. The War Ministry assured Hirota that the
atrocities would be halted. The brutalities nevertheless continued
for roughly a month. The Tribunal ruled that Hirota was derelict
in failing to take all available action, including a demand that the
Cabinet quickly end the atrocities. Instead, he was "content to rely
on assurances which he knew were not being implemented while
hundreds of murders, violations of women, and other atrocities
were being committed daily. His inaction amounted to negli-
gence. 41
Finally, an official who orders a halt in criminal conduct has
the duty to ensure compliance with his commands. Heitaro Kimura
was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Burma Area Army.
Kimura's first act was to admonish his troops to act in a profession-
al fashion and to respect prisoners. However, atrocities continued
in the vicinity of his headquarters and he failed to issue additional
disciplinary directives. The Tribunal ruled that
[tihe duty of an army commander in such circumstances is not
discharged by the mere issue of ... orders .... His duty is to
take such steps and issue such orders as will prevent ... war
crimes and to satisfy himself that such orders are being carried
out. This he did not do.... [H]e deliberately disregarded his
legal duty to take adequate steps to prevent breaches of the law
of war.412
As a case in point, Iwane Matsui was commander of the
Central China Area Army during the siege and seizure of Nanking.
He issued orders prior to the city's capture, cautioning against war
409. Id. at 1155.
410. Id. at 1061-62.
411. Id. at 1134.
412. Id. at 1140.
CONUNDRUMS OF ARMED CONFLICT
crimes. The Tribunal concluded that Matusi must have been aware
that these orders were being disregarded. "He had the power as
he had the duty to control his troops and to protect the unfortunate
citizens of Nanking. He must be held criminally responsible for his
failure to discharge this duty." '413
B. Prosecutions Under Control Council Law No. 10
In the Hostage case, the Tribunal imposed a duty on military
officials to investigate suspected criminal conduct. The Court ruled
that the commanding general of occupied territory is charged with
the responsibility of maintaining peace and order and is account-
able for the conduct of all military units within the scope of his
territorial jurisdiction, regardless of whether they are within his
chain of command. A military officer is considered to possess
constructive knowledge of reports transmitted to headquarters as
well as notorious events and occurrences within his territorial
command.414
The Tribunal elaborated upon the scope of this duty in
convicting Field Marshal Wilhelm List, Commander of German
forces in Greece and Yugoslavia. List's absence from headquarters
did not relieve him of responsibility for acts carried out in accor-
dance with his orders but he would not be charged with acts
committed in his absence by troops in response to orders issued
outside his chain of command. He was, however, required to
rescind those illicit orders which were brought to his attention and
to take steps to prevent a recurrence of such activity.
41
In addition, List was under a duty to remain informed of
events within his territorial command and to request additional
information to supplement facially inadequate or incomplete
reports. A lack of awareness of a report or a failure to investigate
a deficient report did not constitute a defense.416  List received
reports recounting the killing of thousands of innocents in reprisal
for the acts of partisans. These executions had not been carried
out by troops under his command but the Tribunal rejected List's
claim of an absence of authority: "The authority is inherent in his
413. Id. at 1142. A staff officer in a subordinate position with knowledge of
atrocities who lacked the authority to take steps to halt the atrocities was not
criminally liable for a failure to act. See Tokyo Trial supra note 399, at 1144
(Akira Muto).
414. Hostage Judgment, supra note 121, at 1256. See also id at 1271.
415. Id. at 1271.
416. Id.
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position .... [T]he primary responsibility for the prevention and
punishment of crime lies with a commanding general[,] a responsi-
bility from which he cannot escape by denying his authority over
the perpetrators." '417 Defendant Hermann Foertsch was chief of
staff under List. Foertsch was aware of the execution of reprisal
prisoners, but was acquitted based upon a lack of command
authority.418
A military commander in List's position was, according to the
Tribunal, also required to restrain the recurrence of reported
atrocities. For instance, defendant Walter Kuntze, appointed
Deputy Armed Forces Commander Southeast in October 1941,
neither ordered the shooting nor the transfer of Jews to the camps.
Kuntze was nevertheless cognizant that his troops were detaining
and deporting Jews and yet, he "acquiesced in their performance
when his duty was to intervene to prevent their recurrence. 419
In the same situation, defendant Hubert Lanz's explanation that he
was too preoccupied to prevent the continuance of illicit reprisals
was dismissed as a "lame excuse. The unlawful killing of innocent
people is a matter that demands prompt and efficient handling by
the highest officer of any army.'42°
Following the ruling of the Hostage Tribunal, liability was
limited to those military officials with actual or constructive
knowledge of criminal activity in the High Command case as well.
The court argued that ,[m]ilitary subordination is ... not conclu-
sive ... in fixing criminal responsibility. .. . A high commander
cannot keep completely informed of .the details of military
operations ... [;][h]e has the right to assume that details entrusted
to ... subordinates will be legally executed."421 The imposition
of criminal culpability on military commanders required either
deliberate dereliction or gross criminal negligence.42 The strict
liability standard was considered by the judges to "go far beyond
417. Id. at 1272.
418. Hostage Judgment, supra note 121, at 1286. "His mere knowledge of the
happening of unlawful acts does not meet the requirements of criminal law. He
must be one who orders, abets, or takes a consenting part in the crime." Id.
419. Id. at 1279-80.
420. Id. at 1311.
421. High Command Judgment, supra note 146, at 543. "The President of the
United States is Commander in Chief of its military forces. Criminal acts
committed by those forces cannot in themselves be charged to him on the theory
of subordination. The same is true of other high commanders in the chain of
command." 1dM
422. Id. The personal neglect must amount to a wanton, immoral disregard of
the action of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence. Id. at 543-44.
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the basic principles of criminal law as known to civilized na-
tions."4"
The Tribunal also recognized, as the Hostage case did, a
military commander's territorial responsibility for troops not
attached to his command.424 The court stated that an occupation-
al commander is endowed with executive authority and is obligated
to maintain order and to protect the civilian population. Absent a
directive limiting a commander's executive powers, he possesses the
right and duty to curb crime.4" However, liability only attaches
in those instances where an occupying commander possesses actual
or constructive knowledge of these offenses and either acquiesces,
participates or criminally neglects to intervene.426
The Tribunal narrowly applied the criminal intent standard and
resisted imputing knowledge to commanders based upon the size
and scale of the activities of killing squads. In many instances,
these executions were far removed from military headquarters and
reports were routed through the security police in Berlin. The
most visible and notorious killings were attributed to local pogroms
and ethnic persecutions. The Tribunal thus refused to impute
knowledge to the defendants and instead examined whether they
possessed actual knowledge of the Einsatzgruppen's illicit activi-
ties.427.
Clearly, in the case of Georg Karl Friedrich-Wilhelm von
Kuechler, successor to von Leeb as Commander of Army Group
North in 1942, numerous reports detailing illegal executions were
brought to von Kuechler's attention. In fact, "he not only. tolerated
but approved the execution of these orders."4" Henry Hoth,
423. Id. at 544.
424. High Command Judgment, supra note 146, at 544-45. "It cannot be said
that he exercises the power by which a civilian population is subject to his invading
army while ... the state which he represents may come into the area ... and
subject the population to murder of its citizens and to other inhuman treatment."
Id. at 544. The Tribunal distinguished Yamashita based on the fact that Yamashita
possessed complete control in the Philippines. The crimes in the High Command
case, in contrast, were committed at the insistence, of higher military and Reich
authorities. Id.
425. Id. at 547.
426. Id. at 545. The Tribunal also based a commander's responsibility on the
executive power vested in military commanders- under the handbook for the
general staff in wartime. This assigns occupying commanders with the responsibili-
ty for the maintenance of law and order. High Command Judgment, supra note
.146, at 545-46.
427. Id. at 547-48. The Einsatzgruppen were formally charged with providing
security behind military lines. Id
428. Id. at 568.
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Commander of the 17th Army attached to Army Group South, was
also aware of the activities of the killing squads within his territori-
al command but instructed his chief of staff to halt the squad's
activities. Hoth's troops nevertheless continued to transfer
prisoners and Jews to the security police for execution and Hoth
was convicted of having failed to safeguard the civilian popula-
tion."'
Overall, absent reports, it was difficult to establish actual
awareness. Prisoners of war within Field Marshal Wilhelm von
Leeb's territorial command, for instance, were under the supervi-
sion of the quartermaster general who relied on officers subordi-
nate to von Leeb. The Tribunal ruled that von Leeb had the right
to assume that his officers were properly performing their assign-
ments. The use of prisoners in dangerous localities and occupations
was "obviously illegal under international law but there is no
substantial evidence that such illegal uses ... were ever brought to
the attention of the defendant.""43 Von Leeb was not found to
have been aware of the activities of the Einsatzgruppen. Only the
murder of forty thousand at Kovno (Riga) was indisputably
brought to his attention, and this was attributed to a local Latvian
self-defense organization. Von Leeb fulfilled his duty and
affirmatively acted to prevent a recurrence of such incidents. The
Tribunal concluded that von Leeb had not known that the
Einsatzgruppen was carrying out exterminations and thus had not
acquiesced in the killings. 31
The WVHA case addressed the issue of constructive knowl-
edge as well, ruling that the murders and atrocities committed in
the Ukraine by the troops under the command of Erwin
Tschentscher were "not of sufficient magnitude or duration to
constitute notice ... and ... [to] give him [Tschentscher] an
opportunity to control their actions. ' But, a defendant may not
ignore obvious facts and raise the defense of a lack of knowledge.
An additional defendant in WVHA, Karl Mummenthey, directed
various industries owned and operated by the Security Police.
429. Id. at 595-96.
430. High Command Judgment, supra note 146, at 558.
431. Id. at 561-62. In terms of his criminal liability, the Tribunal determined
that it was immaterial whether von Leeb knew that the killings were carried out
under governmental sponsorship or that he believed that the Einsatzgruppen were
acting autonomously. Id at 561.
432. United States v. Oswald Pohl, V TRIALS OF WAR CRIMNALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 958,
1011 (1950) [hereinafter WVHA JUDGMENT].
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Despite Murmmenthey's frequent visits and receipt of reports, he
protested that he lacked awareness of the conditions in the
industrial plants and work camps. The Tribunal ruled that
"Mummenthey's assertions ... [do] not exonerate him. It was his
duty to know., 433
Constructive knowledge also involves an element of judicial
discretion. Was it credible to claim that a defendant was unaware
of the illicit activities of the killing squads? An American tribunal
determined that this was true in the case of Field Marshal Erhard
Milch. The Tribunal found that Milch neither received reports nor
attended conferences discussing the high altitude and freezing
experiments. It decided that he was unaware that humans were
involuntarily subjected to experimentation. The Tribunal acquitted
Milch of complicity in the experiments, accepting the defense that
he had turned responsibility over to a subordinate department and
was preoccupied with other concerns.'
In a similar case, three members of I.G. Farben were board
members in the Degesch firm in which Farben possessed a forty
percent interest. Defendants Wilhelm Mann, Heinrich Hoerlein
and Karl Wurster were charged with approving the company's
provision of Zyklon-B gas which fueled the death chambers in the
concentration camps. The Farben Tribunal decided that neither the
volume of production nor the fact that large shipments were
destined for concentration camps was sufficient to place the board
of directors on notice that inmates were being exterminated. The
court concluded that the defendants may have reasonably believed
that the gas was being used to disinfect displaced persons congested
in the concentration camps. 435 The same defendants were also
charged for knowingly providing drugs which were used in spotted
fever and typhus experiments in the concentration camps. The
Tribunal dismissed the charge and found that Farben had discontin-
ued dispatching drugs as soon as the firm suspected such activity in
the camps.436
The American Tribunal in the Medical case also imposed an
affirmative duty on high-level officials to investigate medical
experiments. Defendant Karl Brandt, Reich Commissioner for
433. Id. at 1055.
434. Milch Judgment, supra note 183, at 773-78.
435. Farben Judgment, supra note 328, at 1168-69.
436. Id. at 1171-72. The question whether the defendants were on notice of the
experiments centered on whether the German word "Versuch" in the doctor's
reports connoted "experiment" or "test." Id. at 1172.
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Medical and Health Services, was given plenary authority over the
medical field and charged with a positive duty to supervise medical
protocols involving human subjects. He received reports and
attended meetings describing sulfanilamide experiments in which
seventy-five persons had been intentionally and involuntarily
infected and treated with various anti-infectious diseases. Brandt
neither objected nor investigated the experiments; had he made an
effort he could have ascertained that non-German nationals were
being involuntarily subjected to these protocols and that ,additional
experiments were planned for the future.437 The Tribunal stated
that had defendants such as Brandt exercised their responsibility,
"great numbers of non-German nationals would have been saved
from murder. 4 38
Brandt was also in charge of the euthanasia program. He
conceded that he was involved in the extermination of so-called
"incurables," but testified that he was unaware that Jews and other
non-German internees were part of euthanasia experiments. The
Tribunal ruled that Brandt's failure to monitor the euthanasia
program constituted "the gravest breach of duty . . . [W]hatever
may have been the original aim of the program, its purposes were
prostituted by men for whom Brandt was responsible, and great
numbers of non-German nationals were exterminated under their
authority." '
Clearly, military and civilian officials are responsible for
insuring lawful conduct within their operational and territorial
command. The duty of military officers with jurisdiction over
occupied territory also extends to units outside the 'chain of
command." An official who either intentionally or negligently
fails to respond to reports or to notorious facts and circumstances
is criminally culpable" and factually deficient reports are re-
quired to be investigated and supplemented."2  Since actual
knowledge was difficult to establish, absent reports, courts were
inconsistent in their application of the constructive knowledge
standard."3
437. United States v. Brandt, II TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 193-
94 (1950) [hereinafter Medical Judgment].
438. See id. at 207 (Siegfried Handloser).
439. Id. at 197.
440. See supra notes 414-18 and accompanying text.
441. See supra notes 419-20 and accompanying text.
442. See supra note 416 and accompanying text.
443. See supra notes 426-27 and 430-34 and accompanying text.
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C. Other Allied War Crimes Prosecutions
Other Allied courts adhered to the contours of the Yamashita
decision and appeared to hold German and Japanese military
commanders strictly liable for war crimes. SS Brigadefiihrer Kurt
Meyer was convicted by a Canadian military court of willful and
criminal negligence and failure to perform his duties as a military
commander. Evidence was adduced that Canadian prisoners of war
had been interrogated and then shot within one hundred meters of
Meyer's headquarters. Meyer was in his headquarters at the time,
but claimed to have been unaware of the killings." The proximi-
ty of the killings to Meyer's headquarters presumably led the panel
to conclude that he had either ordered or countenanced the mur-
ders."5 Similarly, Kurt Student, the Commander-in-Chief of the
German forces in Crete, was found guilty of the killing and illegal
employment of prisoners. The court determined that these
executions would not have occurred absent a belief by the German
troops that they had been either ordered or condoned by Stu-
dent.46
In the Pacific theater Takashi Sakai, commander of Japanese
forces in South China between 1941 and 1943, was convicted of
inciting or permitting his troops to engage in atrocities.447 The
Tribunal rejected Sakai's claim that he had been unaware of thes e
acts and therefore should be exonerated. "That a field Commander
must hold himself responsible for the discipline of his subordinates,
is an accepted principle. It is inconceivable that he should not have
been aware of the acts of atrocities committed by his subordi-
nates."448  Lieutenant General Baba Masao, General Officer
commanding the 37th Japanese Army in Borneo, acted on an order
to move one thousand American and British prisoners sixty-five
miles from Sankakan to Ranau. The order had been issued prior
to Masao's assumption of command but he was aware of the
444. Trial Of S.S. Brigadefhrer Kurt Meyer (Canadian Milit. Ct., Aurich,
Germany, Dec. 10-28, 1945), IV LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 97, 101-04, 106-07
(1948) [hereinafter The Abbaye Ardenne Case].
445.. Id. at 108. Meyer was originally sentenced to death by shooting, but this
was commuted to life imprisonment. Id. at 109.
446. Trial Of Kurt Student (Brit. Milit. Ct., Luneberg, Germany, May 10, 1946),
IV LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 118-120 (1948). See also id. at 124 (Notes on
the Case).
447. Trial Of Takashi Sakai (Chinese War Crimes Milit. Trib., Nanking, Aug.
19, 1946), XIV LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1 (1949).
448. Id. at 7 (Notes on the Case).
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prisoners' dilapidated condition and nevertheless permitted the
march to proceed by ordering the reconnaissance of the route.
Many died of disease and ill-treatment, and others were shot.
Masao ordered the evacuation of the remaining 540 prisoners six
months later; but only 183 reached Ranau. Thirty-three survived
the next two months and were subsequently shot. Masao was
ultimately convicted and executed." 9 The military panel presum-
ably relied on the instructions of the Australian Judge Advocate
who cited Yamashita and found that Masao had an affirmative duty
to take such measures as were within his power and appropriate
under circumstances to protect the prisoners.4 °
D. The Sabra And Shatilla Incidents
The most complete contemporary discussion of command
responsibility involved the incursion into the Sabra and Shatilla
refugee camp. This event arose when Lebanese President-elect and
Christian Phalangist leader Bashir Jemayel was assassinated in a car
bomb explosion in September 1982. Israeli defense forces (I.D.E)
entered West Beirut in, order to prevent an escalating cycle of
violence. The Israelis were fearful of close-order combat and sent
the Phalangists into the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camp in order
to denominate and detain Palestinian terrorists. The Phalangists
were ordered to respect civilians because they were known to
disregard legalities and were eager for revenge. Nevertheless, their
rage erupted inside the camp resulting in the execution of between
seven and eight hundred civilians.45'
There was no evidence that Israeli troops participated in the
killings or that the slaughter was visible from their observation
post. But a commission of inquiry determined that Israel bore
international responsibility:
If ... West Beirut may be viewed... as occupied territory...
then it is the duty of the occupier, according to... internation-
al law, to do all it can to ensure the public's well-being and
security. Even if these legal norms are invalid... as far as the
obligations applying to every civilized nation and ethical rules
449. Trial Of Lieutenant General Baba Masao (Australian Milit. Ct., Rabaul,
May 28, 1947), XI LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 56-57 (1949).
450. Id. at 59 (Notes on the Case).
451. Israel: Final Report Of The Commission Of Inquiry Into The Events At
The Refugee Camps In Beruit, Final Report, 22 I.L.M. 473, 478-81, 491 (1983)
[hereinafter Committee Of Inquiry].
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accepted by civilized peoples go, the problem of indirect
responsibility cannot be disregarded.452
A degree of responsibility was imposed on Prime Minister
Menachem Begin because he was informed of the Phalangist
incursion thirty-six hours following their entry into the camp. The
Commission concluded that he had justifiably relied on the calming
reports issued by subordinates. However, had Begin expressed
concern, the Defense Minister may have been alerted and adopted
protective measures. 3
In the case of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon the commission
recommended his dismissal.4" Sharon had authorized the Phalan-
gist entry into the camps, explaining that no warning had been
issued by the intelligence services. Sharon need not have possessed
prophetic powers in order to have anticipated the danger of
slaughter since he was well-acquainted with the Phalangists.
Furthermore, as a politician responsible for security affairs, he
possessed a duty to safeguard the residents of the camps.455
Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan, Chief of Staff in the Defense
Ministry, was also deemed to have breached his duty when he
approved the Phalangists' entrance into the camps without insuring
the safety of the residents. He immediately met with the Phalangist
commanders upon receiving the first reports of atrocity. Eitan
testified that he believed the report to be erroneous since the
Phalangists failed to mention the killings. Instead of canceling the
operation he permitted additional Phalangists to enter the camp
and provided tractors to bulldoze terrorist concentrations. The
Phalangists may have reasonably concluded that the I.D.F.
condoned or encouraged the killings.456
Similarly, Major General Yehoshua Saguy, Director of Israeli
Military Intelligence, claimed that although he had been present
during discussions, he had been unaware of the decision to permit
the Phalangists to enter the camp. The Commission concluded that
he had demonstrated "indifference and a conspicuous lack of
concern, of shutting of eyes and ears to a matter regarding which
it was incumbent on the director of the intelligence arm ... to
452. Id. at 496.
453. Id. at 501.
454. Id. at 519.
455. Id. at 501-02.
456. Committee of Inquiry, supra note 451, at 505-07.
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open his eyes and listen well to all that was discussed and decid-
ed." '457 Brigadier General Amos Yaron was present at the
forward command post and received three reports of killings. He
promptly admonished the Phalangist liaison officer, but failed to
convey these reports to his superiors. Yaron also permitted
additional Phalangist forces to enter the camp and made no effort
to monitor their movements.
458
Major General Amir Drori, head of the Northern Command,
was held responsible for their neglects. He received a report of
possible killings, promptly ordered a cessation of Phalangist
operations, telephoned the Defense Ministry and attempted to
persuade the Lebanese Army to restore order in the camp. The
Commission concluded that Drori had acted "properly, wisely, and
responsibly., 459 But he also neglected to investigate the reported
killings and failed to urge Lieutenant General Eitan to raise the
issue when Eitan met with the Phalangists in Beirut. The Commis-
sion concluded that the latter constituted a breach of duty.'
The Commission regretted that Israeli civilian and military
officials failed to halt the massacre. Combatants are required to be
courageous "[b]ut the end never justifies the means, and basic
ethical and human values must be maintained in the use of
arms."461
Ultimately, the Israeli Commission of Inquiry imposed
vicarious liability on civilian and military officials. 462  These
individuals were considered to have an affirmative duty to
anticipate the danger accompanying the Phalangist incursion into
Sabra and Shantilla and to investigate reports of atrocities.' This
duty required closely monitoring the activities of the Phalangists,'-
expressing concern to cabinet ministers, 65 transmitting informa-
tion to higher officials,46 interrogating Phalangist officers467 and
457. Id. at 508. He made no effort to contact the Defense Minister or Chief of
Staff following the Phalangist entry into the camps and the first report of killing.
Id. at 509.
458. Id. at 513.
459. Id. at 511.
460. Commission of Inquiry, supra note 451, at 512.
461. Id. at 519.
462. See generally Commission of Inquiry.
463. See supra text accompanying notes 453, 455-57, 460.
464. See supra text accompanying notes 456 and 457.
465. See supra text accompanying notes 458 and 460.
466. See supra text accompanying notes 458 and 460.
467. See supra text accompanying notes 456 and 460.
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halting Phalangist operations in the camps following the receipt of
reports.46s
E. Summary
The imposition of vicarious liability on military officers is an
accepted component of the international code of war.' The
doctrine was first foreshadowed in the Yamashita case which
imposed strict liability on command authorities -in occupied
territories.47 The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal extended this
precedent to civilian as well as military officials. The latter adhered
to an actual or constructive knowledge standard and imposed duties
of investigation and intervention upon officials to curb war
crimes.47' The Hostage and High Command cases extended an
officer's liability to the territorial scope of his or her command and
adhered to the Tokyo standard.472 Other Allied tribunals revert-
ed to the strict liability standard.473 The Israelis' inquiry into the
killings at Sabra and Shatilla returned to the Tokyo investigation
and intervention standard.474
The strict liability standard imposes liability on commanding
officers for the transgressions of their troops. Application of strict
liability promotes diligence by military commanders and thus
furthers the humanitarian law of war by limiting harm to innocents.
468. See supra text accompanying notes 458 and 459.
469. See Protocol I, supra note 274, at art. 86.
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict
shall repress grave breaches, and take measures necessary to
suppress all other breaches, of the Convention or of this
Protocol which result from a failure to act when under a duty
to do so.
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol
was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors
from penal disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if
they knew, or had information which should have enabled them
to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was
committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they
did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent
or repress the breach.
Id.
470. See supra text accompanying notes 377-98.
471. See supra text accompanying notes 399-413.
472. See supra text accompanying notes 414-31.
473. See supra text accompanying notes 444-46.
474. See supra text accompanying notes 451-68.
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There are nevertheless equitable objections to imposing liability on
an officer for the actions of his or her subordinates.475
Actual knowledge is difficult to establish other than in the
limited instances in which a commander is physically present or has
planned or ordered a military operation. This standard also fails
to capture the informal communication within a bureaucratic
structure and has been characterized as "an invitation to the
commander to see and hear no evil. It is not consistent with a
serious effort to make the command structure responsive to the
humanitarian goals involved." '476
The constructive knowledge standard vests inordinate discre-
tion in the finder of facts leading to inconsistent and irreconcilable
verdicts, and offers civilian and military decision-makers limited
guidance. But this certainly encourages command authorities to
closely monitor the activities of their troops.477 Judge Kenneth
A. Howard instructed the jury that "[tihe mere presence at the
scene without knowledge will not suffice . ... While it is not
necessary that a commander actually see an atrocity being commit-
ted, it is essential that he know that his subordinates are in the
process of committing atrocities or are about to commit atroci-
ties." '478 Critics noted that a proper application of the Yamashita
strict liability standard would have resulted in a conviction.479
There would seem to be little controversy over holding a
commander liable for knowingly failing to intervene because high-
echelon officials have a legal and moral duty to intervene. But
some dilemmas still exist. Should an officer also be held jointly
and severally liable for the wrongs of those under his or her
command given the precarious contours of command and control?
Does joint and several liability unacceptably replace personal with
collective liability? Is this merely a mechanism to impose criminal
punishment in those instances in which the prosecution of the
perpetrators is precarious or problematic?
475. See Roger S. Clark, Medina: An Essay On The Principles Of Criminal
Liability For Homicide, 5 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 59, 70-78 (1973).
476. Id. at 78.
477. See id. at 69-78.
478. Kenneth A. Howard, Command Responsibility For War Crimes, 21 J. PUB.
L. 7, 11 (1972).
479. See Clark, supra note 475.
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V. Good Motive
The motive which animates a criminal act is ordinarily
irrelevant in determining guilt. Consideration of motive is limited
to the sentencing phase. "[O]nce the commission of a crime is
established-the doing of a prohibited act with the necessary
intent-proof of a good motive will not save the accused from
conviction."'  A concern with motive is conceived as an invita-
tion for chaos:
[n]o civilized nation can endure where a citizen can select what
law he would obey because of his moral or religious belief ....
[C]haos would exist if an individual were permitted to impose
his beliefs upon others and invoke justification in a court to
excuse his transgressions of a duly enacted law.41
Motives are immeasurable: one person's magnanimity may
appear malevolent and misguided to another. The introduction of
motive at the guilt-determination phase presents a range of
problems. How can a court establish that a criminal act was
animated by a particular motive? Which motives are exculpatory?
What acts may be excused? How is the balance between harm and
motive calibrated? Must the act achieve the actor's aspiration?
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in upholding the conviction
of anti-Vietnam war protesters who had destroyed draft records,
stated that absolving the defendants would mean that those who
breached the law in order to propel the prosecution of the war
would also merit acquittal. This would invite disorder rather than
democracy: "[n]o legal system could long survive if it gave every
individual the option of disregarding with impunity any law which
by his personal standard was judged morally untenable."'
480. United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336, 338 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd sub
nom., United States v. Eberhardt, 417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 909 (1970). See also United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 114 (lst Cir.),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 997 (1969).
481. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. at 339.
482. United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 910 (1970). The so-called Berrigan instruction provides that:
Intent and motive should never be confused. Motive is that
which prompts a person to act. Intent refers only to the state
of mind with which the act is done. Personal advancement,
financial gain, political reason, religious beliefs, moral convic-
tions or some adherence to a higher law even of nations are
well recognized motives for human conduct. These motives
may prompt one person to voluntary acts of good and another
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Defendant Ernst von Weizsaecker was the most prominent
defendant to proffer the good motive defense, claiming that he
should be acquitted based on his secret resistance to Hitler's
regime. Von Weizsaecker was appointed State Secretary under
Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop in 1938. He was not
privy to the conferences at which Hitler planned his imperialist
program; his role was to carry out the Fihrer's criminal com-
mands. 48
3
Von Weizsaecker claimed to have countered rather than
collaborated with the Nazi regime. He testified that he had been
convinced that the Fuhrer's policies would lead to "death, disaster
and destruction."4" As a result, von Weizsaecker devoted
himself to frustrating Hitler's aspirations and enlisted in the anti-
Nazi resistance. The court rejected von Weizsaecker's good motive
defense and ruled that an altruistic attitude cannot compensate for
criminal conduct.
We reject the claim that good intentions render innocent that
which is otherwise criminal, and which asserts that one may
with impunity commit serious crimes, because he hopes thereby
to prevent others, or that general benevolence toward individu-
als is a cloak or justification for participation in crimes against
the unknown many.'
A defendant seeking exoneration based on the fact that "while
apparently acting affirmatively he was in fact acting negatively" was
required to demonstrate that "he did all that lay in his power to
frustrate a policy which outwardly he appeared to support. If...
to voluntary acts of crime. The law does not recognize political,
religious, moral convictions or some higher law as justification
for the commission of a crime no matter how good that motive
may be. The reason this is so is that such personal motives or
firm beliefs, if you will, would enable the individual holder to
select the law which he would obey according to those beliefs.
These personal convictions could prompt him to steal, rob,
commit assaults upon those holding contrary views and even to
kill, under certain circumstances.
United States v. Pearl, 584 F.2d 1316, 1322 n.6 (4th Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1130 (1979).
483. United States v. von Weizsaecker, XIV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAW No. 10, 314, 340-41 (1950) [hereinafter Ministries Judgment].
484. Id. at 341.
485. Id. at 341-42. The Tribunal noted that the defense that an individual was
opposed to the policies which he or she was carrying out was "readily available to
the most guilty." Id. at 341.
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he so acted, we are not interested in his formal, official declara-
tions, instructions, or interviews with foreign diplomats.
' ' 8
Von Weizsaecker wrote von Ribbentrop in April 1941 advising
against the invasion of the Soviet Union. He believed that this
would detract from the central concern: the defeat of England.
Still, von Weizsaecker maintained a stoic silence and did not
disclose that Germany intended to invade Russia in a meeting with
the Soviet ambassador.48
The Tribunal acquitted von Weizsaecker of waging a war of
aggression based on his challenge to the invasion of Russia. He
was not held responsible for deceiving the Russian ambassador
because he was compelled to communicate through an interpreter
who might not have conveyed the content of the conversation. The
possibility that Hitler might postpone or cancel the invasion also
existed. Most importantly, the revelation of the Russian offensive
would have led to the suffering and death of thousands of. German
conscripts.4s  Von Weizsaecker could certainly not be required
to betray his own country. The Tribunal ruled that "the failure to
advise a prospective enemy of the coming aggression in order that
he may make military preparations which would be fatal to those
who in good faith respond to the call of military duty does not
constitute a crime.
489
Von Weizsaecker also opposed the plans to penetrate the Low
Countries. Yet, he pressured Belgium to accede to Germanauthority while continually denying that the Reich planned to
invade.490 The Tribunal found that such "misdoing[s]" were
overshadowed by von Weizsaecker's continual contesting of
German policy. "Even a stout heart for a time might fail under
these circumstances, and the lethargy of futility take its place....
486. Id. at 356.
487. Ministries Judgment, supra note 483, at 381-82.
488. Id. at 382-83.
489. Id. at 383. "We are not to be understood as holding that one who knows
that a war of aggression has been initiated is to be relieved from criminal
responsibility if he thereafter wages it, or if, with knowledge of its pendency, he
does not exercise such powers and functions as he possesses to prevent its taking
place." Id. Von Wiezsaecker was even more enthusiastic in opposition tothe
Fiihrer's Polish policy. He subtly sent messages to other continental countries to
anticipate an armed invasion, implored Italy to dissuade the Fuihrer and connived
to arrange a peace conference between Germany and Poland. The Tribunal noted
that he "used every means in his power to prevent the catastrophe." Id. at 369.
But, he did attempt to persuade the English to limit their support of Poland.
Ministries Judgment, supra note 483, at 357.
490. Id. at 376-78.
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Even heroes have their bad days, he should not be held to a stricter
test."
491
However, as Foreign Secretary, von Weizsaecker was consulted
on policies pertaining to foreign Jews and was aware of plans for
the Final Solution. 2 There is little evidence that he endeavored
to delay their deportation and death.493 Von Weizsaecker ap-
proved the deportation of six thousand French Jews in March 1944
with the comment, "'to be selected by the police."' Neither von
Weizsaecker nor his deputy, Ernst Woermann,
questioned its propriety, objected ... or protested ... or
availed themselves of the opportunity to suggest ... that even
from the viewpoint of German foreign policy its execution
would be a catastrophic mistake ... [and] would arouse a wave
of horror and resentment throughout the world. Neither
[defendant] ... suggests it was other than a flagrant violation
of international law and ... of the Hague Convention.'
The Tribunal refused to accept von Weizaecker's claim that he
believed that the Jews were in greater peril in France, where they
were subject to reprisals, than in Auschwitz. The defendants
"knew and were well-informed of the fate of any Jew who came
into the tender hands of the SS and Gestapo; they knew what had
been the fate of the Jews of Poland, the Baltic states and Russia;
they knew what had been the horrible fate of German Jews.,
495
Von Weizsaecker pled that he had harbored mental reserva-
tions, but remained in office so as to serve the resistance by
gathering intelligence and to promote peace. The Tribunal stated
that this might be considered in mitigation, but did not constitute
a defense to war crimes or crimes against humanity: "One cannot
give consent to or implement the commission of murder because by
so doing he hopes eventually ... to rid society of the chief
murderer. The first is a crime of imminent actuality while the
491. Id. at 378. The Tribunal initially convicted von Weizsaecker of complicity
in the seizure of Bohemia and Moravia, determining that his opposition was
"anemic" and that he had misled the Czechs, British and French. Id. at 350.
"Silent disapproval is not a defense to action." Id. at 354. The Tribunal later
reversed this finding. See Von Weizsaecker-Order And Memorandum Of The
Tribunal And Separate Memorandum Of Presiding Judge Christianson, id. at 950
[hereinafter Order And Memorandum].
492. Ministries Judgment, supra note at 483, 475-91.
493. Id. at 494.
494. Id. at 496. Initialing a draft signified formal approval, regardless of the
signator's mental reservations. Id at 497.
495. Ministries Judgment, supra note 483, at 497.
CONUNDRUMS OF ARMED CONFLICT
second is but a future hope."4  As State Secretary, von
Weizsaecker was under a duty to resist involvement in war crimes
and crimes against humanity. This obligation is not satisfied by
"saying or doing nothing... . [B]eing a member of that [resistance]
movement did not justify one in becoming a party to the program
of the murder of Jews."" 9  "There is a vast difference between
saying 'no' and saying 'no objection.' The first would exonerate,
the second is criminal." '498 Von Weizsaecker's seven year sen-
tence499 was ultimately reduced to time served. 5°°
Sympathy for the resistance was not enough to exonerate an
official either. Defendant Schwerin von Krosigk, Reich Minister of
Finance and an Oxford-educated Rhodes Scholar, was devoted to
his family and religion and exhibited a stringent and simple
lifestyle. He quelled his purported inner opposition and remained
in office out of a sense of patriotism in order to provide balance in
the bureaucratic debates.5"' As Minister of Finance, he issued
and signed regulations for the levying of fines and the confiscation
of Jewish property.5" Yet, his contributions paled in comparison
to his crimes.
A troubled conscience is not a defense for acts which are
otherwise criminal. Nor can we hold that he who signed,
cosigned, executed, or administered measures which violate
international law, because he thought that acquiescence would
enable him to maintain and safeguard the integrity of his
department and the career of his officials or even the life or
liberty of individuals whose cases came to his attention, but who
by his actions condemned the great inarticulate mass to
persecution, mistreatment, brutality, imprisonment, deportation,
and extermination, escapes responsibility for his conduct.'
496. Id. at 497-98.
497. Id. at 498.
498. Order And Memorandum, supra note 491, at 959.
499. Ministries Judgment, supra note 483, at 866.
500. See Statement of the High Commissioner for Germany, Jan. 31, 1951, upon
Announcing His Final Decisions Concerning Requests for Clemency for War
Criminals Convicted at Nuemberg, XV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10,
1176, 1189 (1950) [hereinafter Ministries Case].
501. Ministries Judgment, supra note 483, at 671-72. He contended that he had
protected civil servants from being purged and had alleviated the crushing billion
dollar fine levied on the Jewish community by Hitler. Nevertheless, von Krosigk
conceded that all those who had come in contact with the Nazi regime had been
corrupted. Id. at 672-73.
502. Id. at 675-79.
503. Id. at 674-75.
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Membership in the resistance was also not an excuse from
responsibility. Wolfram Sievers, business manager of the
Ahnenerbe Society for racial research, and a direct subordinate of
Heinrich Himmler, was responsible for funding and organizing
research. He obtained experimental subjects from the concentra-
tion camps for use in high altitude, freezing, mustard gas, sea water
and typhus experiments. He was also involved in the murder of
112 Jews whose skeletons were used to complete a collection at
Strasbourg University."
Sievers claimed to be a member of a secret resistance move-
ment in 1933. The underground group was dedicated to the
assassination of Hitler and Himmler and to the overthrow of the
Nazi regime. He obtained a position in the Ahnenerbe Society in
order to be close to the Reich leadership. The Tribunal held that,
even if these claims were true, Sievers' underground activities did
not constitute a defense to the murder of "countless thousands of
wretched concentration camp inmates who had not the slightest
means of resistance.... It certainly is not the law that a resistance
worker can commit no crime, and least of all, against the very
people he is supposed to be protecting.""5 5
In some instances defendants unsuccessfully claimed that their
successors would prove pernicious and unprincipled. Franz
Schlegelberger served as Secretary of State in the Justice Ministry
under Reich Minister Franz Guertner. He resigned in August 1942
after roughly eighteen months in office. Schlegelberger asserted
that he had sheltered the justice process from assault by Hitler and
his henchmen. But the price was exorbitant; he converted the
courts into a blunt instrument of racial and political repression.506
Schlegelberger was convicted and sentenced to life imprison-
ment.5 7 The Tribunal observed in the Justice judgment that "he
loathed the evil that he did, but he sold that intellect and that
scholarship to Hitler for a mess of political pottage and for the vain
hope of personal security."' '
504. Medical Judgment, supra note 437, at 254-61.
505. Id. at 263. The fact that an individual joined the resistance following his
departure from the Nazi regime also was not recognized as a defense. See WVHA
Judgment, supra note 432, at 1041 (discussing Hans Hohberg).
506. Justice Judgment, supra note 180, at 1082, 1086.
507. Id. at 2000.
508. Id. at 1087. Schlegelberger was succeeded by Otto Thierack who
permitted the police to usurp the role of the courts. Id. at 1086.
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The occasional kind gesture also did not counter a defendant's
crimes. Defendant Karl Mummenthey managed the German Earth
and Stone Works (DEST) and later directed brick and ceramic
works and quarries owned and, operated by the Security Police.
These industrial plants employed between fourteen and fifteen
thousand inmates.5" At trial, Mummenthey's crimes were neither
mitigated nor excused by his occasional altruistic gestures: "It is
not an unusual phenomenon in life to find an isolated good deed
emerging from an evil man .... [T]he kind deed is not enough to
obliterate ... indifference to the wholesale suffering of which he
could not but be aware .... 510
' Despite the altruistic efforts like Mummenthey's, in 1963 a
Frankfurt court sentenced Doctor Franz Bernhard Lucas to three
years and three months at hard labor."' Lucas had served as a
doctor at Auschwitz and had participated in four selections on the
train ramp in which at least one thousand had been dispatched to
the gas chambers. Lucas was praised by the prisoners for providing
care to the sick and infirm. He had unsuccessfully resisted
involvement in the selections and was "caught in a net and did not
have the strength to get out. 5 12
Advocacy of criminal conduct under certain circumstances may
be justified where the purpose was to avoid more severe harm.
The Tribunals examined two issues related to this point in the case
of Adolf Pakorny: whether the defendant was motivated by a
desire to prevent prospective criminal conduct, and whether the
defendant's proposed penal plan led to substantially less harm than
would have resulted from the original proposal. Pokorny was a
captain in the German Army and a medical officer. He wrote to
Himmler in October 1941, suggesting the use of the drug caladium
seginum as an efficient and effective means of medical sterilization.
He contended that this would accomplish the sterilization of three
million Russians who could then be used as slave labor. At trial
Pokorny claimed that he believed that caladium seginum was
ineffective and that he had hoped to sabotage the sterilization
program. The Tribunal questioned his motivations but found that:
509. WVHA Judgment, supra note 432, at 1051-52.
510. Id. at 1054, Mummenthey was sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 1063-
64. See also Medical Judgment, supra note 437, at 280-81 (discussing Viktor
Brack).
511. Bernd Naumann, AuscHwrrz: A REPORT ON THE PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST EOBERT KARL LUDWIG MULKA AND OTHERS BEFORE THE COURT AT
FRANKFURT 413 (1966) [hereinafter AUSCHWITZ JUDGMENT].
512. Id. at 423-24.
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As monstrous and base as the suggestions in the letter are,
there is not the slightest evidence that any steps were ever
taken to put them into execution by human experimentation.
We find, therefore, that the defendant must be acquitted - not
because of the defense tendered, but in spite of it.513
In contrast, defendant Kurt Blome was Plenipotentiary for
Cancer Research and was charged with participation in the
extermination of Poles. Blome was consulted on a proposal to kill
over two hundred thousand allegedly tubercular Poles. He
protested that this would engender global opposition and persuaded
Himmler to quarantine the consumptives.514
The Tribunal accepted Blome's explanation that opposition
based on humanitarian and moral grounds would have proven
ineffective.
[I]t cannot be held that the letter was not well-worded when
considered as an attempt to put an end to the plan originally
adopted, and to bring the substitution of another plan not so
drastic . . . . [T]he letter did ... divert Himmler from his
original program and ... the extermination plan was aban-
doned."5
Blome persuaded the judges that he was driven by a desire to
derail the extermination plan.516
Although motive is generally irrelevant in the determination
of guilt, it may be considered in mitigating a sentence. Unartic-
ulated opposition or reservations will not exonerate a defendant
because an individual is required to interfere with the implementa-
tion of an illicit policy.518 Tribunals acquitted defendants of
crimes against peace only in those instances in which they actively
opposed such policies. However, protesters were not required to
place principle over patriotism and to betray their country.5 9
War crimes and crimes against humanity were measured
against a stricter standard and were generally not mitigated by a
defendant's secret opposition. 2  Membership in the resis-
513. Medical Judgment, supra note 437, at 294.
514. Id. at 233.
515. Id. at 234.
516. Id. at 233.
517. See supra text accompanying notes 480-82.
518. See supra text accompanying notes 501-505.
519. See supra text accompanying notes 489-505.
520. See supra text accompanying notes 496-500.
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tance,521 the contention that resignation would result in increased
repression 5'2 and isolated altruistic gestures did not constitute a
defense.5" Kurk Blome's actions demonstrated that a defendant
might justify a course of criminal conduct on the ground that it was
less harmful than that contemplated by higher authorities.
524
Motive is too ambiguous in the calculation of criminal liability.
Defendant Erwin Tschentscher provided provisions to the Waffen-
SS concentration camp guards. He attempted to ameliorate the
assistance that he had afforded the camp administration by pointing
to the fact that he had periodically provided pablum to in-
mates. 525 But, the Tribunal concluded that Tschentscher's prima-
ry motive was to insure that the inmates "'would regain a better
physical condition and be able to perform their work better.' 526
Can we be confident of a person's motives? At what point should
cooperation with camp officials in these cases have been counter-
balanced by altruistic gestures? Were any other avenues of
opposition available? Should the law require those in opposition
to risk martyrdom as the price of exoneration?
IV. Reprisals
A. The Hostage Case
A belligerent who violated the humanitarian law of war
traditionally provided monetary compensation to the aggrieved
State. But negotiations were often drawn-out and such payments
could not substitute for the loss of life.527
Military reprisals were recognized in both the American and
British military manuals during World War I as an accepted
method of enforcing the humanitarian law of war.52  Critics
characterized reprisals as a crude instrument which created a
spiraling cycle of violence, much of which was directed at the
innocent. Theodore S. Woolsey opined that "[i]f state A permits
521. See supra notes 505-06 and accompanying text.
522. See supra text accompanying note 506.
523. See supra text accompanying notes 501-512.
524. See supra text accompanying notes 514-16.
525. WVHA Judgment, supra note 432, at 1010-14.
526. Id. at 1015 (emphasis omitted).
527. See Bellot, supra note 23, at 35-36. See also Hague Convention, supra note
218, at art. 3 (requiring the payment of compensation).
528. See Bellot, supra note 23, at 35; Bower, supra note 18, at 27-28. The
Lieber Code of 1863 and the Oxford Code adopted by the Institute of Internation-
al Law in 1880 both recognized reprisals. See Woolsey, supra note 310, at 63-64.
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or orders its soldiers to terrorize a population by violence to
women, by killing non-combatants or shielding a body of men
behind them, by waste and destruction of property, retaliation by
B is neither logical nor civilized. If A bombards Rheims cathedral,
shall B knock down the cathedral of Cologne?"529 Woolsey also
pointed out that the weak lacked the capacity to, retaliate against
the strong: "If Germany uses asphyxiating gases in war with
Serbia, how can Serbia retaliate! How could the Boers reply to
British devastation by wasting England".53 Hugh H. L. Bellot of
Oxford University proclaimed that Prussia's advocacy of reprisals
as the main mechanism for enforcing the humanitarian law of war
"must be denounced as a foul libel upon civilization and humanity
by every self-respecting individual outside Germany."'3  This
inevitably would lead to war degenerating into "mere competitions
of barbarism."5
32
Reprisals were nonetheless recognized as a defense to war
crimes. The German Reichsgericht, as previously explored,
acquitted First Lieutenant Karl Neumann of attacking the hospital
ship Dover Castle. The Tribunal ruled that Neumannn "reasonably
believed that the measures taken by the German Admiralty against
enemy hospital ships were not contrary to international law, but
were legitimate reprisals." '533
The law of reprisals was explained by the American court in
the Hostage judgment. The German Army occupied Yugoslavia
and Greece in April 1941 and the defeated forces faded into the'
population and engaged in guerilla tactics.5" The Wehrmacht
attempted to repress the armed rebellion through reprisals against
the civilian population.5 The Tribunal recognized that interna-
tional law is "prohibitive law" and that the "barbarous practice" of
reprisals had not been outlawed.536 But strict restraints had been
imposed in order to insure that reprisals did not degenerate into a
reign of terror and result in a cycle of continuous chaos and
529. Woolsey, supra note 310, at 66.
530. Id.
531. Hugh H.L. Bellot, War Crimes And War Criminals, XXXVI THE
CANADIAN LAW TIMES 754, 766 (1916).
532. Id.
533. Hospital Ship Dover Castle, supra note-36, at 707.
534. Hostage Judgment, supra note 121, at 1243, 1263.
535. Id. at 1264-65.
536. Id. at 1252.
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crime.537 The court ruled that reprisals against hostages may only
be undertaken as a last resort following the exhaustion of other
remedies. Hostages may only be seized in the event that these
precautionary measures fail to deter attacks and the perpetrators
are not apprehended. 38 Such hostages are to be selected from a
population having some connection with the crimes of the parti-
sans.539 Further, a proclamation must be issued listing the names
and addresses of the hostages seized and must notify the population
that the hostages will be shot in the event of additional armed
attacks. The number of hostages executed must not exceed the
severity of the assault which the shooting is designed to deter. The
order of a military commander to kill hostages must be based upon
the finding of a competent court martial that these requirements
have been meticulously met.5" A hearing may be waived in
exigent circumstances541 but the shooting of hostages, absent the
satisfaction of these requirements, constitutes a war crime in
contravention of international law. 54
2
Field Marshal Wilhelm List, commander of the Armed Forces
Southeast and chief of the military in the Balkans and Greece,
completely disregarded these duties and responded to armed
537. Id. The Tribunal rejected the German theory that fear of reprisal is the
only mechanism for enforcing the humanitarian law of war. Reprisals are not the
exclusive remedy; "[i]f it were, the persons responsible would seldom, if ever, be
brought to account. The only punishment would fall upon the reprisal victims who
are usually innocent of wrongdoing." Id. at 1256.
538. Hostage Judgment, supra note- 121, at 1249-50. These measures may
include one or more of the following: Registration of inhabitants; the issuance of
passes or identification certificates; establishment of restricted areas; limitations of
movement; curfew regulations; the prohibition of assembly; the detention of
suspected persons; limitations on communication; the imposition of restrictions on
food supplies; the evacuation of troublesome areas; the levying of monetary
contributions; compulsory labor to repair damage from sabotage; the destruction
of property in proximity to the site of the crime; and any other regulation not
prohibited by international law that would in all likelihood curtail partisan attacks.
Id.
539. Id. at 1250. "If the act was committed by isolated persons or bands from
distant localities without the knowledge or approval of the population or public
authorities, and which, therefore, neither the authorities nor the population could
have prevented, the basis for the taking of hostages, or the shooting'of hostages
already taken, does not exist." Id. The inhabitants of an occupied territory owe
a duty to refrain from attacks on occupying forces. Id. at 1249. The partisans
were not determined to have complied with the requirements of lawful belligeren-
cy. Hostage Judgment, supra note 121, at 1244.
540. Id. at 1250-51.
541. Id. at 1253.
542. Id. at 1250. The provisions of the American and British manuals are
reprinted in id. at 1251.
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opposition with arbitrary reprisals. One hundred Jews were killed
in Belgrade on July 25, 1941 in retaliation for a sixteen-year old
girl's throwing of a gasoline bottle at a German motor vehicle, an
act allegedly instigated by a Jew. 3  On October 4, 1941, List
directed his troops in Serbia to detain those suspected of "'having
taken part in combat, of having offered the bandits support of any
sort, or of having acted against the armed forces in any way ....
[I]n the event that bandits appear, or anything against the armed
forces is undertaken in the territory mopped up or in their home
localities . . . they are to be shot."'
54
List subsequently distributed an order which called for the
execution of one hundred reprisal prisoners in retaliation for the
killing of a German soldier on one occasion, and the execution of
fifty reprisal prisoners in retaliation for the wounding of a German
soldier on another. The Tribunal concluded that an order to
engage in reprisals at this arbitrary ratio was both excessive and
unwarranted and constitutes a violation of international law. Such
a command "appears to have been made more for the purposes of
revenge than as a deterrent to future illegal acts which would vary
in degree in each particular instance .... International law places
no such unrestrained and unlimited power in the hands of the
commanding general of occupied territory." 45
Reprisals were ruthlessly carried out by List's troops. As many
as twenty-one hundred Jews and Gypsies were shot near the
Serbian town of Topola in October 1941 in retaliation for the
killing of twenty-two German soldiers. Almost nine-hundred of the
victims had been selected from hostage camps. There was no
evidence that the inhabitants of Topola had either engaged in or
had supported the armed attack. Nor was there a connection
between the hostage camp victims and the provocation.5 46 List
received notice of reprisals through reports routed to his headquar-
ters. Yet, he did not condemn or call the culprits to account. The
Tribunal found List guilty of a serious breach of duty for "compla-
543. Hostage Judgment, supra note 121, at 1263.
544. Id. at 1265-66. General Franz Boehme, commander of German troops in
Serbia, supplemented this order on Oct. 10, 1941 with a decree calling for the
execution of one hundred prisoners or hostages for each German soldier killed;
and the execution of fifty prisoners or hostages for each German soldier wounded.
Id. at 1266.
545. Id. at 1270.
546. Id.
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cently permitt[ing] thousands ... to die before the execution
squads of the Wehrmacht ....
Defendant Walter Kuntze, Deputy Armed Forces Commander
Southeast and Commander in Chief of the 12th Army in the
Balkans, and Lothar Rendulic, Commander in Chief of the 2d
Panzer Army in Croatia, were convicted along with List. Over
eleven thousand hostages were shot and another twenty thousand
were scheduled for execution in the first month of Kuntze's
command.5" Kuntze issued a directive on March 19, 1942 stating
that "'the more unequivocal and the harder reprisal measures are
applied from the beginning the less it will become necessary to
apply them at a later date. No false sentimentalities! It is prefera-
ble that 50 suspects are liquidated than one German soldier loses
his life . . . .""' In those instances in which the partisans who
perpetrated an attack were not apprehended, "'reprisal measures
of a general kind may be .. . advisable, for instance the shooting
to death of all male inhabitants from the nearest villages according
to a definite ratio (for instance, 1 German dead - 100 Serbs; 1
German wounded - 50 Serbs).""'55  Kuntze was judged guilty for
issuing illicit orders and for failing to take steps to curtail the
unlawful killings."'
Similarly, Rendulic ordered that attacks on the Wehrmacht
were to be answered by shooting or hanging hostages, destroying
surrounding villages and arresting males capable of bearing arms.
Fifty were to be executed in reprisal for the killing of a German;
and twenty-five were to be executed in retaliation for the wounding
of a German." 2 Rendulic received reports of reprisals and yet
failed to ensure that the threshold conditions had been satisfied.
He made no effort to apprehend those responsible for the attacks,
public proclamations were not issued concerning the detention and
death of hostages, and no court martial proceedings were conduct-
ed. Hostages with no connection to the attack were killed without
trial.553
The Tribunal concluded that the taking of reprisals "became
so common that the German commanders became indifferent to
547. Hostage Judgment, supra note 121, at 1272.
548. Id. at 1277.
549. Id. at 1277-78.
550. Id. at 1278.
551. Id. at 1278-79.
552. Hostage Judgment, supra note 121, at 1289.
553. Id. at 1290-91.
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the seriousness of the acts. They appear to have been accepted as
legitimate acts of war with the extent of their use limited only by
the whim or judgment of divisional commanders."s 4 The evi-
dence indicates that "the practice of killing ... got completely out
of hand, legality was ignored, and arbitrary action became the
accepted policy." '555 Jews, Gypsies and suspected Communists
were singled out to be shot. The court stated that reprisals directed
against a certain race or group "irrespective of the circumstances
... sounds more like vengeance than an attempt to deter ...
criminal acts ... [and] contravenes established rules. This is a
matter which a judicial proceeding should determine from available
evidence." '556
The Hostage case established that reprisals must conform to
various restrictions and restraints. The mere claim that a criminal
act was a reprisal was not recognized as a justification. 7
B. Other War Crimes Prosecutions
SS Obersturmbannfiihrer Friedrich Ernst Flesch headed the
Security Police in Northern Norway. He ordered the arrest and
execution of a number of Norwegian citizens, six of whom were
shot. Flesch contended that this was in retaliation for the illegal
activities of the Norwegian underground. The victims were shot in
the back to give the impression that they had been killed while
escaping.11s
The Norwegian Lagmannsrett found that the Germans had not
publicly proclaimed that the shootings were reprisals. Flesch
claimed that the killings were intended to deter the continuance of
guerilla attacks but the court ruled that guerilla warfare was not
necessarily contrary to international law. British brigades had been
sent into Norway to sabotage factories but these attacks, for the
most part, were carried out by uniformed combatants and did not
constitute breaches of international law. The retaliatory killings
ordered by Flesch, though, were not legitimate reprisals. They
554. Id.
555. Id. at 1299.
556. Id. at 1303.
557. See supra text accompanying notes 528-57.
558. Trial Of Gerhard Friedrich Ernst Flesch, SS Obertsurmbannfiihrer,
Oberregierungsrat (Frostating Lagmannsrett, Nov.-Dec. 1946 and Sup. Ct. Norway,
Feb. 1948), VI LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 111, 114-15 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n 1948).
CONUNDRUMS OF ARMED CONFLICT
were acts of terrorism designed to deter the population from
supporting the underground opposition."
Three members of the German security force contended, in a
related case, that their torture of partisans constituted justifiable
reprisals. The Norwegian Lagmannsrett determined that the
underground's activities had been limited to military training and
that the partisans had not attacked German forces. The resistance
thus had not contravened international law.'6° German forces
had never publicly proclaimed that their acts of torture were
intended to modify the illicit conduct of the partisans. Such abuse,
in fact, was routinely used to punish or to elicit confessions from
suspects.5 61The most significant reprisal cases centered on the Ardeatine
Cave killings. A bomb exploded in March 1944 on Rosella Street
in Rome, killing thirty-two German police. Hitler directed Field
Marshal Albert Kesselring, the Commander of Army Group C in
Italy, to execute ten Italians in retribution for each German police
officer killed. The order was passed on to General Eberhard von
Mackensen, Commander of the German 14th Army in Rome, who
in turn, telephoned the accused, General Maelzer, who was the
military commander in Rome. Maelzer then conveyed the
command to Lieutenant Colonel Kappler, head of the Security
Service in Rome, who was responsible for prisons.
5 62
Kappler testified that he informed von Mackensen and
Maelzer that the requisite number of reprisal prisoners was not
available, but that he would compile a list of 280 people "'worthy
of death."' The latter included those who were awaiting execution
or serving long sentences as well as those who had been detained
for partisan activities or acts of sabotage. The defense contended
that Kappler privately promised von Mackensen that only prisoners
confronting capital punishment would be executed, but that he
would nevertheless issue a communique that 320 had been shot.
Both the defense and prosecution stipulated that Kappler had
559. Id. at 115-16. The judgment was confirmed by the Norwegian Supreme
Court. Id. at 118 (decision of the Supreme Court).
560. Trial Of Kriminalsekretar Richard Wilhelm Hermann Bruns And Two
Others (Eidsivating Lagmannsrett, Mar. 20, 1946 and Supreme Court Of Norway,
July 3, 1946), III LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 15, 18 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n. 1948).
561. Id. at 19 (Decision of the Supreme Court).
562. Trial Of General Von Mackensen And General Maelzer (Brit. Milit. Ct.,
Rome, Nov. 1830, 1945), VIII LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 1 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n 1949).
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informed the defendants that only four of the proposed victims had
been connected with the bombing."6
Kappler executed 335 people, claiming that thirty-three
Germans had died and that the Italian police had inadvertently
included an additional five prisoners. The victims ranged in age
from fourteen to seventy. Fifty-seven were Jews not affiliated with
the partisans and a number of them were not even Italian. The
victims were gathered in the Ardeatine Cave on March 24 and shot
at close range. They were divided into groups of five, each of
which was required to kneel on top, or beside, the corpses of the
previous victims. The cave was blown up following the execu-
tions."6
Von Mackensen and Maelzer contended that this reprisal was
required to deter additional attacks. They wanted to dampen the
harshness of Hitler's execution order by limiting the killings to
those confronting death or long-term imprisonment. Both were
sentenced to death, which was later commuted to life imprison-
ment.5 65 There was uncertainty as to whether the British Military
Court determined that the reprisals were unreasonable, excessive,
or were carried out in an unnecessarily cruel fashion. The manifest
illegality of the command presumably prevented von Mackensen
from pleading superior orders566
Field Marshal Albert Kesselring was convicted in a separate
trial. Kesselring testified that Kappler had informed him that there
were a sufficient number of convicts confronting capital punishment
available to satisfy the reprisal order. Kesselring then proceeded
to issue the command to "'kill 10 Italians for every German. Carry
out immediately.,' 5 67  Kesselring also instructed his troops to
aggressively attack Italian partisans. He pledged in June 1944 to
protect any commander who severely and swiftly sanctioned the
563. Id. at 1-2.
564. Id. at 2.
565. Id.
566. Id. at 7-8 (Notes on the Case). An unreasonable reprisal would include
the unwarranted taking of lives. Reprisals taken at a ten-to-one ratio also may
have been determined to be excessive. The court presumably did not feel it
necessary to address the significance of the fact that a plurality of the reprisal
prisoners had been sentenced to death. U.N. War Crimes Comm'n 1949, supra
note 562, at 7.
567. The Trial Of Albert Kesselring (Brit. Milit. Ct., Venice, Italy, Feb. 17,
1947), VIII LAW REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 9 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n 1949).
Kesselring testified that he had omitted the term "'hostages' in order to avoid the
killing of persons not sentenced to death. I at 10.
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guerrillas.5" A month later he ordered the arrest of a portion of
the male population in partisan-infested areas. These detainees
were to be shot in the event of violence. Villages from which shots
had been directed against German troops were also to be immolat-
ed. Kesselring admonished his troops that "'fa]ll counter measures
must be hard[;] .... [T]he dignity of the German soldier demands
it."'569  Over a thousand innocents were subsequently killed by
German combatants, compelling Kesselring to remind his troops to
control their conduct.57
Kesselring was sentenced to death, later commuted to life
imprisonment.571 Regarding the Ardeatine Cave massacre, the
Judge Advocate stated that there had been no organized opposition
in Italy with which to negotiate. The only avenue available to the
Germans may have been to shoot hostages but the execution of
five of the hostages was not a legitimate reprisal and constituted a
war crime." The Judge Advocate also argued that Kesselring's
reprisal orders against the Italian partisans were deliberately
drafted and designed to incite and result in the types of excesses
engaged in by German troops.5 73
Similar acts by the Germans took place in the Netherlands.
Albert Rauter, Higher S.S. and Police Leader and General
Commissioner for Public Safety in the occupied Netherlands, was
the second highest-ranking Nazi official. He was accused of
directing illegal reprisals against civilians, including collecting fines,
pillage, detention, and mass executions.574 He acknowledged that
he ordered the shooting of innocents and conceded that the
expression in public announcements, "'shot while attempting to
escape,"' was a euphemism for summarily shooting the victim.575
The Netherlands Tribunal sentenced Rauter to death576 because
his commands contravened the humanitarian law of war. He
exerted no effort to apprehend the perpetrators under his com-
mand and executed hostages as an act of "revenge or intimidation
568. Id. at 10.
569. Id. at 10-11.
570. Id. at 11.
571. The Trial of Albert Kesselring, supra note 567, at 12.
572. Id. at 12-13 (Notes on the Case).
573. Id. at 13-14.
574. Trial Of Hans Albin Rauter (Netherlands Special Court, 'S-Gravenhage,
May 4, 1948 and Netherlands Special Court of Cassation, Jan. 12, 1949), XIV LAW
REP. TRIALS OF WAR CRIM. 89, 91-92 (U.N. War Crim. Conun'n 1949)
[hereinafter Rauter Judgment].
575. Id. at 104.
576. Id. at 107.
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•... [B]y killing several hostages at a time for the death of one...
German ... he... committed excessive reprisals in violation of the
rule requiring due proportion. '" 577  The court noted that
"'Germany is the only country in modern times which has proceed-
ed with the killing of innocent citizens in occupied territory for the
purpose of maintaining peace and order... in a manner contrary
to the most elementary conceptions of humanity and justice."'5 7
The Netherlands Special Court of Cassation considered the
case on appeal and held that Germany had carried out a war of
aggression against the Netherlands and had engaged in illegal
occupation policies. Members of the indigenous population were
entitled to resist the Reich, and Germany was authorized to punish
those who breached the boundaries of law and order. However,
the Germans were not entitled to retaliate against innocents in
order to dampen opposition. Reprisals were a response to State
criminality and were not to be deployed to deter partisan attacks
in occupied territories. 57
9
In the majority of cases, tribunals approved the reprisal
execution of hostages subject to reasoned restraints. Those who
engaged in or ordered excessive, unnecessary, or unreasonable
reprisals were criminally convicted.5" Only the Netherlands
Special Court of Cassation clearly condemned reprisal killings in
occupied territories. 8 1  There was a suggestion in a British
Military Court that, under some circumstances, even innocents
might be justifiably killed.582
Still, a question remains as to whether publicly proclaimed,
proportional executions of those connected with the perpetrators
of armed attacks should receive judicial endorsement. Reprisals
are rationalized in the interests of public safety and order. But,
should an occupying power supplement or withdraw its forces
rather than engage in reprisals? Will hostage reprisals encourage
577. Id. at 131 (Notes on the Case).
578. Id. at 130 (Notes on the Case).
579. Rauter Judgment, supra note 574, at 132-38 (Notes on the Case). The
Hague Convention was silent on inter-State reprisals, but prohibited collective
penalties by an occupying power. Id. at 133. See Hague Convention, supra note
218, at art. 50 (prohibiting collective penalties); Nuremberg Charter, supra note 81,
at art. 6(b) (prohibiting execution of hostages). Reprisals, in the view of the court,
were appropriate in the case of acts attributed to a belligerent State. Such
reprisals were inapplicable in instances of individual action. Rauter Judgment,
supra note 574, at 132, 137-38.
580. See supra text accompanying notes 528-58.
581. See supra text accompanying note 580.
582. See supra text accompanying note 573.
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rather than end violence? Do reprisals blur the boundaries
between lawful belligerents and protected persons? Is collective
responsibility being substituted for individual liability? Will
domestic military tribunals effectively encumber hostage repri-
sals?5 83
The Judge Advocate, in the trial of von Manstein, questioned
the killing of reprisal hostages. The Advocate noted that such
executions defy the dictate that an occupant respect the lives of
inhabitants. He also opined that such killings contravene the
Martens Clause in the preamble to the Hague Convention. This
provides that, in cases not covered by the Convention, "'inhabitants
of the belligerents remain under the protection and governance of
the principles of the law of nations derived from the usages
established among civilized peoples from the laws of humanity and
from the dictates of public conscience. ' ' '
584
VI. Conclusion
War crimes tribunals have generally restricted the scope of
defenses in order to preserve and protect the sanctity of the
humanitarian law of war. The rules of the code of conflict were
viewed as having already incorporated the relevant conditions of
the Law of War and these provisions had thus achieved a balance
between the competing considerations of humanitarianism and
war's necessities.
The contemporary code of conflict is concerned with confining
conflict and circumscribing the harm to protected persons.
Developing doctrinal defenses for enemy combatants accused of
criminal conduct is of secondary significance.- In the past,
defenses were structured to restrict reliance on superior orders,
limit the scope of military necessity and extend vicarious responsi-
bility to military commanders. The good motive defense was
rejected and individual necessity, although liberally interpreted in
583. See supra notes 528-80. Reprisals are prohibited under contemporary
military. conventions. See Protocol I, supra note 274, at arts. 20 (prohibiting
reprisals against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked) 51(6) (prohibiting reprisal
attacks on civilians). Commentators generally agree that reprisals are prohibited
under the United Nations Charter. See Gregory Francis Intoccia, American
Bombing Of Libya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
177, 198-200 (1987). But see Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help In Combatting State-
Sponsored Terrorism: Self Defense and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 243, 282-86 (1987).
584. Quoted in von Manstein Judgment, supra note 334, at 519.
585. See supra text accompanying notes 310-49.
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the trials of industrialists, was limited to a proportionate response
to an imminent threat. This rationale recognized that individuals
confronting calamities will invariably act in their own self-interest
and cannot be deterred by the threat of sanction. The imposition
of criminal punishment in such situations will only succeed in
bringing the law into disrepute.16 The defenses also incorporated
a guilty knowledge or reasonableness requirement rather than
impeding prosecutions with a less settled subjective standard. The
requirement gave some discretion to tribunals in determining
whether to impute criminal knowledge or intent to a defendant."
Reprisal against hostages is an anomaly in that it condones
retribution against innocents. Such an unfortunate practice
recognizes the need to reinforce and respect the reciprocal rights
and obligations of the occupant and the inhabitants of the occupied
territory. American tribunals substantially limited the availability
of this remedy through the imposition of procedural prerequisites.
There is no reported instance in which a defendant during World
War II successfully relied on the defense of lawful reprisal in an
American court. 88
In each of the war crimes cases the defendants face a dilemma:
whether to conform and thus commit crimes, or to assert their
autonomy and risk retribution. The collective view of war crimes
courts is that combatants' duty of obedience to domestic doctrine
is limited by the principles of the humanitarian law of war. The
prototype is a soldier conversant with the code of war and the
conditions of his command. The combatant is charged to resist
illegality and to curb criminal conduct, and necessity is subordinate
to the absolute adherence to the code of conflict. This rationale
provides a rule of moral conduct but defies human inclinations.
The code's effectiveness is further reduced by the modest probabili-
ty that a combatant will confront criminal consequences. The
violence inherent in war inevitably results in trials which engage in
"selective prosecution" or "victor's justice.""
The integrity of trials is also weakened by the incomplete,
imprecise character of the law of war. Aerial combatants, for
instance, appear to have almost complete immunity from criminal
prosecution since military targets encompass an enormous range of
586. See supra text accompanying notes 17-480.
587. See generally supra text accompanying notes 191-192, 206, and 226-27.
588. See supra text accompanying notes 528-85.
589. See generally supra text accompanying notes 144-45, 164, and 289-91.
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sites. The result is substantial collateral damage from aerial
attacks59°
In the final analysis, there is a chasm between common
criminals and conscripts charged with crime in combat. The realist
cannot avoid discomfort in judging soldiers by the same standards
of the peacetime conditions of the common law. Courts typically
minimize the significance of trained obedience and the cataclysmic
circumstances of military conflict. Yet, recognition of such realities
would reduce respect for the integrity of the humanitarian law of
war.5 9' The distance between the code and conditions of conflict
is enhanced by the problems encountered in enforcing the humani-
tarian law of war. The chaos of war and the code of complicity
among armed comrades complicate the reconstruction of events
and the apprehension and prosecution of offenders. 2
Doctrinal discussions of the humanitarian law of war may
divert attention from the destruction accompanying armed conflict.
Ultimately, we must guard against being satisfied with simply
ameliorating, rather than abolishing, war.593
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